Lobbying of the accounting standard-setter by South Africa companies by Gaie-Booysen, Felicia
 
 
LOBBYING OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTER 
 BY SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES 
 
 
by 
 
 
FELICIA GAIE-BOOYSEN  
 
 
Dissertation submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN ACCOUNTING SCIENCES 
 
at the 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: J.A.C. Bosman 
CO-SUPERVISOR: Professor H.C. Wingard 
 
 
JUNE 2016 
 
i 
 
 
Student number: 3333-003-4 
 
DECLARATION 
I declare that the dissertation entitled LOBBYING OF THE ACCOUNTING 
STANDARD-SETTER BY SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES is my own work, that all 
the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by 
means of complete references, and that this work has not been submitted before for 
any other degree at any other institution. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________   10/09/2016_______________ 
SIGNATURE   DATE 
F.F. GAIE-BOOYSEN   
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to extend my sincerest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Christa Wingard 
and Mr Jan Bosman, for their excellent guidance, insightful comments and 
continuous support during the writing of my dissertation. Your academic contributions 
throughout this study period were extremely valuable. 
 
A special thank you to Professor Zanné Koppeschaar, Chair of the Department of 
Financial Governance at Unisa, for providing me with the necessary time, resources 
and support to conduct my research. 
 
I am sincerely grateful for the assistance of a highly skilled and professional 
statistician, Mr Hennie Gerber from Unisa. Thank you for your knowledge, insight and 
time in helping me to convert the data into useful findings.  
 
I wish to acknowledge the excellent contribution of my language editor,  
Mrs Moya Joubert.   Thank you for refining the wording of this dissertation. 
 
I am most grateful to the respondents who provided the data necessary to conduct 
this research. 
 
I wish to extend my heartfelt appreciation to my husband, Kevin Booysen, for his 
steadfast support, numerous sacrifices and love. Thank you for your encouragement. 
I dedicate this work to you. 
 
I am eternally thankful to my parents, Joe and Freesia Gaie, for their guidance, 
wisdom, love and support. You are both an example of excellence. 
 
Above all, I thank my Heavenly Father for affording me the opportunity, resources 
and grace to complete this journey. 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examined the lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) by South African companies. The aim of this study was to establish the timing 
and methods of lobbying of the IASB by South African companies.  
 
Central to this study was the seminal work of Sutton (1984), predicting when and how 
companies lobby an accounting standard-setter. The research hypotheses for this 
study were formulated on the basis of Sutton’s (1984) predictions.  
 
The online questionnaire in this study was distributed to the top 100 JSE primary 
listed companies in order to collect primary data to test the four hypotheses regarding 
the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African 
companies.  
 
The findings of the empirical investigation indicated that most South African 
companies lobby later in the due process of the IASB and prefer using their auditors 
to support their views at the IASB. The findings are subject to certain limitations that 
are addressed in the study.   
 
Lastly, the researcher provided recommendations for future research in accounting 
standard-setting in South Africa. 
Key words: accounting standard-setting, accounting standards, due process, 
effectiveness, lobbying, lobbying methods, International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA), rational choice theory, stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The actions or attempts by parties to influence a rule-making body are collectively 
referred to as lobbying (Sutton, 1984:81). Harris and Lock (1996:315) describe 
lobbying as “…mobilising opinion to exert pressure on public authorities for 
commercial gain or competitive advantage”.  
 
History abounds with examples of well-known lobbyists exerting pressure on 
legislators for their own advantage. By far the most famous lobbyist was Samuel 
Ward, “the king of the lobby” in the United States of America (US) during the post-
Civil War period (Jacob, 2012:477). He cunningly organised society dinners with 
influential people and congressmen as a method of lobbying for or against proposed  
legislation (Jacob, 2012:490). He is known to have used his elegant dinners as an 
opportunity to pressure congressmen to sneak certain statutes, which he was paid to 
advocate, through the US Congress (Jacob, 2012:489). He did not perceive these 
extravagant dinners as a form of bribery but instead as a method to strengthen his 
political friendships (Jacob, 2012:490). Jacob (2012:490) ascribes the following 
compliment to Samuel Ward: 
 
“No one had ever before used canvas-back ducks and Maryland terrapin, fine 
wines and savoir faire to lobby as systematically, with as much forethought, or 
to better effect than he.” 
 
Although Samuel Ward’s method of lobbying is not an official lobbying method in the 
context of this study, the strategy of using extravagant dinners as a lobbying 
opportunity is a fitting example of the extent to which a lobbyist will go in order to 
influence a legislative process. 
 
Lobbying is considered to be a highly rational response in a democracy  
(Downs, 1957:141) and is also beneficial to the maintenance of a legislative system 
(Patterson, 1963:72). Lobbyists provide the legislator with important information on 
the impact of its policies on the public, organisations or specific interest groups 
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(Caldeira and Wright, 1998:504). Therefore, lobbyists are not only the 
representatives of views but are also crucial in the communication process with the 
legislator (Patterson, 1963:73). For these reasons, the right to petition and also the 
right to lobby the government are protected in South Africa in section 17 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa. South African Government, 
1996). 
  
Accounting standards are regulations, and owing to their nature, attract substantial 
opposition when they are perceived by constituents to have a negative  
impact (Sutton, 1984:81). It is then not surprising that accounting standard-setters 
are also the target of lobbying efforts. The accounting standards issued by an 
accounting standard-setter have economic consequences (Wagenhofer, 2011:229) 
and may impact, inter alia, on a company’s future cash  
flows (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978:132), accounting numbers and disclosure 
(Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens & Van der Tas, 2010:28), information-processing load 
(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:602) and corporate value  
(Mathur and Singh, 2011:252). In light of these consequences, companies may 
attempt to influence, in the pursuit of self-preservation, the outcome of an accounting 
standard (Georgiou, 2004:222). The lobbying of accounting standards is therefore 
expected, given its impact on various stakeholders. 
1.1.1 Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory 
Lobbying of an accounting standard-setter is explained by Sutton (1984:81) in a 
seminal and comprehensive study on the subject in general. In terms of the rational 
choice model, Sutton (1984:93) argues that a rational individual will only lobby an 
accounting standard-setter by considering the probability of affecting the outcome, 
the potential benefits of succeeding and the costs of his or her lobbying efforts.  
 
Sutton’s (1984:81) submissions in this regard are primarily based on economist 
Anthony Down’s (1957) theoretical framework of voting behaviour. Down’s (1957) 
theoretical framework predicts when a constituent will vote and which voting methods 
he or she will employ based on his or her own benefit-cost analysis. Sutton (1984:83) 
applies Down’s rational choice model to formulate lobbying behaviour as follows: 
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A lobbyist will lobby an accounting standard-setter only when the potential benefit 
derived from the difference in two potential outcomes (𝑈𝑎 −  𝑈𝑏 ) of the standard-
setting process, multiplied by the probability of influencing the accounting standard-
setter decision (𝑃), exceeds the cost (𝐶) of the lobbyist’s efforts. It follows that the 
lobbyist will lobby when 𝑃(𝑈𝑎 −  𝑈𝑏) > 𝐶.  
 
Based on the cost-benefit framework established under the rational choice theory 
above, Sutton (1984) predicts the timing and methods of lobbying the accounting 
standard-setter. Twenty years after Sutton’s (1984) predictions explaining lobbying of 
the accounting standard-setter, Georgiou (2004) adopted Sutton’s theoretical 
framework to explain the methods, timing and effectiveness of lobbying of accounting 
standards in the UK by preparers of financial statements. The empirical study by 
Georgiou (2004) provides strong support for the relevance and application of  
Sutton’s (1984) hypotheses regarding lobbying, even after 20 years since the 
origination of Sutton’s theoretical framework. This study relied on the seminal work 
by these two leading researchers. 
 
The accounting standard-setting process provides lobbyists with various 
opportunities to raise their views on a proposed accounting standard. In order to 
grasp the timing and methods of corporate lobbying of accounting standards an 
understanding of the accounting standard-setting process itself is required. 
1.1.2 The due process of developing International Accounting Standards 
The development of accounting standards, namely International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), is assigned to the International Accounting Standards Boards 
(IASB). The IASB has a mandate of developing “… in the public interest, a set of high 
quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting 
standards based on clearly articulated principles” (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:5). 
 
In light of the potential impact a new IFRS may have on companies, as discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs, the IASB invites the participation of various stakeholders 
throughout the standard-setting process. Consultation and stakeholder engagement 
form an integral part of the IASB’s process of developing accounting standards  
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(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:8). The process of the IASB for developing IFRS is referred 
to as the “due process” of the IASB and affords affected parties various opportunities 
to influence the outcome of an IFRS. The due process of the IASB serves as a 
“dispute resolution mechanism” when developing new accounting standards or 
amending current accounting standards (Wingard, Bosman & Amisi, 2016).  
 
The due process of the IASB is formalised and contained in the Due Process 
Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a) and is subject to the review of Due Process 
Oversight Committee (DPOC) (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:6). The due process of the 
IASB ensures transparency, accessibility and accountability throughout the standard-
setting process (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:8). The IASB was commended for its 
transparent due process of standard-setting in the 2007 Global Accountability Report 
(Lloyd, Oatham & Hammer, 2007:44). The report reveals that the IASB has advanced 
capabilities for engaging external stakeholders in its decision-making processes 
(Lloyd et al, 2007:36). 
 
Any proposed accounting standard or major changes to an accounting standard are 
subjected to the various stages of due process of the IASB, as contained in the Due 
Process Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a). The stages are summarised in figure 
1.1 below. 
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FIGURE 1.1 – The due process of the IASB to develop IFRS
 
 
Source: Own observation from the Due Process Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a) 
 
The first stage in the due process of developing an IFRS is to determine if an 
accounting issue warrants the IASB’s attention as a project. The importance of an 
accounting issue is determined by the IASB through formally consulting with the 
public by way of a document called the “Request for Information” and/or through its 
research programmes (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:21). During this period, respondents 
have the opportunity to raise their financial reporting concerns in a comment letter in 
response to the Request for Information issued by the IASB, which is then analysed 
and if deemed necessary, prioritised by the IASB in its technical work programme 
(agenda) (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22). The research programme of the IASB also 
plays a pivotal role during this stage by identifying topical accounting issues for its 
agenda (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22).  
 
The main output of a Request for Information and the research programme is to 
issue a discussion paper on the proposed accounting standard in order to further 
consult with interested parties on the accounting issue (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:23). 
The discussion paper contains a summary of the accounting issue at hand and the 
IASB’s preliminary views on the accounting issue (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:23). The 
Agenda formation 
(development of a 
technical work programme)  
Drafting of a discussion 
paper 
Exposure (comment) 
period of a discussion 
period 
Publishing an exposure 
draft 
Exposure (comment) 
period of an exposure draft 
Publishing the final 
accounting standard 
Post implementation 
review 
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issue of a discussion paper for each proposed accounting standard or amendment is 
not a mandatory step in the due process of the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:15). 
 
Once all matters or concerns resulting from the discussion papers have been 
addressed, the IASB develops an exposure draft for comment from all stakeholders 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:28). The exposure draft is in the form of the proposed final 
accounting standard (IFRS). During the comment period of the exposure draft, 
various stakeholders have the opportunity to raise their concerns on the proposed 
accounting standard by submitting a written comment letter to the IASB. At the end of 
the comment period, the IASB summarises the major issues raised in the comment 
letters of stakeholders (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:30). It then attends to these issues 
by doing additional field work, holding public hearings and consulting with various 
professional bodies (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:31). Once all issues arising from the 
exposure draft have been resolved, the IASB informs the DPOC that re-exposure 
drafts are not necessary (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:31). The final IFRS is then 
published by the IASB as an accounting standard (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:31). 
 
After the issue of the final IFRS, usually two years since the IFRS has been applied 
by constituents, the IASB conducts a post-implementation review. The purpose of 
this review is to determine the effect that a new IFRS has had on preparers of 
financial statements, auditors and investors (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). In order to 
gather this information, the IASB issues a Request for Information to gather 
comments from constituents and also conducts various consultative activities  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). 
 
It is evident from the above description of the due process that stakeholders have 
various formal opportunities during the due process to raise their views and concerns 
on a proposed IFRS with the IASB. Stakeholder participation in the consultative 
processes that form part of the due process of the IASB is considered a formal 
method of lobbying (Jorissen et al, 2010:4).  
 
The next section discusses how South African companies formally participate in the 
due process of the IASB. 
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1.1.3 South Africa’s role in accounting standard-setting 
The Accounting Practices Board (APB) was the official accounting standard-setter in 
South Africa before the promulgation of the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill in 2011 
(Stainbank, 2010:63). The APB issued accounting standards as statements of South 
African Generally accepted accounting Practice (SA GAAP), which were primarily 
based on international accounting standards (Venter and Stiglingh, 2006:87). In 
2003, after various conversion projects, the statements of SA GAAP issued by the 
APB were an exact replica of IFRS (Venter and Stiglingh, 2006:87).  
 
In 2005, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) required all listed companies to 
report their financial statements in accordance with IFRS (Venter and Stiglingh, 
2006:87). Non-listed companies continued with the use of SA GAAP as financial 
reporting standards. In February 2012, a decision was taken to completely withdraw 
SA GAAP as the financial reporting standards and only allow IFRS or IFRS for SMEs 
as a basis for the preparation of financial statements of South African companies 
(IFRS Foundation, 2015b). 
 
The APB is not the only role player in accounting standard-setting in South Africa. 
The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) plays a significant role 
in accounting standard-setting by serving as the secretariat to the APB (Gloeck, 
2003:71).  
 
In essence, SAICA manages the accounting standard-setting process on the APB’s 
behalf in South Africa (Gloeck, 2003:71). SAICA manages the process by issuing the 
IASB’s exposure drafts on proposed accounting standards for comments in South 
African (Stainbank, 2010). SAICA is also tasked with analysing and interpreting the 
comments it receives from South African stakeholders to determine the dominant 
concerns on a proposed accounting standard from a South African perspective 
(Gloeck, 2003:71). These concerns from stakeholders are considered by SAICA, and 
its technical committees and are then compiled by SAICA in one comment letter to 
the IASB. This process affords South African stakeholders opportunities to formally, 
but indirectly, participate in the consultative process of the IASB. Obviously, South 
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African stakeholders may also directly participate in the IASB’s standard-setting 
process by writing a comment letter to the IASB.   
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
An examination of extant research indicates that very few comment letters are written 
by South African stakeholders directly to the IASB compared to the number written 
by stakeholders in developed countries. Gloeck (2003:73) found in his research on 
South African accounting standard-setting practices that South African companies 
are not actively involved during the comment period despite comment invitations by 
SAICA during the consultation period of an exposure draft.  
 
The limited number of comment letter submissions by South African companies 
during the consultative periods of the accounting standard-setter has also been 
observed in other studies. Larson’s (1997:185) study of 288 comment letters on 17 
exposure drafts issued between 1989 to 1994 showed that during this five-year 
period, only three South African stakeholders responded to the invitations to 
comment. These three South African respondents wrote 12 comment letters over a 
five-year period compared to 121 comment letters from respondents in the US and 
43 comment letters from respondents in the UK over a five-year period  
(Larson, 1997:185).  
 
Also, Stainbank (2010) investigated the responses from South African stakeholders 
on the exposure draft IFRS for SMEs issued by SAICA in 2007. Stainbank’s 
(2010:64) investigation showed that only 14 comment letters on the exposure draft 
IFRS for SMEs were received by SAICA from South African stakeholders during the 
comment period. Stainbank (2010:62) argues that the reason for this low response 
rate is the highly technical nature of the accounting standard at hand. Larson and 
Hertz (2013) analysed comment letters received by the IASB regarding 57 
accounting issues from 2001 to 2008. Their geographical analysis shows that South 
Africa constituted 3% of the worldwide comment letter writers over this period  
(Larson and Hertz, 2013:16). 
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In light of the research mentioned above, it is evident that there is hardly any 
participation by South African stakeholders during a comment period of a proposed 
accounting standard. One should, however, not assume that the low number of 
comment letters is proof that South African stakeholders do not lobby accounting 
standard-setters. Instead, it is suggested by Gloeck (2003:73), that South African 
stakeholders have found alternative means of influencing the accounting standard-
setting process.  
 
Georgiou (2004:230) agrees with Gloeck (2003) that a considerable number of 
lobbyists prefer using lobbying methods for which there is inadequate public 
evidence. Comment letters are publicly available, unlike evidence from public 
meetings, field visits and private meetings with the accounting standard-setter. For 
the researcher, the investigation of unobservable lobbying methods was a major 
challenge. In the words of Sutton (1984:93):  
 
“If the success of lobbying depends in large part on disguise, then such activity 
will doubtless escape the attention of the researcher too.” 
 
Another challenge imposed on researchers in South Africa is the fact that the few 
comment letters that are received by SAICA on behalf of the IASB are not publicly 
available. Those few comment letters that are ultimately collected by SAICA during a 
comment period are researchers (Gloeck, 2003:73). Gloeck (2003:72) argues that 
the scarcity of extant research in the field of accounting standard-setting in South 
Africa is as a direct result of SAICA’s “closed” process of accounting standard-
setting. This is in stark contrast with the IASB’s “open” process where the comment 
letters submitted by stakeholders are available to the public on its website (Wingard 
et al, 2016:142) . 
  
In summary, there is a paucity of observable evidence of corporate lobbying attempts 
by South African companies during the accounting standard-setting process. As a 
result, the lobbying attempts by South African companies during accounting 
standard-setting are relatively unexplored from a research perspective. The limited 
number of South African journal articles on this subject matter is evidence of this. It 
therefore follows that the research problem of this study was formulated as follows:  
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The lobbying methods and the timing at which they are employed by South African 
companies during the accounting standard-setting process are uncertain. 
 
The choices of when to lobby and which lobbying methods to use are driven by the 
effectiveness principle as discussed by Sutton (1984) in his theoretical framework. 
Lobbying at certain stages in the standard-setting due process is more effective than 
lobbying at other stages (Georgiou, 2004). Also, the use of certain lobbying methods 
is more effective than others (Georgiou, 2004).  
 
According to Sutton (1984), selecting the most effective stages for lobbying and most 
effective lobbying methods increases the probability of influencing the accounting 
standard-setter. In other words, companies select lobbying methods and stages of 
the accounting standard-setting process for lobbying based on their perceived 
effectiveness to influence the accounting-standard setter.   
 
Sutton (1984) admits that observing the effectiveness of lobbying is difficult. 
Therefore, the lobbying decision is not necessarily based on actual observable 
evidence of the effectiveness of certain lobbying methods and stages of lobbying. It 
is suggested that the perception of effectiveness is sufficient for the lobbyist to 
determine when and how to lobby (Georgiou, 2004).  
 
There is a scarcity of empirical evidence on how effective South African companies 
perceive their lobbying attempts to be during accounting standard-setting. For this 
reason, the research problem stated above included the following sub-problem: 
 
The perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies during the 
accounting standard-setting process is uncertain. 
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1.3 HYPOTHESES 
The research hypotheses flow logically from the research problem stated above. A 
research hypothesis is a prediction that the researcher aims to prove as true  
(Kothari, 2004:186).  
 
The research hypotheses for this study were formulated from Sutton’s (1984) 
predictions based on the rational choice theory. Sutton (1984) predicted when 
companies would lobby and which lobbying methods they would probably employ 
based on cost-benefit considerations. He also addressed the effectiveness of 
lobbying at certain points in the standard-setting process and the effectiveness of the 
use of the various lobbying methods to increase the probability of influencing the 
accounting standard-setter. 
1.3.1 Timing of lobbying and its perceived effectiveness 
Sutton (1984:83) argues that the best time to lobby is in the pre-draft stages of the 
accounting standard-setting process, which is to say during the stages preceding the 
exposure draft period of the due process. Lobbying during this period is highly 
effective and less costly since the accounting standard-setter is still undecided about 
the accounting issue and is therefore susceptible to external  
influence (Sutton, 1984:88). During the later stages of the accounting standard-
setting process, the accounting standard-setter has formulated an opinion on the 
accounting issue and is therefore less susceptible to those who wishing to sway its 
opinion. Consequently, there is a higher probability of influencing the accounting 
standard-setter earlier rather than later in the process. In light of Sutton’s (1984) 
assertions on the timing of lobbying, the research hypothesis was formulated as 
follows: 
It is expected that the earlier stages are used more by companies to lobby the IASB 
than the later stages due to the effectiveness of influencing the IASB during the 
earlier stages of the accounting standard-setting process.  
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1.3.2 Lobbying methods and their perceived effectiveness 
Lobbyists choose a mix of lobbying methods that is the most cost-effective and 
increases the probability of influencing the accounting standard- 
setter (Sutton, 1984:89). The most observable form of lobbying of the IASB is 
comment letter submissions which are publicly available. However, the use of 
lobbying methods other than comment letter submissions is difficult to observe. 
Hence hardly any empirical evidence, other than that of Hodges and Mellet (2002) 
and Georgiou (2004; 2010), exists for lobbying methods other than comment letter 
submissions.  
 
Hodges and Mellet (2002) and Georgiou (2004) found that the use of comment 
letters submission is strongly associated with the use of other lobbying methods. In 
fact, Georgiou (2004) reported that comment letter submissions are not the most 
used lobbying method. Sutton (1984) also suggests that lobbying methods such as 
seeking a private audience with the accounting standard-setter are more popular 
than comment letter submissions.  
 
Therefore, based on the findings of Sutton (1984), Hodges and Mellet (2002) and 
Georgiou (2004), it is expected that those lobbyists that submit comment letters 
have, in conjunction with comment letters, also employed other lobbying methods. 
Consequently, the research hypothesis regarding the use of lobbying methods was 
formulated as follows: 
 
The use of comment letter submission is strongly associated with the use of other 
lobbying methods. 
 
The perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods is based on the cost/benefit 
considerations of Sutton (1984). Companies only lobby if the perceived benefit of 
influencing the accounting standard-setter outweighs the cost of  
lobbying (Sutton, 1984).  
 
There is limited evidence of how effective lobbying is perceived to be by the lobbyist. 
Sutton (1984) predicts that lobbyists rate the various lobbying methods differently in 
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terms of effectiveness. He also suggests that other lobbying methods are more 
effective than comment letter submissions (Sutton, 1984). Georgiou’s (2004) results 
from his survey confirm Sutton’s predictions about the effectiveness of the various 
lobbying methods: Lobbying methods are not perceived by lobbyists as equally 
effective and lobbying methods other than comment letters are perceived to be the 
most effective. Consequently, the research hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of 
lobbying methods was formulated as follows: 
Other lobbying methods are more effective than comment letter submissions. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study was to examine the timing, methods and perceived 
effectiveness of corporate lobbying of accounting standard-setting in South Africa. 
More specifically, the objectives of this study were as follows: 
 to critically analyse the extant literature on accounting lobbying behaviour from 
which hypotheses are formulated; 
 to empirically test the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying of 
the accounting standard-setting process through a questionnaire instrument 
distributed to a sample of South African listed companies; and 
 based on the findings of the empirical investigation, to determine the applicability 
of Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory in the South African 
context. 
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1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Two research methods were used to achieve the research objectives of the study: a 
literature review and survey-based research. 
1.5.1 Literature review 
The literature study is undertaken in chapter 2. The literature review, firstly, includes 
a broad discussion on the relevant academic works of lobbying in the field of the 
political, economic and accounting sciences. The literature review narrows its focus 
as it proceeds to the next discussion on the accounting standard-setting process of 
the IASB, and more specifically the role of South Africa in the IASB’s due process. 
Thereafter a definitive examination of the methods, timing and benefits of lobbying 
the accounting standard-setter is undertaken. Finally, the likely stakeholders 
participating in the lobbying of the accounting standard-setter are discussed in more 
detail.  
1.5.2 Collection of empirical evidence  
1.5.2.1 Research instrument 
Empirical evidence of corporate lobbying by South African companies was obtained 
through an internet-based questionnaire. The questionnaire is included in  
appendix A.  
 
Owing to the lack of observable lobbying by South African stakeholders of SAICA’s 
or the IASB’s due process, this study lent itself to a questionnaire as a research 
instrument. Procuring data specifically relating to unobservable lobbying was difficult 
mainly because of the disguised nature of this form of lobbying. Sutton (1984:93) 
therefore suggests that researchers make use of survey-based research to collect 
information on lobbying methods employed by stakeholders. This study’s 
questionnaire was based on Georgiou’s (2004) survey, which was used in his 
research on corporate lobbying behaviour in the UK. Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
addresses a similar research problem and hypotheses as in this study. 
 
15 
 
The questionnaire was self-administered. The response was internet-based. The 
software used to develop and administer the questionnaire was LimeSurvey. 
1.5.2.2 Population and sample 
The population for this study consisted of primary listed companies on the JSE. The 
sample selected for this study was deliberately chosen by the researcher as the top 
100 JSE listed companies based on market capitalisation. Only companies with a 
primary listing on the JSE were eligible for selection of the sample.  
The reason for selecting the top 100 companies listed on the JSE was that lobbying 
companies are larger than non-lobbying companies (Larson, 1997). Sutton (1984:93) 
also submits that larger companies are more likely to lobby than smaller companies 
owing to the potential high cost of lobbying. In light of these assumptions, the 
researcher deemed it appropriate to select the largest primary listed companies in 
South Africa for collecting empirical evidence for this study.  
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Firstly, the aim of the study aim was to provide insight into the methods, timing and 
perceived effectiveness of corporate lobbying by leading companies in South Africa. 
The extant studies on corporate lobbying mainly focus on lobbying activity in the 
developed world (Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987; Georgiou, 2004; Elbannan and 
McKinley, 2006; Jorissen et al, 2010; Wagenhofer, 2011; Koh, 2011). Very few 
studies, if any, examine the methods, timing and perceived effectiveness of corporate 
lobbying of the IASB by South African companies. Hence there is a paucity of 
empirical research in the South African literature on this subject. This empirical study 
is significant in that it fills the gap in the accounting literature by providing an 
understanding of corporate lobbying attempts by South African companies during the 
accounting standard-setting process of the IASB. 
 
Secondly, the study is important in that it determines the applicability of Sutton’s 
predictions regarding the timing and methods of lobbying of the IASB in the South 
African context. An extensive literature review has proven that the general 
applicability of Sutton’s predictions to South African companies has not yet been 
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examined. Georgiou (2004:235) and McLeay, Ordelheide and Young (2000:83) 
encourage research in accounting standard-setting in other countries in order to 
establish the general relevance of Sutton’s predictions that are based on the rational 
choice model. The aim of this study was to use the empirical results from the 
questionnaire to determine if there is support for Sutton’s predictions in the South 
African context. 
1.7 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This study was delimited to focus on the top 100 listed firms on the JSE. The top 100 
JSE listed firms were selected on the basis of their market capitalisation and not by 
means of a random sample. For this reason, the responses received from the listed 
companies cannot be generalised to all companies in South Africa. However, the top 
100 listed companies on the JSE are more likely to lobby since they are able to afford 
the costs associated with lobbying (Sutton, 1984). Thus a study of the top 100 
companies listed on the JSE provided insight into the corporate lobbying behaviour of 
the leading companies in South Africa. The results of the study should nevertheless 
be interpreted by taking into account the limitation of the relatively small sample. 
 
The listed companies that responded to the questionnaire were also requested to 
indicate their lobbing during a specific period, this being from 1 January 2005 to the 
current year. The reason for this delimitation was that listed companies were required 
from 1 January 2005 to report their financial statements in accordance with IFRS 
(IFRS Foundation, 2015b). Prior to this date, financial reporting in terms of GAAP 
was allowed. Consequently, the accounting regulatory environment before 
1 January 2005 was significantly different to the current accounting regulatory 
environment. The questionnaire therefore focused on participation in the accounting 
standard-setting process from 1 January 2005. 
 
Lastly, a limitation to the study may have resulted from companies’ willingness to 
disclose their participation in lobbying methods for fear of being perceived as 
illegitimately influencing a regulatory process (Georgiou, 2005:222). The potential 
negative publicity a constituent might be subjected to if it is associated with lobbying, 
especially lobbying outside of the formal due process, may have influenced the 
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companies’ responses to the questionnaire. Given this potential limitation, a cover 
letter was attached to the questionnaire assuring respondents that the information 
provided by them would be treated with the utmost confidence and personal details 
of the respondents would not be disclosed. In terms of the ethical clearance obtained 
from Unisa for the use of a questionnaire instrument, the researcher undertook to 
keep all information pertaining to the respondents and their submissions on 
computer-based records that are password protected and with access privileges only 
available to the researcher. 
1.8 LIST OF DEFINITIONS USED 
For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined: 
 
Direct lobbying  
Direct lobbying denotes that the lobbyist communicates directly with the IASB in 
order to influence the IASB’s decisions. Direct lobbying includes communicating 
directly with the project staff of the IASB, joining a working group of the IASB or 
writing a formal comment letter directly to the IASB (Georgiou, 2004:222; Jorissen et 
al, 2010:4). 
 
Due process 
The due process is the formal stages of the accounting standard-setting procedures 
of the IASB, as set out in the constitution of the IFRS Foundation. The due process 
contains established consultative procedures to ensure a standard-setting process 
that is transparent and that considers a wide range of views from interested parties 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a).  
 
Formal lobbying 
Formal lobbying means permitted participation methods allowed by the due process 
of the IASB, as described in the Due Process Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a). 
Formal lobbying includes direct and indirect lobbying methods. 
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Indirect lobbying 
Indirect lobbying refers to those methods the lobbyist uses to influence the IASB 
indirectly through a third party such as a national accounting standard-setter, the 
media or external auditors (Georgiou, 2004:222; Jorissen et al, 2010:4). 
 
Informal lobbying 
Informal lobbying is defined as lobbying that occurs outside of the formal due process 
of the IASB (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:144). Informal lobbying may include private 
conversations and informal meetings with staff of the IASB, or influencing the opinion 
of accounting professional bodies when they make their representations to the IASB 
(Jorissen et al, 2010:5). 
  
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
These are the accounting standards and interpretations issued by the IASB. They 
comprise IFRS, IAS, IFRIC interpretations and SIC interpretations  
(IFRS Foundation, 2011). 
 
Lobbying 
Lobbying refers to the actions by stakeholders to influence a regulatory  
body (Sutton, 1984:92). 
 
Organisation theory 
Organisation theory studies the behaviour of an organisation in response to 
environmental factors (e.g. scarce resources or political influence) and conversely 
the impact of the organisation on its environment (Encyclopedia of Small Business, 
2007). The human influence on the behaviour of the organisation, and vice versa, is 
also a key element of organisation theory (Encyclopedia of Small Business, 2007). 
 
Positive accounting theory (PAT) 
PAT examines through observation the conditions that lead to existing accounting 
practices. PAT attempts to predict the outcome, after taking into account certain 
conditions, and thereafter comparing the predicted outcomes with the observed 
outcome (Schroeder, Clark & Cathey, 2011). 
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Rationality 
Rationality in the economic sense refers to the decision making behaviour of an 
intelligent citizen whereby it carries out any act whose marginal return exceeds its 
marginal costs (Downs, 1957:149). 
 
Rational choice theory 
The rational choice theory is an economic theory that explains human behaviour 
when confronted with decisions and suggests individuals always behave rationally 
during decision making by weighing the potential benefits against the potential costs 
before taking action (Parsons, 2005:11).  
 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders refer to those parties with an interest in the outcome of the accounting 
standard-setting process, and according to Jorissen et al (2010:11), include the 
following parties: 
 preparers of financial statements; 
 users of financial statements; 
 the accounting profession; 
 national standard-setters; 
 stock exchanges; 
 governments; 
 academics; and 
 individuals. 
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1.9 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised into chapters as follows. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
The literature study first provides an overview of the extant research on lobbying 
behaviour and the rational choice theory. Thereafter the accounting standard-setting 
process of the IASB is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the methods, 
costs and benefits of lobbying the accounting standard-setter. Furthermore, the 
stakeholders that are likely to lobby accounting standard-setters are examined. 
Importantly, South African participation in the due process of the IASB is discussed. 
 
Chapter 3: Research methodology 
This chapter explains the research design and methodology of this study. It describes 
the process used for selecting the sample, the survey instrument utilised and how the 
data was collected from the sample companies. 
 
The survey instrument was based on Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire used in his 
study on the timing and methods of corporate lobbying by UK companies. Limited 
amendments were made to Georgiou’s questionnaire in order to adapt the 
questionnaire for the South African context and the IASB’s due process.  
 
In this chapter, the development of the four hypotheses upon which the questionnaire 
was based are discussed in detail. Finally, chapter 3 concludes with the limitations, 
delimitations and ethical procedures of the empirical investigation. 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis of the research findings 
This chapter presents the data and results from the questionnaire instrument. 
Statistical tests are employed in this chapter to analyse and draw conclusions on the 
procured data. Notably, this chapter also describes the results from the testing of the 
four hypotheses of this study. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
Chapter 5 summarises the research problem, research objectives and the research 
methodology employed in this study. Furthermore, the findings and results reported 
in chapter 4 are summarised in chapter 5. Next, conclusions are drawn, based on 
these findings on the general applicability of Sutton’s predictions regarding the 
timing, methods and effectiveness of lobbying. Finally, the contribution of this study 
and recommendations for further research are discussed. 
1.10 SUMMARY 
In this chapter Sutton’s predictions regarding the methods and timing of lobbying 
were discussed. Sutton’s theoretical model serve as a background to this study. The 
due process of the IASB and South Africa’s role in the accounting standard-setting 
process of the IASB were examined. The problem statement relevant to this study 
was formulated and demonstrated that the lobbying methods and the timing at which 
they are employed by South African companies during the accounting standard-
setting process are uncertain. 
 
In light of the above problem statement, the research objectives of the study were 
discussed and the hypotheses to address each research objective were formulated 
from Sutton’s theoretical model for lobbying the accounting standard-setter.  
 
Even though the empirical research is subject to certain limitations, the researcher 
suggested that this empirical study will provide insight into the methods, timing and 
perceived effectiveness of corporate lobbying by leading companies in South Africa. 
 
A list of definitions was provided for words or terms commonly used throughout this 
study. Lastly, an outline of the chapters in this study was provided to the reader. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Various scholars agree that the accounting standard-setting process is not only a 
technical process, but also inherently a political process (Sutton, 1984; McLeay et al, 
2000; Georgiou, 2004; Elbannan and McKinley, 2006; Perry and Nölke, 2006). This 
political process of accounting standard-setting creates an ideal opportunity for 
lobbyists to influence the outcome of the accounting standard-setting process. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine the methods, timing and perceived effectiveness of 
such political lobbying of the accounting standard-setter. 
 
The chapter commences with an examination of the nature of lobbying. This 
overview of lobbying demonstrates that it involves the transfer of information to the 
regulator, which is a socially responsible action, and in the context of a democracy, 
deemed to be rational behaviour.  
 
The section that follows examines rational choice theory, an economic theory 
underlying this study. The review of the rational choice theory is necessary since the 
remainder of this chapter analyses lobbying of the accounting standard-setter from 
this theoretical perspective.  
 
Against this background, the accounting standard-setter and its due process are 
discussed. An analysis of the due process stages of accounting standard-setting 
demonstrates that various opportunities exist for lobbying by stakeholders. 
 
Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory framed this study and 
highlighted two important principles: the costs and benefits of lobbying. A discussion 
of these two principles was therefore deemed necessary. Firstly, a review is included 
on the lobbying methods and associated costs of these lobbying methods during the 
various stages of the due process of the accounting standard-setter. Secondly, an 
analysis of the motivations for and benefits of lobbying is included. The costs and 
benefits examination emphasises the applicability of Sutton’s predictions, which are 
based on the rational choice theory in the context of accounting standard-setting.  
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Based on the above, a review of who is likely to lobby the accounting standard-setter 
is included. This review reveals how Sutton’s (1984) cost-benefit analysis determines 
who the most likely lobbyists are.  
 
Finally, lobbying by South African companies during the IASB’s due process is 
examined. 
2.2 LOBBYING BEHAVIOUR 
An understanding of lobbying in its economic and political forms is necessary before 
one can examine the lobbying of the accounting standard-setter. This section of the 
literature study starts off with the seemingly obvious, but necessary discussion on the 
definition of lobbying. This is followed by an examination of the theorem applied to 
lobbying in the economic field that forms the framework of this study. 
2.2.1 The nature of lobbying 
2.2.1.1 Lobbying is the transfer of information 
Lobbying is described as the collective action by parties to influence a legislator 
(Sutton, 1984:81). Gullberg (2008:165) explains lobbying as “… interest groups’ 
contact with – and directed at – decision-makers in an attempt to influence public 
policy” and “… comprises contact made through institutionalised and non- 
institutionalised participation in the policy-making process”.  
 
The word “influence” refers to a wide range of methods to exert pressure on a 
legislator such as an accounting standard-setter. This type of pressure on a legislator 
does not necessarily refer to the use of money to sway the legislator, but rather the 
facilitation of negotiations between the legislator and interested parties (Richter, 
Samphantharak & Timmons, 2009:895). The lobbying process in its political nature 
necessitates the transfer of information between parties (De Figueiredo, 2002:126).  
 
The information transferred by interested parties to a legislator may take on various 
forms such as fact-based reports, statistics, opinions and forecasts, and may even 
contain threats (De Figueiredo, 2002:125). In the field of accounting specifically, the 
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comment letters to the standard-setter are an important tool for transferring 
information from affected parties to the standard-setter. Evidence of the impact of 
information transfer with comment letters is provided by Brown and Feroz (1992). 
Their study shows that an accounting standard-setter is influenced or swayed by the 
views expressed in the comment letters submitted during the due process (Brown 
and Feroz, 1992:719). Van Lent (1997:22) also notes in his study on lobbying of the 
Dutch government during the promulgation of two controversial financial reporting 
laws in the financial services industry that most of the lobbying that occurred was in 
the form of information transfer to the Dutch government. Surprisingly, in this case, 
the government even requested interested parties to transfer information on the 
controversial financial laws to the government (Van Lent, 1997:22).  
 
The above highlights Chung’s (1999:244) view that a regulator such as the 
accounting standard-setter finds the views expressed by interested parties 
particularly informative. This susceptibility of regulators to interested parties’ opinions 
is not entirely unexpected since it is widely accepted in a democracy that regulators 
should consider the preferences of affected parties (Brown and Feroz, 1992:715). In 
this regard Patterson (1963:72), and Keffer and Hill (1997:1371), suggest that the 
role of the lobbyist is so important in legislative structures that legislators in fact rely 
heavily on lobbyists as a source of information. 
2.2.1.2 Lobbying is socially responsible 
Apart from being a necessary legislative tool, lobbying is also seen as socially 
responsible. When companies lobby legislation or government policies that may 
negatively impact on companies’ stakeholders, they are considered to be socially 
responsible (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997:119).  
 
It is obvious that in reality social responsibility is not the primary driver for companies 
to lobby. Many companies embark on lobbying out of pure self-interest. However, 
those companies who pursue their own ends within the framework of sound business 
ethics may inevitably also carry out their social responsibilities (Downs, 1957:136). 
The correct balance between public good and self-interest should be maintained by 
sound business practices and ethical standards (Hamilton and Hoch, 1997:121). This 
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ethical approach to lobbying is reiterated by Keffer and Hill (1997:1376), who suggest 
that ethical lobbying can only occur if the lobbyist considers the goals and desires of 
the community in which it operates.   
2.2.1.3 Lobbying is a rational action 
The lobbyist is a rational actor in a political process. According to Downs (1957:149), 
“… lobbying is effective in a democracy because all the agents concerned, the 
exploiters, the exploited, and the government, behave rationally”. Lobbyists behave 
rationally because they evaluate the costs, probability of influencing the regulator and 
the associated benefits of lobbying before embarking on their lobbying activities.  
 
Based on the above assumption of rational behaviour, it is expected that an 
interested party would only participate in lobbying if the expected benefits of lobbying 
are greater than the costs thereof (Gullberg, 2008:165). The converse is also true: It 
is rational to refrain from lobbying if the expected benefits are lower than the costs of 
lobbying (Gullberg, 2008:165). This rational model of lobbying was the foundation for 
this study, and an appropriate focus for any study on corporate lobbying. In the words 
of Gullberg (2008:165):  
 
“…a rational perspective is a useful starting point when trying to explain 
lobbying by interest groups”.  
 
Hence a detailed explanation of the rational choice theory warrants attention in this 
chapter. The next section expands on this rational choice model for lobbying and the 
economic theory underlying it.  
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2.2.2 Lobbying: a rational choice 
2.2.2.1 Rational choice theory: background and relevance  
As mentioned above, the most influential theory applied to study the political 
phenomenon of lobbying is the rational choice theory (Parsons, 2005:1). This is an 
economic theory that explains human behaviour when confronted with decisions, and 
suggests individuals always behave rationally during decision making by weighing 
the potential benefits against the potential costs before taking action (Parsons, 
2005:11).  
 
The rational choice theory has its roots in the rational actor theory developed by 
micro-economist Adam Smith, who suggests individuals act out of self-interest within 
the constraints of information costs and opportunity costs (Monroe, 2001). The 
rational actor theory, or rational choice theory, as it is more commonly known, has 
developed into a widespread theory that is applied in various other fields such as 
politics, law, sociology, criminology, accounting and even physiology. 
 
In a seminal political study by Downs (1957), voting behaviour is explained in terms 
of the rational choice theory. Downs goes further by applying his theorem to lobbyists 
and suggests that individuals in a democracy always act rationally by choosing to 
lobby if the expected benefit of doing so will exceed the cost of information or the 
cost of time (Downs, 1957). Gullberg (2008:165) describes the application of the 
rational choice theory to lobbying behaviour as follows:  
 
“It is rational to lobby if the expected benefits outweigh the costs of lobbying. It 
is also rational to refrain from lobbying if the expected benefits are outweighed 
by the costs”.  
 
The rational choice theory is expressed by using the equation (𝑈𝑎 −  𝑈𝑏) > 𝐶, where 
𝑃 is the probability of influencing the accounting standard-setter, multiplied by two 
potential outcomes (𝑈𝑎 − 𝑈𝑏 ) exceeding the lobbyist’s costs ( 𝐶 ) (Sutton, 1984; 
Georgiou, 2004; Gullberg, 2008). Therefore, in essence, the rational choice theory 
explains why an individual chooses to participate in lobbying activities. 
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The framework of lobbying behaviour formulated by Downs (1957) set the course for 
other researchers of lobbying behaviour. In particular, it inspired Sutton’s (1984) 
influential study on the lobbying of accounting standard-setters.  
2.2.2.2 Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory 
Sutton (1984) applies the Downsian model of rational choice theory to develop 
hypotheses about the nature, timing and methods of lobbying an accounting 
standard-setter.  
 
Sutton’s (1984:85) first hypothesis is that preparers of financial statements are more 
likely to lobby the accounting standard-setter than users of financial statements. The 
reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the earnings and valuation of assets of preparers of 
financial statements are more affected than users of financial statements when 
changes are made to accounting standards (Sutton, 1984). Secondly, preparers of 
financial statements are more likely than users of financial statements to afford the 
costs associated with lobbying whilst also enjoying greater benefits of successful 
lobbying than users do (1984). For this reason Sutton (1984:85) also suggests that 
larger preparers are more likely to lobby than smaller preparers. 
 
The second hypothesis from Sutton’s (1984) study relates to the timing of lobbying. 
Sutton (1984:85) suggests that lobbying during the earlier stages of the standard-
setting process (pre-exposure draft period) is more effective and less costly than 
lobbying during the later stages (post-exposure draft period). This is because of the 
accounting standard-setter being undecided on the issue at hand during the earlier 
stages, and as a consequence the accounting standard-setter is more susceptible to 
external influences at this point (Sutton, 1984:88). As the due process progresses, it 
becomes more difficult to sway the accounting standard-setter on the accounting 
issue at hand since the accounting standard-setter’s view and opinion become more 
framed and robust (Sutton, 1984:88). 
 
Regarding lobbying methods, Sutton (1984:89) argues that lobbyists use lobbying 
methods that “offer the most influence per unit (increase in P) of lobbying costs”. 
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Sutton (1984:90) predicts that indirect lobbying methods are used more than direct 
lobbying methods since the former are more effective than the latter in influencing the 
accounting standard-setter. Georgiou (2004:222) defines indirect lobbying methods 
as those used to lobby through a third party such as the company’s external auditors 
or trade organisations. Direct lobbying methods entail direct communication with the 
accounting standard-setter through such means as comment letter submissions or 
having private meetings with the accounting standard-setter (Georgiou, 2004:222). 
Overall, Sutton (1984:86) suggests that the less visible lobbying methods are more 
effective in influencing the accounting standard-setter. 
 
Sutton (1984:93) admits that the above predictions or hypotheses regarding the 
timing and methods of lobbying are difficult for the researcher to test on account of 
the disguised nature of most lobbying activities. However, 20 years later, Georgiou 
(2004) empirically examined the timing and methods of lobbying the accounting 
standard-setter in the UK and found strong support for Sutton’s predictions. Other 
notable research that supports Sutton’s predictions of lobbying the accounting 
standard-setter includes McLeay et al (2000), Lindhal (1987), Van Lent (1997) and 
Jorissen et al (2010). The studies by these researchers in the field of accounting 
sciences provide strong support for the relevance and application of the rational 
choice theory in accounting. 
2.2.2.3 Support for and critics of rational choice theory 
The rational choice theory has made a significant and undeniable contribution to our 
understanding of human behaviour. However, it is not without its critics. The most 
important critics are Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (hereafter referred to as Green 
and Shapiro). Their main criticism is that rational choice theory has not contributed 
any new empirical evidence about politics (Cox, 1999). In response to Green and 
Shapiro’s critique, Cox (1999:157), a supporter of the rational choice theory, strikes 
back by citing numerous existing and recent empirical studies that provide strong 
evidence of and support for the rational choice theory. Cox (1999:153) criticises 
Green and Shapiro for only focusing in their criticism on two weak empirical studies 
that have already been recognised by rational choice supporters as inferior and 
unsuccessful models for rational choice theory. Hardly any of the successful 
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empirical work on rational choice theory is mentioned by Green and Shapiro in their 
book (Cox, 1999:153). This has certainly left Green and Shapiro’s main criticisms on 
the availability of new empirical evidence on rational choice theory  
flawed (Cox, 1999:154). 
 
Another critic, Monroe (2001:165), suggests that the rational choice theory has its 
shortcomings even though it is recognised that the theory has had an influence on 
various sciences. Monroe (2001:166) explains that a limitation of the theory is that it 
is based on the assumption that individuals are driven by self-interest motivations. 
Monroe (2001:166) posits that this assumption ignores the individual’s perspective of 
himself or herself in relation to others. Adding to this statement, Monroe (2001:151) 
suggests that the only reason for the continued use of the rational choice theory by 
researchers is that there is no suitable alternative theory in existence to explain 
human decision-making behaviour. Cox (1999:159) also successfully addresses 
general criticisms such us these, by stating that rational choice theory does not 
attempt to describe all human behaviour but it does provide a method, which has 
been successfully applied across different sciences, to analyse interactions between 
various parties. 
 
Gullberg (2008:165) reiterates the statement of Cox (1999) above, by writing that the 
rational choice theory provides the researcher with a means of analysing lobbying 
behaviour. It is for this very reason that the theory has also successfully infiltrated the 
field of accounting sciences and contributed to the knowledge of lobbying of 
accounting standard-setters. Seminal studies by researchers such as Sutton (1984), 
Georgiou (2004) and Jorissen et al (2010), provide evidence that the rational choice 
theory is an appropriate and relevant basis for analysing and understanding the 
lobbying of accounting standard-setters.  
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2.3 LOBBYING OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTER 
The accounting standard-setting process has been described by many scholars as a 
political process. Haller, Nobes, Cairns, Hjelstrom, Moya, Page and Walton 
(2012:119) explain why accounting standard-setting is a political process:  
 
“We accept that standard-setting is a political activity, in the sense that it can 
have major social and economic consequences, such that many parties can be 
affected”.  
 
Similarly, Sutton (1984:81) explains that standard-setting is a political process 
characterised by the preservation of self-interest: 
 
“Financial accounting standards are regulations. At best, they restrict the choice 
of accounting methods available to management. At worst, they force 
companies to report financial information in a form those companies would not 
have chosen voluntarily. A party, whether manager, investor or auditor, who is 
affected by such regulations, will seek to persuade the rule-makers to write the 
rules to his advantage. Likewise, when balancing the competing demands of 
"interested parties", the rule makers will be mindful of their own position and, in 
particular, how their activities are perceived by their masters” (Sutton, 1984:81). 
 
The process of standard-setting is seen as a political process for three reasons: 
 the high degree of “openness” of the due process allows for the input of interested 
parties, and as a consequence subjects the IASB to political pressure (Elbannan 
and McKinley, 2006:607); 
 the IASB operates in a highly politicised environment owing to its wide-reaching 
authority and impact on various economies around the world (Perry and Nölke, 
2006:561); and 
 the outcome of a political process such as accounting standard-setting is largely 
dependent on the strength or influence of the parties involved (Van Lent, 
1997:17).  
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The political process of accounting standard-setting creates an ideal opportunity for 
the lobbyist to attempt to influence the outcome of the accounting standard-setting 
process (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:111). The standard-setting process in itself 
provides the lobbyist with the opportunity to “promote, influence or obstruct proposed 
standards” (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:111).  
 
There is clear evidence in the literature of this influence over the accounting 
standard-setting process. A case in point is the political pressures that undermined 
the agenda of an accounting standard-setter during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Preparers of financial statements, especially financial institutions, blamed the mark-
to-market (fair value) accounting prescribed by the IASB for intensifying the financial 
crisis in Europe (Zeff, 2012:829). Market prices for securities decreased significantly 
during the financial crisis. For financial institutions that were required in terms of 
accounting standards to write down their financial assets to market value, this 
resulted in the recognition of major unrealised losses in their financial statements 
(Zeff, 2012:829). The financial institutions urgently pressed the IASB to allow them to 
discontinue their mark-to-market accounting by allowing them to reclassify their 
financial assets from “trading instruments” to “held-to-maturity instruments”  
(Zeff, 2012:829). The reclassification of these financial instruments was not allowed 
in terms of IFRS (Zeff, 2012:829).  
 
The European Commission, which was under tremendous pressure from various 
financial institutions at that point in time, notified the IASB that a change in the 
accounting standards should be authorised and issued immediately (Zeff, 2012:830). 
Being totally undermined, the IASB responded by approving and issuing the 
amendment to IFRS without following the normal due process (Zeff, 2012:830). The 
effect of this change was so significant that the reported earnings of various financial 
institutions went from major losses to unexpected profits (Zeff, 2012:830).  
 
Another example of political pressure on the accounting standard-setter is provided 
by Larson (2008) in his research on the lobbying of the draft interpretation note, 
SIC 12 Special Purpose Entities. The most active lobbyists of SIC 12 Special 
Purpose Entities, included banks and financial intuitions are renowned for using and 
marketing special purposes entities (Larson, 2008:42). Interestingly, Arthur Andersen 
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also joined the ranks of the lobbyists since many of their major clients, such as 
Enron, also used special purpose entities. Larson (2008:40) suggests that the strong 
opposition by Arthur Andersen had its roots in political considerations to protect the 
interest of its major clients and inevitably its own interests (see section 2.5.1.4). 
 
The political nature of standard-setting creates opportunities and benefits for the 
lobbyist to influence the outcome of proposed accounting standards. The discussion 
on lobbying of an accounting standard-setter is therefore based on the following two 
interlinked philosophies that the researcher in the current study derived from the 
academic literature.  
 
The first is that the very nature of the accounting standard-setter’s democratic 
process solicits lobbying behaviour (Cortese, Irvine & Kaidonis, 2010:85). In other 
words, the regulatory structure of the accounting standard-setter creates the 
opportunity for power and influence (McLeay et al, 2000:83). In order to understand 
the regulatory structure and process of the accounting standard-setter and therefore 
the very opportunity it provides for the lobbyist, the IASB’s history and due process 
are discussed in the next section. The second philosophy is that of motive and 
implies that certain benefits motivate interested parties to lobby accounting standard-
setters (Sutton, 1984:85). This is based on the assumption that “… since lobbying 
activities involve real economic costs, a rational individual or organisation will only 
lobby if the benefits of the desired outcome, adjusted by the probability that lobbying 
will lead to the desired outcome, exceed these costs” (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:112). 
The discussion of the philosophy of motive follows in section 2.5. The philosophy of 
opportunity and that of motive are interlinked: Interested parties affected adversely by 
a proposed accounting standard, given the opportunity and means to change the 
outcome in their favour, are motivated to lobby an accounting standard-setter to 
influence the outcome of a proposed accounting standard to their  
benefit (Sutton, 1984). 
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2.3.1 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the due 
process of developing accounting standards 
2.3.1.1 A history of the IASB 
The development of international accounting standards is assigned to the IASB, a 
private accounting standard-setter. The IASB members consist of an independent 
group of experts with appropriate experience that represents various geographical 
constituents (Perry and Nölke, 2006:563). The 22 trustees of the IASB appoint and 
supervise the members of the IASB and the IFRS Interpretations Committee 
(Wingard et al, 2016). The members of the IASB and the IFRS Interpretations 
Committee are mainly of European origin (Wingard et al, 2016). 
 
The IASB was established in 2001 and thereby replaced the first international 
accounting standard-setting body, the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) that had existed from 1973 (FASB, 2013). The IASB accepted the accounting 
standards issued by the IASC during the preceding years but stated that its objective 
was “to develop, in the public interest, a set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards” (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:5). The IASB is a 
private accounting standard-setter and therefore does not have the authority to 
impose IFRS on any entity, country or jurisdiction (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
Those countries or jurisdictions that choose to adopt IFRS must comply with all of the 
individual IFRSs and the IFRS interpretations (Financial Stability Board, 2013).  
 
The adoption of IFRS by the European Union in 2005 (Perry and Nölke, 2006:561) 
effected a huge shift in the accounting regulatory environment in European countries 
because accounting standards had previously been set and regulated at national and 
not transnational level (Perry and Nölke, 2006:567). For instance, accounting in the 
Netherlands was vested in Dutch company law, or the Dutch civil code (Van Lent, 
1997:3) and was therefore regulated at national level by Dutch law. The move from 
national to transnational accounting standard-setting in Europe generated 
substantive changes to the accounting standards themselves  
(Perry and Nölke, 2006:560) and evoked much controversy. In addition, the different 
legal, economic and accounting regimes of the various European countries posed a 
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serious challenge to the IASB to ensure that IFRS is acceptable and applicable in all 
countries (Hansen, 2011:58). Owing to the above challenges faced by European 
countries with the convergence with IFRS, the Financial Accounting Services Board 
(FASB) in the United States is hesitant to converge with IFRS  
(Perry and Nölke, 2006:576).  
 
In order to address the IFRS convergence challenges and to avoid forcing a “one 
size fits all” accounting standard on all countries adopting IFRS, the IASB facilitates a 
consultative process, referred to as the “due process”, before issuing any accounting 
standard or making amendments to existing accounting standards (IFRS Foundation, 
2013b). The purpose of an accounting standard-setter’s due process is to be a 
“mechanism for transforming individual preferences into societal preferences”  
(Brown and Feroz, 1992:715). This allows interested parties from various cultural, 
economic and political backgrounds to participate in the IASB’s accounting standard-
setting process through its formalised due process.  
2.3.1.2 The due process of the IASB 
The due process of accounting standard-setting is prescribed in the Due Process 
Handbook of the IASB and ensures transparency, accessibility and accountability 
throughout the standard-setting process (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:6). Throughout 
every step of the due process, the IASB welcomes the participation of interested 
parties through a formal protocol.  
 
During the agenda setting phase of the due process, the IASB involves professional 
bodies and accounting standard-setters to determine the pressing accounting 
matters faced by constituents, that warrant the IASB’s attention  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:25). If the IASB decides to address these issues by making 
changes to current accounting standards or by issuing a new accounting standard, it 
invites the opinions of interested parties through a discussion paper on the matter 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:25). After comments are received from interested parties, 
the IASB decides to add the accounting issue to its work plan  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:25). The technical aspects and possible impact of a 
proposed IFRS or changes to an IFRS are considered by the IASB  
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(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:29). A key part of this process is the public meetings 
facilitated by the IASB to consult with various stakeholders  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:29).  
 
Once all matters or concerns resulting from the public hearings have been 
addressed, the IASB issues an exposure draft to invite comments from interested 
parties. These comments are collected by the IASB and are considered when 
drafting the final accounting standard (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:30). 
 
The following question was relevant to this study: How can South African 
constituents participate in the formal due process of the IASB? South African 
interested parties can directly write a comment letter to the IASB to raise their 
concerns on a discussion paper or exposure draft of a proposed accounting 
standard. Interested parties in South Africa can also indirectly participate in the due 
process of the IASB by communicating their concerns to SAICA.  
 
SAICA fulfils a vital role in representing the views of South African interested parties 
to the IASB. It does this by inviting comments from South African constituents on 
proposed changes or a new accounting standard and manages the process of 
collecting, interpreting and analysing those comment letters from South African 
constituents (Gloeck, 2003:71). SAICA then submits one comment letter, 
representing the collective comments of interested parties in South Africa that have 
merit, to the IASB.  
 
Gloeck (2003:73) found that a limited amount of comment letters have been 
submitted to SAICA, but suggested that the low number of comment letters is an 
indication that South African stakeholders have found alternative means of 
influencing the accounting standard-setting process.  
 
Apart from the formal lobbying methods facilitated by the due process of the IASB, 
stakeholders also use informal lobbying methods. Since informal lobbying methods 
are employed outside of the due process, they are more disguised in  
nature (Sutton, 1984:93). In the discussion to follow, the nature of formal and 
informal methods is discussed in more detail. 
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2.3.2 An opportunity to persuade: formal lobbying methods 
In light of the above discussion, it is evident that the very nature of the formal process 
of the IASB provides interested parties with an ideal opportunity to influence the 
outcome of the accounting standard-setting process. Formal lobbying methods are 
those participation efforts allowed by the due process of the IASB and are specifically 
outlined in the Due Process Handbook for the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:6). 
Formal lobbying methods include the following: 
 consulting with the IASB on accounting issues that warrant its attention  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:7); 
 participating in project groups of the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:8); 
 submitting comment letters on discussion papers or exposure drafts  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:9); and 
 attending public meetings of the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:9). 
 
In the words of Cortese et al (2010:85), it seems that the due process itself provides 
“a forum within which powerful and self-interested constituents and constituent 
coalitions could contribute to and capture the standard-setting process in order to 
secure favourable regulation”. It is therefore not surprising that Weetman, Davie and 
Collins (1996:61) specifically describe the written submissions period of the due 
process as a “process of persuasion”.  
 
Although comment letters do not influence the pre-drafting stages of an accounting 
standard, they do significantly impact on the final form of the accounting standard 
that is eventually issued by the accounting standard-setter (Hansen, 2011:59). An 
interesting note by Georgiou (2004:230) and Hodges and Mellet (2002:141) on 
comment letters is that they are generally an indicator that other lobbying methods 
have also been employed to influence the accounting standard-setter. It is therefore 
not unusual for lobbyists to use a mix of lobbying efforts or to combine formal and 
informal lobbying methods in their efforts to influence the accounting standard-setter.  
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2.3.3 Behind the scenes: informal lobbying methods 
The lobbying efforts of interested parties are of course not limited to the opportunities 
created by the formal due process. Informal interactions with the accounting 
standard-setter may accompany the formal participation efforts of the interested 
parties (Hodges and Mellet, 2005:175). These activities that occur “behind the 
scenes” fall outside of the formal due process and are considered to be unobservable 
or disguised lobbying methods (Sutton, 1984:93). Informal lobbying methods include, 
but are not limited to, the following: 
 informal private meetings with members or staff of the accounting standard-setter 
(Georgiou, 2004:222; Jorissen et al, 2010); 
 influencing the opinion of accounting professional bodies (Georgiou, 2004:222; 
Jorissen et al, 2010); 
 communicating directly with the project staff through other means such as 
telephone conversations (Georgiou, 2004:222; Jorissen et al, 2010); 
 becoming a member or consultant of working groups/projects (Georgiou, 
2004:222; Jorissen et al, 2010); 
 communicating with a preparer’s organisation in order to influence its comment 
letter sent to the IASB (Georgiou, 2004:222; Jorissen et al, 2010); 
 using external auditors to represent the interests of the company at the 
accounting standard-setter (Georgiou, 2004:222); 
 securing representation on the board, committees or work groups of the 
accounting standard-setter (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:602; Sutton, 1984:90); 
and 
 commenting in the media (Georgiou, 2004:222). 
 
Lobbyists favour informal lobbying methods above formal lobbying methods 
(Georgiou, 2004:230; Hodges and Mellet, 2005:177). Researchers advance various 
reasons for the preference of informal lobbying methods. Van Lent (1997:18) 
suggests that informal lobbying is successful because of its secrecy.  
Sutton (1984:93) also concludes that the success of lobbying is dependent on its 
“disguised” nature. Also, formal lobbying methods, such as comment letter 
submissions, may expose the true preferences or motives of a lobbyist to the public 
(Königsgruber, 2010; Chung, 1999). By expressing their views publically, lobbyists 
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are revealing their interests, motives or other information to external parties  
(Chung, 1999:246). This phenomenon is called the “informational effect of lobbying 
behaviour” (Chung, 1999). By employing informal lobbying methods, lobbyists 
therefore have the benefit of avoiding the informational effect of lobbying since most 
informal lobbying methods are unobservable to the public. 
 
The various lobbying methods, their associated costs and the point in time when 
lobbying occurs are all interlinked. The different stages of the accounting standard 
setting-process necessitate different lobbying methods. Since lobbying is costly, 
lobbyists have to choose a mix of lobbying methods with the most influence per unit 
of lobbying cost that increases the probability of influencing the accounting standard-
setter (Sutton, 1984:89). These dependent factors are discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
2.4 THE METHODS, COST AND TIMING OF LOBBYING THE 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTER 
Lobbying is not confined to a specific day or time. As discussed in the sections 
above, the standard-setting process in itself provides lobbyists with multiple 
opportunities to influence the outcome of a proposed accounting standard. However, 
it is evident that at certain points in the standard-setting process, it is more efficient to 
lobby the accounting standard-setter than at other points in time (Sutton, 1984; 
Georgiou, 2004). The question therefore is: At what point in the standard-setting 
process is lobbying the most effective in influencing the accounting standard-setter?  
 
To answer this question, the next section examines the various stages of the due 
process, the lobbying methods employed during each stage, the costs of these 
lobbying methods and their efficacy to influence the accounting standard-setter. 
2.4.1 Agenda-setting period 
The setting of an agenda (technical work programme) by the accounting standard-
setter is the first step in the due process. The aim of the agenda-setting exercise, 
undertaken by the IASB every three years (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:21), is to identify 
accounting issues that warrant inclusion in the IASB’s technical work programme 
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(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22). Therefore the purpose of the agenda-setting period is 
to “assess and define the problem within existing reporting practice” (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013b:22). To achieve this, the IASB collects information on relevant 
accounting issues through two courses of action: Issuing a “request for information” 
document; and collecting evidence through the IASB’s research programme (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013b:22).  
 
FIGURE 2.1 – Activities during the agenda-setting period 
 
Source: Own observation from the Due Process Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a) 
 
The purpose of the request for information is to formally consult members of the 
public for their comments on the strategic direction of the technical work programme 
and current accounting issues that should be prioritised by the IASB  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22). In addition, the IASB is also open to discussions on 
financial reporting issues raised by other accounting standard-setters, other 
interested parties and the Advisory Council and Interpretations Committee of the 
IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22).  
 
The research programme of the IASB plays a pivotal role in adding accounting issues 
to its agenda. The purpose of the research programme is to collect evidence of 
accounting issues and how to resolve them (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22). The 
Agenda-setting 
Issuing a request 
for information to 
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research programme relies on research conducted by the IASB’s own staff or 
research by external parties such as accounting firms, accounting professional 
bodies and academics (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22).  
 
The most effective lobbying occurs during the earlier stages of the due process (Van 
Lent, 1997:22). Sutton (1984:83) argues that the best time to lobby is in the pre-draft 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process, that is, during the stages 
preceding the exposure draft period of the due process. Lobbying during this period 
is effective since the accounting standard-setter is still undecided about the 
accounting issue and is therefore susceptible to influence from affected parties 
(Sutton, 1984:88). 
 
As discussed above, one of the main methods of participating in the agenda 
formation stage is to provide the IASB with research on specific accounting issues. 
The transfer of sponsored “expert” information from a company to an accounting 
standard-setter is a well-known lobbying method (Van Lent, 1997:22). McLeay et al 
(2000:96) found that lobbyists collaborating with and using the contributions of 
academics exert significant influence over the accounting standard-setter. 
 
To employ research as a lobbying method, lobbyists can either use research 
conducted by their own in-house research department or sponsor academic research 
(Sutton, 1984:88). Audit firms typically use research undertaken by their in-house 
research departments to transfer information to the accounting standard-setter 
(Sutton, 1984:88). Those lobbyists who do not maintain in-house research 
departments have the option of sponsoring academic research.  
 
It is true that the aim of sound research is to be “unbiased, rigorously crafted and 
grounded in economic theory” (Barth, 2012:483), but the researcher may be 
prejudiced by his or her own ideas, incentives and research conclusions (Fülbier, Hitz 
& Sellhorn, 2009:483). Perry and Nölke (2006:578) agree with Fülbier et al (2009) 
that expert information provided to the accounting standard-setter in the form of 
research may not be purely technical in nature, but may also include underlying 
political motivations to influence the agenda items.  
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However, the fact remains that accounting standard-setters are interested in relevant 
research and regularly call on academics for their research input (Barth, 2012; 
Fülbier et al, 2009). Without research to rely on, the IASB is left to make judgements 
on the setting of accounting standards without knowing the impact of such standards 
on various constituents (Fülbier et al, 2009:466). Beresford and Johnson (1995:115), 
former members of the FASB, confirmed this need for expert information specifically 
during the early stages of the standard-setting process. During the agenda-setting 
period, relevant research can assist the accounting standard-setter to address those 
“questions that arise in the process of deliberating proposed standards as well as 
before formal deliberations begin” (Beresford and Johnson, 1995:115).  
 
Professor Mary Barth, academic and former member of the IASB, also underscores 
the importance of research to accounting standard-setting in the following statement: 
“Thus, research can aid standard setters in identifying issues, structuring their 
thinking about a particular issue, and providing evidence that informs the debate 
about the issue …” (Barth, 2012:8). She further explains that research can 
specifically assist the accounting standard-setter by resolving conceptual and 
practical issues with accounting measurements (Barth, 2012:14). Similarly, Fülbier et 
al (2009:469) found that research can contribute to current issues faced by the 
accounting standard-setter such as recognition, measurement, presentation and 
disclosure questions.  
 
In light of the above, it is evident that research contributes to the standard-setting 
process, especially during the early stages of the process (Fülbier et al, 2009:479). It 
is therefore suprising that so few companies use sponsored research as a lobbying 
method. Georgiou’s (2004:229) results from his survey on corporate lobbying in the 
UK show that only 1.85% of respondents admitted to using research on financial 
accounting as a lobbying method. The reasons for this may be twofold. Firstly, the 
respondents in Georgiou’s (2004) survey, comprising preparers of financial 
instruments, indicated that they perceive lobbying at the agenda stage as extremely 
ineffective and consequently did not actively lobby during this period. Secondly, the 
transfer of sponsored research to the accounting standard-setter is a costly exercise 
since the cost of collecting expert information is high (Downs, 1957:148). One can 
therefore infer from these results that, in line with Sutton’s (1984) model, interested 
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parties find that the probability (P) of influencing the accounting standard-setter with 
research is low and the cost (C) of using research as a lobbying method is high. 
Georgiou’s (2004:226) explanation for the low rate of lobbying during the agenda 
formation stage is that companies may have been reluctant to admit in the 
questionnaire that they had attempted to shape the outcome of the agenda of the 
accounting standard-setter.  
 
Apart from the formal lobbying methods discussed above, the lobbyist can also 
employ informal lobbying methods during the agenda-setting period. One such 
informal lobbying method is a private meeting with the accounting standard-setter. 
Private conversations and informal meetings with the accounting standard-setter are 
some of the most effective lobbying methods in the early stages of the due process 
(Van Lent, 1997:22). Gullberg (2008:172) agrees that “early lobbying might influence 
the political debate by defining the political problem from the beginning, before 
decision-makers have decided on a position”. Sutton (1984:90) also suggests that a 
lobbyist first attempts to have a private meeting with the accounting standard-setter 
since the cost of this lobbying method is low and the probability of influencing the 
accounting standard-setter is high compared to other lobbying methods  
(Sutton, 1984:90).  
 
Another informal method of lobbying is the use of media pressure and campaigns to 
exert pressure on the accounting standard-setter to include an accounting issue on 
its agenda (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:129). The challenge with informal methods 
such as the above is that researchers have difficulty finding observable data of how 
these methods contributed to the emergence of an item on the accounting standard-
setter’s agenda (Sutton, 1984:88; Hodges and Mellet, 2002:136).  
What is clear is that the inclusion of an item on the agenda of the accounting 
standard-setter is the result of various external factors at work to influence agenda-
setting. Hodges and Mellet (2005:168) suggest that agenda items emerge from the 
accounting standard-setter’s relationships with certain outside stakeholders and also 
from individuals with “privileged access and influence”.  
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2.4.2 Discussion paper period 
The main output of Request for Information and the IASB’s research  
programme is a discussion paper inviting comment from interested parties  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:23). It is important to note that the issuance of a discussion 
paper on a proposed accounting standard or amendment is not compulsory  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:23).  
 
The purpose of requesting comments from interested parties at this point is to ensure 
that the IASB fully comprehends the accounting problem at hand and any possible 
solutions to the problem (IFRS Foundation, 2013b:25). The discussion paper 
contains a summary of the relevant accounting issues and the IASB’s collective 
views and preliminary approaches to the accounting issues  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:23). The discussion paper does not contain a singular view 
of the IASB, but sets out the different opinions of IASB members on the accounting 
problem. From the above, it is evident that at this stage of the process,the IASB is 
still undecided on the outcomes of the accounting issues on its agenda.  
 
One way to formally participate in the lobbying in the early stages is by writing a 
comment letter in response to the discussion paper issued. Although comment letters 
are an ineffective form of lobbying (Lindahl, 1987:70) it is more effective to provide 
comments at this point of the due process rather than later in the due process 
(Fülbier et al, 2009:481).  
 
It is interesing to note that the exposure period of the discussion paper was the 
second most used stage in Georgiou’s (2004) survey of UK respondents. It was also 
considered by the UK respondents to be one of the most effective stages for lobbying 
the ASB (Georgiou, 2004). The reason is the perceived effectiveness of lobbying 
during the comment periods of the discussion paper and exposure draft of the 
accounting standard-setter.  
 
At this early stage of the due process, the accounting standard-setter is highly 
susceptible to external influences (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:135). It is for this reason 
that Sutton (1984:93) states the following:  
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“Lobbying is most productive (i.e. has the greatest impact on P per unit of C) 
when the rulemakers’ preferences are still undecided.” 
 
Thus regarding the timing of lobbying, the proverbial early bird catches the worm.  
2.4.3 Exposure draft period 
The next step in the due process after the technical programme has been finalised 
and a discussion paper has been issued, is the finalising of an exposure draft of the 
proposed accounting standard by the IASB (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:28). The 
exposure draft is in the form of the proposed IFRS and its main purpose is to petition 
the public for its views on the proposed accounting standard  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:28). This is the stage where most lobbying occurs, 
according to Georgiou’s (2004:225) results from his survey in the UK. The main 
formal lobbying method available to lobbyists during the exposure draft period is 
writing a comment letter to the IASB. Another formal lobbying method available to the 
lobbyist during that period includes attending the IASB’s public hearings to raise 
issues regarding the exposure draft (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:30). The above formal 
lobbying methods are not costly, but the cost of these measures relates to the 
opportunity cost of the time spent preparing the comment letters or attending the 
public hearings (Sutton, 1984:90). 
 
The IASB regards the comment period of the exposure draft as crucial in the 
consultation process with the public. From these comment letters, the IASB obtains 
an overview of the major issues and concerns raised by affected parties  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:30). The comment letters collected by the IASB during this 
period are made available to the public on its website (Wingard et al, 2016:142). The 
comment letters contain the details of the sender and the issues of concern raised by 
the sender. The availability of these comment letters and the content they include 
provide researchers with observable evidence of lobbying of accounting standard-
setters (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:111).  
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It is therefore not surprising that most of the empirical evidence in the literature in the 
area of accounting standard-setting relates to the use of comment letters  
(Stenka and Taylor, 2010:111). For instance, Jorissen et al (2010:17) analysed 
comment letters to determine the nature and motivation of the parties participating in 
the comment process of the IASB. Larson (1997) also analysed the characteristics of 
companies that sent comment letters to the IASC. Stenka and Taylor (2010) and 
Yen, Hirst and Hopkins (2007) analysed comment letters received by the ASB in the 
UK to determine the nature of the arguments used by the senders of those comment 
letters. Hence researchers are able to obtain valuable insight from the content 
analysis of comment letters into certain lobbying aspects. However, one should 
exercise caution in relying on comment letters as the main evidence of lobbying 
behaviour.  
 
Comment letters represent only one lobbying attempt at one point in the accounting 
standard-setting process (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:145). Lobbying is an extended 
process that occurs over time (Sutton, 1984:84). There is continuous interaction 
between the accounting standard-setter and interested parties throughout the 
accounting standard-setting process (Hodges and Mellet, 2005:175). Hence Lindhal 
(1987:65) suggests that it is not appropriate to make use of only comment letters 
submissions to understand the scope of lobbying of the accounting standard-setter. 
Comment letters are valuable to the researcher in that they are indicative of certain 
lobbying aspects rather than providing evidence of the extent of lobbying behaviour. 
 
Researchers such as Hansen (2011) and Brown and Feroz (1992) studied the 
effectiveness of comment letters. Hansen (2011:73) found that the quality  
of the information provided by the lobbyist in its comment letter and the  
credibility of the lobbyist are two important factors for lobbying success.  
Brown and Feroz’s (1992:728) analysis of comment letters indicates that the 
accounting standard-setter is influenced by the comment letters of large companies, 
but is not equally influenced by all large companies. These two studies suggest that 
comment letters are effective in lobbying the accounting standard-setter. It is also 
perceived by interested parties to be an effective formal lobbying method (Georgiou, 
2004:262). Conversely, Lindhal (1987:75) and Sutton (1984:86) do not concur with 
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the perceived effectiveness of comment letters. According to Sutton (1984:86), the 
fact that comment letters are an observable form of lobbying makes them ineffective 
The findings of Hansen (2011) and Brown and Feroz (1992) regarding the 
effectiveness of comment letters may be explained by the results from Hodges and 
Mellet’s (2002) study of comment letters and Georgiou’s (2004) study of corporate 
lobbying in the UK. Hodges and Mellet (2002:144) show that certain companies 
make reference in their comment letters to earlier lobbying efforts on the accounting 
standard-setter. This may suggest that comment letters are from respondents that 
initiated their lobbying efforts before the exposure draft period – in other words, 
during the pre-agenda and agenda-setting stages (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:144). 
This certainly seems to be consistent with the findings of Georgiou (2004:233) that 
companies that use comment letters are likely to use a variety of other lobbying 
methods. Therefore, the submission of a comment letter by a lobbyist during the 
exposure draft period is perceived to be effective simply because it has been 
preceded by other less overt lobbying attempts. This may include more informal 
lobbying attempts.  
 
One such informal lobbying method that is perceived to be effective is using auditors 
to lobby on the company’s behalf. Georgiou’s (2004:229) findings show that the 
lobbying method used most by companies is appealing to their auditors to support 
their views when communicating, formally or informally, with the accounting 
standard-setter. Sutton (1984:90) acknowledges this perception of the effectiveness 
of communicating views to the accounting standard-setter through auditors, and 
suggests that it is an efficient method of lobbying.  
 
Other popular informal lobbying methods include communicating with the accounting 
standard-setter in a pre-arranged private meeting or through other means such as 
telephone conversations (Georgiou, 2004:229). The reason for the popularity of using 
informal communication with the accounting standard-setter as a lobbying method 
lies in the efficacy of this method. According to Sutton (1984:90), this is the most 
effective lobbying method because the probability (P) of influencing the accounting 
standard-setter is high relative to the cost (C) of this lobbying method. 
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2.4.4 Publishing the final IFRS 
Once the IASB has reached consensus on the technical issues in the exposure draft, 
the final accounting standard is prepared for balloting (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:31). 
If the IASB has not reached consensus on substantial issues in the accounting 
standard, the exposure draft may be re-issued for further comment (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013a:31). If this route is followed, due process is followed in the same 
manner as during the initial exposure draft period (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:32). 
 
The publishing of the final accounting standard is approved by a supermajority vote 
when nine of the 15 IASB members are in favour (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:11). Each 
accounting standard is accompanied by additional material such as the basis of 
conclusion and Dissenting Opinions (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:32). The IASB also 
ensures communication material, such as a press release, accompany the release of 
an accounting standard or amendment (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:33).  
 
Georgiou’s (2004:228) survey reveals that few companies lobbied during this stage 
of drafting the final accounting standard for publishing. Since no formal lobbying is 
facilitated at this point, one can conclude that if there is lobbying at this point it will 
consist of informal lobbying.  
2.4.5 Post-publication procedures 
During the publishing period of the accounting standard or amendment, the IASB 
does not formally consult with interested parties. The post-publication procedures 
include editorial corrections to the accounting standard, educational activities and 
translation of the new accounting standard (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:34). Lobbying is 
therefore not expected during the post-publication procedures of the IASB. 
 
Once these activities have been completed, a two-year period elapses before the 
IASB proceeds with its post-implementation review of the new accounting standard 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). 
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2.4.6 Post-implementation review 
The post-implementation review of the IASB mainly consists of public consultation to 
determine the impact of a new accounting standard on interested parties  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). This is an important review by the IASB since the 
benefits of implementing a new accounting standard should exceed the costs of its 
implementation (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:25).  
 
The IASB is also required to specifically assess those issues that were flagged as 
important or contentious during the development of this accounting standard  
(IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). The main tool for consulting the public during this 
review is through the Request for Information issued by the IASB (Moldovan, 
2014:118). It allows interested parties to raise their opinions, in the form of comment 
letters, on the impact of a new accounting standard (Moldovan, 2014:130). The IASB 
may also use academic research, its own analysis of financial statements or surveys 
of other interested parties to determine if there are any major concerns with the 
implementation of the new IFRS or amendment (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:36).  
 
The IASB prepares a report of its findings for approval by the DPOC. The IASB then 
considers if a proposal for an amendment to the new accounting standard or a 
broader review of the impact of the new IFRS is necessary (IFRS Foundation, 
2013a:36). It is interesting to note that the post-implementation review stage is the 
only stage where the Due Process Handbook mentions that informal consultation 
with interested parties is allowed (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:36). Informal lobbying 
methods utilised during the post-implementation review typically include the use of 
the media, press and private meetings with the accounting standard-setter to exert 
pressure on it (Hodges and Mellet, 2002:129).  
 
The researcher in the current study again experienced as problematic finding 
evidence of these informal communications with the IASB. Another problem noted by 
researchers of the post-implementation review process is that the IASB reviews the 
implementation and impact of its own standards (Moldovan, 2014:18; Haller et al, 
2012:122). The fact that the post-implementation review is not performed by an 
independent task team raises concern about the transparency and legitimacy of the 
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findings of the review (Haller et al, 2012:122). The IASB, however, has attempted to 
mitigate this perceived independence threat by ensuring that the DPOC oversees the 
complete due process, including the post-implementation review (IFRS Foundation, 
2013a:6). Since the DPOC is part of the IFRS foundation, it cannot be seen as 
entirely objective.  
 
Regarding the efficacy of lobbying the IASB during the post-implementation review, 
Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2004) do not specifically address its efficacy during this 
stage. Moldovan (2014) finds, specifically regarding the post-implementation review 
of IFRS 8 operating segments, that the 64 comments letters sent to the IASB during 
the post-implementation review were not that effective in influencing it. The IASB 
indicated after the post-implementation review that it would not make any further 
changes to IFRS 8 Operating Segments, but would include additional guidance for 
certain aspects of the standard (Moldovan, 2014).  
Lobbying during the post-implementation review of IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
had a different and more long-term impact on influencing the accounting standard. 
After the post-implementation review of IFRS 3 Business Combinations, the IASB 
included issues of concern raised by stakeholders during the post-implementation 
review, as research projects on its agenda (IFRS Foundation, 2015a). Hence, the 
lobbying may not have been effective in amending IFRS 3 at that time, but it did 
influence the next agenda formation of the IASB. It appears that lobbying during the 
post-implementation review stage in this case had the objective of influencing the 
next agenda items of the IASB. This long-term strategy of lobbying is in agreement 
with Sutton’s (1984:89) suggestion that lobbyists aim to gain a “greater say in drafting 
that committee’s agenda, with a view to suppressing, as well as raising issues”. 
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2.4.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is evident that lobbying begins even before the accounting standard-
setter has drafted the exposure draft (Sutton, 1984:90). The lobbyist has an array of 
lobbying methods available to him or her. These range from the formal methods 
allowed by the due process to the informal lobbying methods that are more disguised 
in nature. The lobbyist selects those lobbying methods that are the most effective (P) 
per unit of cost (C) in influencing the accounting standard-setter.  
 
Regarding the timing of lobbying, Sutton (1984) predicts that lobbying during the 
earlier stages, such as the agenda-setting stage, is more effective and less costly 
than lobbying at a later stage (Sutton, 1984:88). Contrary to this prediction, 
Georgiou’s (2004:227) findings show that lobbyists prefer lobbying during the later 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process.  
 
Lobbyists use a wide range of lobbying methods. Indirect communication with the 
accounting standard-setter is the most effective lobbying method but can be an 
extremely costly exercise for the lobbyist (Sutton, 1984:90). The most effective direct 
lobbying method is private meetings with the accounting standard- 
setter (Sutton, 1984:89). Using comment letter submissions ranks high as a lobbying 
method since it is an inexpensive form of lobbying. However, it is not a very effective 
lobbying method (Lindahl, 1987:70). What is important is that the use of comment 
letters as a lobbying method indicates that the lobbyist also used a range of other 
lobbying methods prior to the use of comment letter submissions (Georgiou, 
2004:233).  
 
Overall, Sutton (1984:93) suggests that lobbying that takes place behind the scenes 
of the due process, is the most effective method. Obtaining evidence of such 
disguised lobbying poses a challenge for researchers. In the words of Hodges and 
Mellet (2002:149):  
 
“… what is visible in the process through which a particular accounting standard 
is developed is rather like the tip of the iceberg; its visibility confirms the 
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existence of a lot more submerged material although its shape and density has 
still to be confirmed.” 
2.5 THE MOTIVATIONS FOR AND BENEFITS OF LOBBYING THE 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTER 
The motivations for lobbying an accounting standard-setter have been the subject of 
many studies. Elbannan and McKinley (2006) put forward reasons that drive 
companies to lobby an accounting standard-setter. They suggest that there are 
certain attributes in the proposed accounting standards, specific corporation 
characteristics and industry factors that cause companies to lobby an accounting 
standard-setter (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006). Koh (2011) and Larson (1997) also 
suggest that companies that lobby accounting standard-setters display specific 
characteristics that ultimately drive their decision to lobby. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) propose that the impact of an accounting standard on a company’s future 
cash flow is a major driver for corporate lobbying.  
 
What all of the above studies show is that the main objective of a lobbyist is to 
influence the outcome of a proposed accounting standard in order to minimise any 
negative impact on the lobbyist. Olson (2002:7) explains that for this reason lobbying 
is considered a rational activity since the mere reason for the existence of companies 
is to further the common interests of individuals or groups. Therefore lobbying is 
expected in that companies that lobby do so to protect their self-interest  
(Zeff, 2002:43).  
 
The protection of self-interest is not necessarily driven by unethical motives. 
Lobbying is the natural consequence of complex social interactions between the 
accounting standard-setter and companies (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:618). It is 
also worth noting that lobbying that is guarded by sound business ethics, is a 
powerful legislative tool, socially responsible and a rational response in a democracy. 
 
Based on a study of the academic literature, the researcher found that the motives 
for lobbying could be grouped into two primary categories: outcome-orientated 
motives and theoretical (definitional) motives. Lobbying motives are grouped in this 
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particular manner in studies on the subject by Yen et al (2007) and Stenka and 
Taylor (2010). Outcome-orientated motives refer to the economic impact of proposed 
accounting standards (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:113), external users’ reaction to new 
accounting standards (Yen et al, 2007:68) and company-related effects such as 
implementation costs (Yen et al, 2007:63). Theoretical motives or definitional 
arguments refer to a lobbyist’s position on accounting concepts or principles  
(Stenka and Taylor, 2010:112). These arguments include discussions on 
presentation and disclosure (Yen et al, 2007:63), wording in the proposed accounting 
standard (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:117) and the technical feasibility of the proposed 
accounting standard (Stenka and Taylor, 2010:118).  
 
The grouping of motives into these two primary categories assists in structuring this 
wide-ranging discussion into a simpler and more organised one. They are by no 
means the only motives that drive lobbying of the accounting standard-setter. There 
is the strong possibility that a respondent is motivated to lobby because of other 
more unobservable factors. These may include motivations such as industry peer 
pressure (Koh, 2011:15) or cultural influences (MacArthur, 1996:231). Also, as 
discussed earlier, the informational effect has a significant impact on lobbying 
behaviour (Chung, 1999:246). A respondent may choose not to disclose all of his or 
her motivations in a comment letter in order to avoid revealing some information 
about himself or herself to the accounting standard-setter and/or the public. The 
motivations for lobbying are therefore complex and extensive.  
 
The discussion below focuses on the two primary categories of motives, namely 
outcome-orientated and theoretically orientated motives. 
2.5.1 Outcome-orientated motives 
Accounting is described as a necessary and important social practice (Perry and 
Nölke, 2006:560) and is essential to the efficient functioning of the economy (Brown, 
1990:91). Accounting standards ensure that credible financial information is 
presented that is necessary for the functioning of capital markets and sound 
corporate governance in the economy (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), 1991:2). It affects many different aspects of financial markets such as share 
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prices, dividends, covenants and management compensations (Haller et al, 
2012:117). Hence any changes to accounting standards result in economic 
consequences for various parties and consequently impact on the decision-making 
behaviour of businesses, governments, unions, investors and creditors  
(Zeff, 1978:56).  
 
Owing to this economic and social impact, “many parties stand to gain or lose” from 
the implementation of new accounting standards (Haller et al, 2012:117). Avoiding 
any potential economic losses due to a proposed accounting standard is a major 
motive for lobbying an accounting standard-setter. It is not surprising then that the 
“economic consequences” argument is so extensively used by lobbyists  
(Sutton, 1984; Stenka and Taylor, 2010). Lobbyists who use this argument in 
comment letters tend to refer to issues such as taxation effects, the variability of 
financial results, cost versus benefit considerations, cost impact and borrowing costs 
effects (MacArthur, 1996:231).  
 
Evidently not all companies are affected equally by a proposed accounting standard. 
The attributes of a proposed accounting standard affect companies differently. For 
instance, a change to fair value measurement of financial instruments affects 
companies in the financial services industry more than, say, companies in the 
manufacturing industry. Hence, the lobbying of a proposed accounting standard is 
undertaken by the constituent group or industry most affected by the attributes of the 
proposed standard.  
 
In this regard, accounting choice theory suggests that accounting preferences or 
choices are “clustered by industry” (Jorissen et al, 2010:15). This was proven by Yen 
et al’s (2007:73) results from their content analysis of arguments used in comment 
letters in response to the Comprehensive Income exposure draft:  
 
“… there is a distinctly tailored aspect to the letter-writing process, as the 
arguments raised in many of the letters appear to reflect firm and industry-
specific concerns”. 
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This statement shows that the motives for lobbying a proposed accounting standard 
are likely to be similar for constituents of the same industry since they all face similar 
economic and social consequences if the proposed standard is issued. The 
economic consequences, specifically the impact of those consequences on 
management’s wealth and companies’ accounting numbers, cash flows and client 
relationships, are now investigated. 
2.5.1.1 Management wealth 
Positive accounting theory (commonly referred to as PAT) is used to predict, through 
observation, what conditions lead the management of a company to oppose an 
accounting standard. PAT attempts to predict the outcome, after taking into account 
certain conditions, and then comparing the predicted outcome with the  
observed outcome (Schroeder et al, 2011). Watts and Zimmerman (1978:113)  
use this theory to study the lobbying behaviour of management. They  
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978:113) predict that proposed accounting standards that 
negatively affect management’s wealth (cash bonuses and stock options) motivate 
management to lobby the accounting standard-setter. Chung (1999) and  
Holthauzen (2009) concur with Watts and Zimmerman that this wealth effect is a 
major driver for lobbying the accounting standard-setter.  
 
The factors that indirectly affect management’s wealth are taxes on the company, 
regulatory procedures, political costs and information production costs. These 
indirect costs impact on the cash flows, earnings and share price of the company and 
consequently affect the wealth of the management of the company  
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978:114 & 118). In an attempt to avoid this, management 
are willing to expend resources to affect the standard-setting  
process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978:113). In conclusion, management are likely to 
be involved with lobbying attempts to influence the outcome of the accounting 
standard-setting process when the impact on accounting numbers affects their 
compensation (Georgiou, 2005:326) .  
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2.5.1.2  Accounting numbers 
Jorissen et al (2010) studied the drivers for participation in the lobbying of an 
accounting standard-setter. They found that preparers of financial statements resist 
the accounting standard-setter significantly more when their accounting numbers and 
earnings are negatively affected by a proposed accounting standard  
(Jorissen et al, 2010:20). In this regard, Sutton (1984:87) also suggests that those 
accounting standards that have an impact on earnings or affect the valuation of 
companies’ assets and liabilities evoke corporate lobbying behaviour. In addition, 
Jorissen et al (2010:22) posit that when a proposed accounting standard deviates 
from the current accounting practices, companies tend to lobby the accounting 
standard-setter more.  
 
This was also found to be the case in a seminal study on lobbying behaviour from an 
organisation theory perspective by Elbannan and McKinley (2006). Organisation 
theory studies the behaviour of an organisation in response to environmental factors 
(e.g. scarce resources or political influence) and conversely the impact of the 
organisation on its environment (Encyclopedia of Small Business, 2007).  
 
Elbannan and McKinley (2006:608) concluded that a proposed accounting standard 
that causes uncertainty with management drives companies to lobby the accounting 
standard-setter. An accounting standard may cause uncertainty if management are 
required to make estimates of accounting numbers or if the accounting standard 
alters the company’s conventional accounting methods (Elbannan and McKinley, 
2006:608). Therefore any proposed accounting standard that causes volatility in a 
company’s accounting numbers is likely to be met with lobbying attempts  
(Saemann, 1999:19). This was demonstrated when a controversial proposed 
accounting standard on the fair value measurement of financial instruments was 
issued in March 1997 (Chatham, Larson & Vietze, 2010). The proposed 
measurement differed significantly from the current measurement practices. It was 
not surprising that the proposed fair value measurement of financial instruments was 
severely opposed by companies and the reason cited by 82% of the comment letter 
writers was that the proposal was inconsistent with the current management of 
financial instruments (Chatham et al, 2010:103). Despite the lobbying efforts of the 
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stakeholders, the IASC proceeded with the much criticised proposed fair value 
measurements by issuing IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement (Chatham et al, 2010:105). 
2.5.1.3  Cash flow 
The negative impact of an accounting standard on a company’s cash flows company 
motivates a company to lobby the accounting standard-setter. In the words of Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978:132):  
 
“As long as financial accounting standards have potential effects on the firm's 
future cash flows, standard setting by bodies such as the Accounting Principles 
Board, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission will be met by corporate lobbying.” 
 
Accounting standards affect a company’s cash flows in multiple ways. They may 
potentially impact the political costs of the company, debt covenants and the 
information processing costs of preparing financial statements  
(Jorissen et al, 2010:7). Increased political costs, such as costs imposed by labour 
unions and government taxes, are a significant motivator for very large companies to 
lobby (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978:126). The effect of a proposed accounting 
standard on debt covenants that determine future funding arrangements also 
motivates a company to lobby an accounting standard-setter (Georgiou, 2005:325). 
In support of this, Koh (2011:21) found that managers that lobbied the proposed 
accounting standard on share option expensing, did so mainly because it caused an 
increase in debt contracting costs for their companies.  
 
On the topic of the information processing cost, Elbannan and McKinley (2006:609) 
state that an increase in information processing costs is likely to cause companies to 
lobby a proposed accounting standard. Watts and Zimmerman (1978:126) also 
found, in terms of PAT, that a major motivator for lobbying is an increase  
in information processing costs brought on by a proposed accounting  
standard. The reason for this is that the company may have to expend cash to collect 
and analyse data to comply with the new accounting standard  
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(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:609). The company may also have higher  
cash outflows since it has to employ additional staff or create additional  
business units in order to facilitate the new accounting processing  
(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:609). Consequently, the impact of an accounting 
standard on a company’s cash resources is a great activator for lobbying behaviour.  
 
Cash is the lifeline of any company, and companies go to great lengths to protect that 
resource. Holder, Karim, Lin and Woods (2013) illustrated this point. In their study of 
comment letters on enhanced disclosure requirements for contingent liabilities 
proposed by the IASB and FASB, they found that the main reason cited by lobbyists 
for opposing the proposal was litigation issues. This argument was submitted more 
by United States companies than other countries simply because they operate in a 
“highly litigious environment” (Holder et al, 2013:144). Increased litigation may have 
a huge impact on a company’s resources – hence the result from the companies on 
the proposed enhanced disclosure on potential contingent losses could be expected. 
2.5.1.4  Client effect 
The client effect occurs when a corporation is dependent on its stakeholders for 
resources and consequently adapts its behaviour to support their preferences 
(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:612). In other words, the client effect arises when a 
corporation participates in lobbying the accounting standard-setter mainly because its 
stakeholders are participating in lobbying the accounting standard-setter (Elbannan 
and McKinley, 2006:612).  
 
The client effect is best illustrated in the context of an audit firm and its clients. In 
terms of agency theory specifically, it is suggested that auditors have an incentive to 
support their clients’ views on proposed accounting standard changes  
(Saemann, 1999:5). Mckee, Williams and Frazier (1991) illustrate this theory on the 
client effect between accounting firms and their clients in a study on an accounting 
standard for internally generated computer software. The proposed accounting 
standard was selected by McKee et al (1991:276) because it mainly influenced one 
specific industry and had economic consequences and financial reporting 
consequences for all the companies in this particular industry. Based on a content 
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analysis of the comment letters received by the FASB on the proposed accounting 
standard, McKee et al (1991:282) determined that the position of the accounting 
firms that wrote comment letters was closely aligned with their clients’ comment 
letters on the proposed changes. Their findings indicated that the larger the client, 
the more likely the accounting firm was to support its client’s position  
(McKee et al, 1991:283).  
 
Larson (2008) reported similar results on the client effect. Larson’s (2008) study 
examined the lobbying of the draft interpretation note, SIC 12 Special Purpose 
Entities (hereafter referred to as SIC 12). SIC 12 addresses the accounting of off-
balance sheet securitisation financing, also known as Special Purpose Entities 
(Larson, 2008:30). This interpretation note was urgently required to stipulate the 
criteria for including a financing vehicle in the corporation’s consolidated financial 
statement, since at the time, many of these financing vehicles were kept off-balance 
sheet (Larson, 2008:31). SIC 12 was severely opposed, especially by financial 
institutions, according to Larson’s content analysis of comment letters on SIC 12 
(Larson, 2008:35). This is significant because all the financial institutions that 
opposed SIC 12 in this study actively marketed Special Purpose Entities to their 
clients (Larson, 2008:29). A second significant result from Larson’s study is that the 
only accounting firm that opposed SIC 12 was Arthur Andersen (Larson, 2008:30). 
One of Arthur Andersen’s major clients was Enron, which was well known for using 
many Special Purpose Entities in its business model (Larson, 2008:40). In order to 
protect its clients’ interests and consequently its own, Arthur Andersen acted as the 
“hired gun” to advocate Enron’s position on SIC 12 with the accounting standard-
setter.  
 
Both of the findings from Larson (2008) and Mckee (1991) illustrate how the client 
effect motivates companies, and even professional audit firms, to lobby the 
accounting standard-setter. Regarding audit or accounting firms presenting their 
clients’ interests to the accounting standard-setter, Mckee et al (1991:289) express 
great concern:  
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“If indeed accounting firms are engaged primarily in advocating the interest of 
clients when they discuss proposed accounting rules, the intellectual honesty of 
the process is jeopardised.”  
2.5.2 Theoretical motives 
Stenka and Taylor (2010:118) provide the following description of theoretical 
(conceptually based) arguments:  
 
“Conceptually based arguments are taken to refer to accounting concepts and 
principles as well as technical issues. Respondents using such arguments 
would base their reasoning on theoretical and conceptual soundness, as well as 
the technical feasibility of the proposals. They would also refer to potential 
institutional and legal complications caused by the proposals if they were to be 
in conflict (in the respondents’ view) with current government policies or already 
existing regulations and statutory provisions.” 
 
Theoretical arguments are important to the accounting standard-setter. When the 
accounting standard-setter has to consider the alternatives to its proposal, it needs to 
“… understand the conceptual basis of the idea and how it can be applied 
comprehensively in financial reporting” (Barth, 2012:13). Evidence from studies on 
arguments used in comment letters does suggest that lobbyists are aware of the 
necessity of conceptually based arguments in their comment letters.  
Holder et al (2013:145) found on the proposed enhanced disclosure requirements on 
contingencies that 60% of the respondents include theoretical arguments in their 
comment letters. Stenka and Taylor’s (2010) content analysis of comment letters 
written in response to four exposure drafts, indicated that 85% of respondents 
referred to theoretical arguments to state their positions. The theoretical argument 
mostly cited by these respondents related to the relevance principle of the 
Conceptual Framework. Chatham et al (2010:103) also found the use of conceptually 
based arguments in 75% of the comment letters written on the proposed fair value 
measurement of financial instruments.  
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2.5.3 A combination of motives 
Although the motives above are presented separately, one should acknowledge the 
fact that comment letter writers use a combination of outcome-orientated and 
technical motives in their comment letters and regularly integrate these when 
presenting their views (Yen et al, 2007:73). Empirical results from studies on which 
motives are used most often in comment letters, show contradictory results.  
Chatham et al (2010:103) found in their data analysis of comment letters on the 
proposed fair value measurement of financial instruments that outcome-orientated 
arguments were used more than theoretical arguments. Yen et al (2007:64), like 
Chatham et al (2010), reported that respondents used more outcome-orientated 
arguments than theoretical arguments when citing their motivations for writing a 
comment letter. Conversely, Stenka and Taylor’s (2010:125) results from their data 
analysis of comment letters showed that theoretically based arguments were used 
more by respondents than outcome-orientated arguments. McLeay et al (2000:83) 
suggest that “constituent lobbying may be affected by the scope and nature of the 
accounting issue under consideration”.  
 
Therefore, a proposed accounting standard, severely impacting on the cash flows of 
companies, naturally leads to more outcome-orientated arguments in comment letter 
submissions. Conversely, a proposed accounting standard that does not significantly 
impact on accounting numbers or cash flows, may result in less outcome-orientated 
arguments and more theoretical arguments in comment letter submissions. 
 
In conclusion, one has to accept that motivations for lobbying the accounting 
standard are complex and diverse. In the current study, comment letters only gave 
the researcher a glimpse of the motivations of the lobbyist. 
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2.6 WHO LOBBIES THE ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTER?  
McLeay et al (2000:96) identified four main lobbying groups in the accounting 
standard-setting arena: preparers of financial statements, users of financial 
statements, auditors and academics. Other lobbying groups mentioned in prior 
studies include accounting standard-setters, regulators, government entities, stock 
exchanges, financial institutions and trade associations (Yen et al, 2007; Chatham et 
al, 2010; Jorissen et al, 2010). Sutton’s (1984) cost-benefit framework is an important 
determinant for who is likely to lobby the accounting standard-setter. Constituents 
lobby with currency (Sutton, 1984:85). Since the cost of lobbying is high, only those 
parties that expect the greatest financial benefits from its lobbying attempts are 
willing to expend costs to lobby (Sutton, 1984:85). Hence only certain groups lobby 
because the “resources are widely but unequally distributed” (Van Lent, 1997:18). In 
the next section, the four main lobbying groups’ participation in the due process of 
accounting standard-setting is discussed.  
 
2.6.1 Preparers versus users 
Preparers of financial statements are the most active lobbying group (Holder et al, 
2013:141). They are more likely to lobby than users, auditors and academics (Sutton, 
1984:93; Larson, 1997:196; Chatham et al, 2010:100; Jorissen et al, 2010). The 
empirical results from the content analysis of comment letters in studies such as 
those by Yen et al (2007), Jorissen et al (2010), Chatham et al (2010) and  
Holder et al (2013) show that preparers dominated the respondents.  
 
The above findings can be assigned to the greater benefits preparers receive from 
lobbying compared to other constituents (Sutton, 1984:85). Sutton (1984:86) 
suggests that preparers of financial statements are dependent on a limited number of 
sources of income and are therefore severely impacted when an accounting standard 
influences their income. It follows then that the more undiversified a preparer is, the 
more likely he or she is to participate in lobbying (Sutton, 1984:93). Preparers also 
lobby more than other constituents because they are wealthier than the other 
constituents (Jorissen et al, 2010:6). There are also certain characteristics of 
preparers that cause higher participation in lobbying compared to other constituents. 
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Elbannan and McKinley (2006:615) suggest that preparers in highly concentrated 
industries are more likely to lobby than those in less concentrated industries. They 
also argue that preparers in less regulated industries tend to respond significantly 
more to proposed accounting standards than those in highly regulated industries 
simply because they are not used to regulatory structures  
(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:616).  
 
The larger preparers are more likely to lobby than smaller preparers  
(Sutton, 1984:93; Jorissen et al, 2010:28). The reason is that the possible benefits a 
preparer is likely to obtain are directly correlated to its size (Lindahl, 1987:62). The 
lobbying costs are also more easily borne by larger preparers  
(Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:613). Larger preparers are likely to employ 
accounting experts who are able to interpret the impact of a proposed accounting 
standard on the preparer (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:613). Even if a large 
preparer does not employ accounting experts, he or she may be willing to hire the 
expertise (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:613) or sponsor academic research.  
 
From a user perspective, prior studies show that users write the fewest comment 
letters to the accounting standard-setter (Yen et al, 2007; Jorissen et al, 2010; 
Chatham et al, 2010; Holder et al, 2013). Users of financial statements include 
shareholders, financial institutions, tax authorities, potential investors, regulatory 
bodies, employees, creditors and customers (Saemann, 1999:4). Sutton’s (1984:86) 
explanation for the low participation of users in the due process is that users are 
generally dependent on various sources of income and are not significantly impacted 
when an accounting standard influences one of its sources of income. Users are also 
not the wealthiest group and thus do not lobby as actively as preparers  
(Van Lent, 1997:18; Holder et al, 2013:141). When users do lobby, they are more 
likely do so for enhanced disclosure in financial statements than for any other reason 
(Van Lent, 1997:19; Saemann, 1999:4; Jorissen et al, 2010:28).  
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2.6.2  Audit and accounting firms 
Chatham et al (2010:100), Jorissen et al (2010:25) and Holder et al (2013:151) found 
in their analysis of comment letters that after preparers, the audit and accounting 
firms send more comment letters to the accounting standard-setter than users and 
academics. The intense participation of audit and accounting firms in the lobbying 
process may be due to the significant financial interest that audit firms have in their 
clients’ welfare (McLeay et al, 2000:82).  
 
It is also interesting to note from Georgiou’s (2004:233) findings that preparers of 
financial statements perceive their auditors to be influential in affecting the 
accounting standard-setting process. Hence preparers rely greatly on their auditors 
to represent their preferences to the accounting standard-setter (Van Lent, 1997:25). 
Accordingly, audit firms are likely to resist the accounting standard-setter when their 
clients resist an accounting standard (Elbannan and McKinley, 2006:612). The 
reason for their avid support of the clients’ views with the accounting standard-setter 
is the client effect, which was discussed previously in section 2.5.1.  
 
It is therefore anticipated that preparers and auditors cluster together when 
presenting their views to the accounting standard-setter (Van Lent, 1997:25). In light 
of this, it is reasonable to submit that audit and accounting firms belong to the 
preparer group rather than the user group (Sutton, 1984:86). This increases the 
probability of audit firm lobbying compared to user and academic lobbying. Larger 
audit firms, like preparers, are more likely to lobby since they have greater resources 
at their disposal and receive greater benefits from successful lobbying (Van Lent, 
1997:23). 
 
2.6.3 Academics 
Academics are one of the lobbying groups who write the fewest comment letters 
compared to other lobbying groups (Yen et al, 2007:59; Jorissen et al, 2010:18). 
There are a few possible reasons for the low response rate from academics. Firstly, 
academics are perceived to have limited influence over the accounting standard-
setter and their likelihood of success in lobbying is therefore  
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low (McLeay et al, 2000:82). Secondly, apart from the low probability of successful 
lobbying, the low academic participation is partially because of the lack of a 
significant wealth effect (McLeay et al, 2000:82). In other words, the economic effect 
of a proposed accounting standard is not significant on academics and they therefore 
stand to gain little from lobbying the accounting standard-setter. Thirdly, academics 
focus their lobbying efforts more at the earlier stages of the process, that is, the 
agenda-setting stage (Jorissen et al, 2010:28). As discussed previously, the agenda-
setting stage requires the involvement of academics in the form of research, to 
collect evidence on accounting issues and how to resolve these accounting issues 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013b:22).  
 
Even though it appears from content analysis of comment letters that academics on 
their own seem to exert little influence over the accounting standard-setter, preparers 
collaborating with and using the contributions of academics seem to exert more 
influence over the accounting standard-setter since the preparer’s position seems to 
be more credible because of the academic community’s backing  
(McLeay et al, 2000:94 & 96). In light of this supposition, preparers may sponsor 
academic research projects to support their position on an accounting issue  
(Sutton, 1984:89). Thus, even if the academic community does not significantly 
participate in direct lobbying of the accounting standard-setter, it does play an 
indirect role in transferring information to the accounting standard-setter. 
 
In conclusion, extant academic research supports Sutton’s cost-benefit framework in 
determining who is likely to lobby. Preparers of financial statements are more likely to 
lobby than users of financial statements (Sutton, 1984:93; Jorissen et al, 2010:28; 
Chatham et al, 2010:100). The larger preparers are more likely to lobby than smaller 
preparers (Sutton, 1984:93; Jorissen et al, 2010:28). Audit and accounting firms are 
likely to support their clients’ preferences and are therefore more likely to lobby with 
the preparers of financial statements (Van Lent, 1997:25; Sutton, 1984:86). 
Academic participation in the due process of accounting standard-setting is low 
mainly because of the low success rate in influencing the accounting standard-setter 
and the cost-benefit considerations of the rational choice theory  
(McLeay et al, 2000:82). 
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The next section examines South Africa’s participation in the IASB’s accounting 
standard-setting process. 
2.7 LOBBYING BY SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS OF THE IASB 
Since 2005, the year in which South African listed companies adopted IFRS as 
financial reporting standards, interested parties in South Africa have had the 
opportunity to directly participate in the due process of the international accounting 
standard-setter.  
This section examines the adoption of IFRS by South Africa, the accounting 
regulators in South Africa and South Africa’s participation in the IASB’s accounting 
standard-setting process. 
2.7.1 The context of accounting regulation in South Africa  
2.7.1.1 Financial reporting standards in South Africa 
The Accounting Practices Board (APB) was the official accounting standard-setter in 
South Africa up to late 2011 (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). In 1995, the APB decided to 
issue accounting standards as statements of South African Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice (SA GAAP) that were primarily based on international 
accounting standards (2006:87). Eventually, the APB completely converged  
SA GAAP with IFRS and as a consequence, from 2003, issued IFRS as SA GAAP 
without amendment (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). From this date, all companies were 
required to compile their financial statements on the basis of SA GAAP (IFRS 
Foundation, 2015b).  
From 1 January 2005, the JSE disallowed the use of SA GAAP for financial reporting 
by listed companies, and adopted IFRS for financial reporting purposes for all listed 
companies (Venter and Stiglingh, 2006:87). Non-listed companies continued with the 
use of the statements of SA GAAP for financial reporting purposes. The promulgation 
of the Companies Act of 2008 in 2011 resulted in the decision to completely withdraw 
SA GAAP as the financial reporting standard in South Africa and only allowed IFRS 
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or IFRS for SMEs as a basis for the preparation of financial statements of South 
African companies (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). 
2.7.1.2 Accounting standard regulators in South Africa 
The APB was established in 1973 as a private accounting standard-setter in South 
Africa (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). Since its establishment, SAICA has served as the 
technical advisory body of the APB (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). SAICA has played a 
significant role in accounting standard-setting by acting as technical advisor to the 
APB and also by managing the accounting standard-setting process in South Africa 
on the APB’s behalf (Gloeck, 2003:71). In this regard, SAICA’s technical body, the 
APC, has supported SAICA’s objective and strategy. The objectives of the APC are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
The promulgation, in 2011, of the new Companies Act 2008 in South Africa, 
established a legally constituted accounting standard-setting body named the 
Financial Reporting Standards Council (FRSC). The FRSC is tasked to issue 
financial reporting pronouncements in South Africa in alignment with IFRS (IFRS 
Foundation, 2015b). Hence the FRSC’s establishment resulted in the winding-up of 
the APB (IFRS Foundation, 2015b). SAICA continues, even after the establishment 
of the FRSC, to issue the IASB’s exposure drafts on proposed accounting standards 
for comments in South Africa. SAICA also continues to serve, through the APC, as 
technical advisor to the FRSC (the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(SAICA), 2014). SAICA consequently remains as a technical secretariat to the 
national accounting regulator.  
 
The APC has 15 voting members and a chairperson (SAICA, 2014). According to the 
2015 APC members list, the members of the APC consist of a board member of the 
IASB, the five largest audit firms in South Africa, commerce and industry 
representatives (e.g. MTN and Anglo Gold Ashanti Limited), users of financial 
statements (e.g. Barclays Bank) and SAICA executives (SAICA, 2016). Owing to its 
role in South Africa and its support to the APB and now the FRSC, the APC’s 
objectives regarding accounting standard-setting were deemed important in the 
context of this study and merit comment. 
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In paragraph 4.3 of its operating procedures, the APC states that its objective is to 
submit, on behalf of SAICA, comments on exposure drafts or discussion papers 
issued by the IASB “… with the intention to influence outcomes …” (SAICA, 2014). 
This is achieved by inviting South African constituents to send their comments on an 
IASB issued discussion paper and exposure draft to SAICA (SAICA, 2014). SAICA, 
in collaboration with the APC, then analyses and interprets the comments it receives 
from South African constituents to determine the dominant concerns on a proposed 
accounting standard from a South African perspective (Gloeck, 2003:71). These 
concerns from stakeholders are considered by the APC and are then compiled in one 
comment letter to the IASB (Gloeck, 2003:71). This procedure affords South African 
stakeholders opportunities to formally, but indirectly, participate in the consultative 
process of the IASB. Obviously, South African stakeholders may also directly 
participate in the IASB’s discussion period or exposure period by writing a comment 
letter to the IASB, instead of going through SAICA.   
 
The APC (SAICA, 2014) states in paragraph 4.4 of its operating procedures, that it 
aims to “influence the setting of new and revised/amended IFRSs, IFRIC 
Interpretations and IFRS for SMEs, where appropriate, by nominating members to 
the relevant IFRS Foundation structures”. It also has the same objective in paragraph 
4.5 with the national accounting standard regulator, the FRSC (SAICA, 2014). Sutton 
(1984) describes this attempt at representation on the committees or board of the 
accounting standard-setter, as a “long-term” lobbying method. By obtaining 
representation on the accounting standard-setters committees or board, the lobbyist 
has the opportunity  to influence not only a proposed accounting standard, but also, 
in the long run, the accounting standard-process itself (Sutton, 1984).  
 
It is also interesting to note that one of the APC’s objectives is to encourage research 
on financial reporting matters at universities or other institutions (SAICA, 2014). As 
discussed previously, the transfer of “expert” information to the accounting standard-
setter is a well-known informal lobbying method (Van Lent, 1997:22).  
 
In light of the above APC objectives, it is clear that the APC, in collaboration with 
SAICA, aims to influence on behalf of South African stakeholders the IASB’s setting 
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of accounting standards. Hence Gloeck (2003:71) aptly states that “… SAICA 
therefore has a major influence on accounting conventions in South Africa. It 
effectively controls agendas, procedures and publications.” 
2.7.2 South Africa’s participation in the IASB’s accounting standard-
setting 
The following question was relevant to this study: How and when do South African 
companies participate in the accounting standard-setting process of the IASB? Since 
2005, the year listed companies adopted IFRS, interested parties in South Africa 
have had the opportunity to directly participate in the due process of the international 
accounting standard-setter. South African interested parties therefore have the same 
opportunity as other constituent countries to directly participate in the formal public 
consultations of the IASB (e.g. attending public meetings or submitting a comment 
letter during the discussion or exposure period) as well as to informally participate in 
the IASB’s due process (e.g. informally meeting with IASB members or staff) 
(Jorissen et al, 2010:3). In addition, South African stakeholders can also indirectly 
participate (Jorissen et al, 2010:3) in the due process of the IASB by communicating 
their concerns to SAICA.  
 
There is a paucity of academic literature providing empirical evidence of South 
Africa’s participation, directly or indirectly, in the IASB’s due process. What is clear 
from the academic literature is that hardly any comment letters have been written by 
South African stakeholders directly to the IASB, compared to the number of comment 
letters written by stakeholders in developed countries. For example, Larson’s 
(1997:185) study of 288 comment letters on 17 exposure drafts issued between 1989 
to 1994 shows that during this period, only three South African stakeholders 
responded to the invitations to comment by the IASC, the predecessor of the IASB. 
MacArthur (1996:231) analysed 47 comments letters received from respondents over 
the world in response to the exposure draft on Comparability of Financial Statements 
issued by the IASC. The majority of comment letters in this study were received from 
Australia (12), the United States (10) and the UK. South Africa submitted one 
comment letter in this regard (MacArthur, 1996:217). Chatham et al’s (2010:101) 
geographic analysis of 169 comment letters received by the IASB on the IAS 39 
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discussion paper indicated that only two comment letters had been received from 
South Africa. The highest number of comment letters in this regard was received 
from the Netherlands, namely 23 (Chatham et al, 2010:101). Larson and Hertz 
(2013) analysed comment letters received by the IASB regarding 57 issues from 
2001 to 2008. The geographical analysis shows that South Africa constituted 3% of 
the worldwide comment letter writers over this period (Larson and Hertz, 2013:16).  
 
In light of the above, even though South Africa participates directly and formally in 
the IASB due process, its participation is low compared to other countries. It should 
also be noted that those South African stakeholders that submitted comment letters 
referred to in the above studies, include SAICA, the professional accounting body 
representing the interest of South African stakeholders. In this regard,  
Samkin (1996:146) correctly predicted that after the adoption of IFRS as reporting 
standards in South Africa, “the future role of South African corporate management is 
likely to be reduced to merely lobbying the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants who, in turn, also faces the very real danger of being relegated to a 
mere lobbying role on behalf of South African statement users and preparers”.  
 
The indirect participation in the IASB due process merits comment. Evidence of 
indirect participation in the IASB’s due process by South African companies is difficult 
to observe. The most obvious evidence of indirect lobbying of the IASB, is the 
comment letters written by South African companies to SAICA. However, the 
participation rate in the comment period is low. Stainbank’s (2010:64) investigation 
shows that a total of 14 comment letters on the exposure draft IFRS for SMEs were 
received by SAICA from South African stakeholders during the comment period. The 
number of comment letters received in this regard is low, given the significant impact 
of the proposal on financial reporting for small and medium-sized companies. Given 
Sutton’s (1984) predictions that those preparers of financial statements that do 
participate in lobbying are likely to be large, the low number of responses in this case 
is not entirely unexpected. IFRS for SMEs pertains to small and medium-sized 
companies and based on Sutton’s assumptions, small preparers are not likely to 
lobby.  
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However, one cannot assume that the low number of comment letters is proof that 
South African stakeholders do not lobby the IASB. Instead, Gloeck (2003:73) 
suggests that South African stakeholders have found alternative means of influencing 
the accounting standard-setting process. In Stainbank’s (2010) study, the use of 
other lobbying methods by South African stakeholders seems likely. In order to elicit 
opinions on the proposed exposure draft for IFRS for SMEs, a member of the IASB 
and a member of SAICA held discussion forums throughout South Africa (Stainbank, 
2010:64). In total, 800 individuals attended these discussion forums (Stainbank, 
2010:64). According to Sutton (1984), the oral testimony of the lobbyist at a public 
meeting such as this is an effective lobbying method. In Georgiou’s (2004:232) 
empirical study on the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by 
UK companies, he found that approximately a third of companies perceived this 
lobbying method as effective to very effective. One can therefore conclude that in the 
case of the IFRS for SMEs proposals, the high number of South African companies 
attending the discussion forums compared to the low number of South African 
comment letter writers indicates that companies perceived methods other than 
comment letters to be more effective in this case.  
 
Therefore, in conclusion, at first glance, it appears that there is a low response rate 
from South African stakeholders during the IASB comment period. The evidence 
presented by Gloeck (2003) and Stainbank (2010), however, suggests that South 
African stakeholders make use of other lobbying methods to influence the outcome of 
accounting standards. 
  
71 
 
2.8 SUMMARY  
In this chapter, the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying the 
accounting standard-setter were examined. Companies have an interest in shaping 
the outcome of accounting standard-setting owing to its effect on the allocation of 
scarce economic resources (Jorissen et al, 2010:5). The attempts by companies to 
shape the outcome of an accounting standard are referred to as lobbying.  
The point of departure of this study was a discussion on the nature of lobbying and 
the theoretical framework of lobbying. A discussion on Sutton’s (1984) predictions 
based on the rational choice theory was central to this exposition since it forms the 
background to this study. Sutton’s (1984) hypotheses posit that an individual faced 
with the different lobbying options prefers the option that provides the greatest 
benefits subject to cost constraints.  
The due process of accounting standard-setting of the IASB was examined. This was 
necessary since the highly regulatory structure of the accounting standard-setter 
provides the opportunity for lobbying. The discussion on the stages of the due 
process demonstrated that the earlier stages of the due process (agenda formation 
and discussion paper stages) are expected to be used more by lobbyists because of 
the effectiveness of influencing the accounting standard-setter during these stages. 
The discussion of the due process also included the various lobbying methods 
employed during the various stages. These lobbying methods include formal lobbying 
methods, namely those participation efforts allowed by the due process and informal 
lobbying methods, that are informal interactions with the accounting standard-setter 
that occur behind the scenes. The literature examination of lobbying methods and 
their associated costs revealed that lobbyists tend to choose the mix of lobbying 
methods with the most influence per unit of lobbying cost. 
 
Ensuing from the above discussion on lobbying methods and their associated costs, 
the expected benefits from lobbying were explained. The analysis of the motivations 
revealed that lobbyists are driven by outcome-orientated and theoretical motives. 
Avoiding any negative economic impact of a proposed accounting standard was 
shown to be a major motive for lobbying an accounting standard-setter. However, in 
formally addressing the accounting standard-setter on an accounting issue, a 
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theoretical argument is necessary. The literature revealed that the use of one of 
these motives above another or a combination of motives is dependent on the 
accounting issue at hand or the so-called “informational effect”. 
Finally, the applicability of Sutton’s predictions to the question of who is likely to lobby 
was studied. On the question of who is likely to lobby the accounting standard-setter, 
the conclusion was that preparers are more likely to lobby than users; larger 
preparers are more likely to lobby than small preparers; preparers and auditors 
cluster together when presenting their views; and lastly, the academic participation 
rate in lobbying is low.  
The literature study ended with a discussion of lobbying by South African companies 
of the IASB’s accounting standard-setting process. Firstly, the context of South 
Africa’s financial reporting standards and the relevant regulatory bodies responsible 
for those accounting standards were outlined. In this regard, SAICA, in collaboration 
with the APC, has played a significant role in accounting standard-setting in South 
Africa. Secondly, the participation of South African companies in the IASB’s due 
process was deliberated. Although evidence from the academic literature indicates a 
low response rate from South African stakeholders during the IASB comment period, 
Gloeck (2003) and Stainbank’s (2010) findings suggest that South African 
stakeholders make use of other lobbying methods to influence the outcome of 
accounting standards. 
The next chapter presents the study’s research methodology, which includes a 
discussion on the research design, development of the hypotheses, research 
limitations and ethical considerations of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, corporate lobbying of the accounting standard-setter was 
reviewed. The objective of this study was to examine the timing, methods and 
perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies during the 
accounting standard-setting process. The study’s objective was first addressed in 
chapter 2 in the form of a review of the relevant literature in the field of political 
economy and accounting. 
 
It was submitted that there is a paucity of empirical evidence of South African 
companies’ participation, directly or indirectly, in the IASB’s due process. This 
chapter addresses the research design and method of this study to determine the 
timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies 
of the accounting standard-setter. Survey-based research was employed in this study 
to collect primary data on the timing, method and perceived effectiveness of lobbying 
by a sample of South African companies. By comparing the empirical results from the 
questionnaire with Sutton’s (1984) theoretical model, as examined in chapter 2, 
support for Sutton’s (1984) theoretical model in the South African context could be 
determined. 
 
This chapter provides the related research design (section 3.2), the development of 
the hypotheses (section 3.3.), the research methodology used to determine the 
timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies 
during the accounting standard-setting process (section 3.4), the limitations of this 
research methodology (section 3.5), and lastly, the ethical procedures followed in the 
study (section 3.7).  
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In determining the research design of this study, the nature of the proposed research 
had to be considered (Blaxter, 2010:81). The nature of the research in this study was 
the collection of primary data to provide evidence of the timing, methods and 
perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies of the accounting 
standard-setter. In principle, the research aimed to collect this information from a 
sample of listed companies in South Africa through survey-based research.  
3.2.1 Survey-based research 
A survey–based research design was selected as a suitable design since a survey 
“uses a series of written and verbal prompts/items to quantify personal opinions, 
beliefs and ideas from a group of respondents” (Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:206). 
According to Vogt, Haeffele and Gardener (2012:16), a survey-based research 
design is suitable when the following criteria are met: 
 the data is best obtained directly from respondents; 
 the data is best obtained by brief answers to structured questions; 
 it is expected that the respondents will provide reliable information; 
 the answers will be useful to the researcher; and 
 an adequate response rate is expected. 
 
The acceptability of a survey based-research design for this study, based on the 
above criteria of Vogt et al (2012), is discussed in more detail below. 
 
According to Sutton (1984:93), the “construction of hypotheses concerning the timing 
and nature of lobbying is not difficult, but their testing is”. The reason why the testing 
of lobbying activity is difficult is that much of the lobbying of the accounting standard-
setter is private and unobservable (Sutton, 1984:93).  
 
Many studies, such as those of Larson (2008), Jorissen et al (2010) and Stenka and 
Taylor (2010), examine the most observable form of lobbying, that is, the 
respondents’ use of comment letters to the accounting standard-setter. Evidence 
gathered from comment letters is considered weak in respect of theoretical 
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propositions of corporate lobbying behaviour (Lindahl, 1987:63) and does not provide 
insight into other forms of lobbying during the accounting standard-setting process 
(Georgiou, 2004:220). Sutton (1984:93) and Georgiou (2004:220) thus suggest that a 
survey based-research design, using survey instruments such as questionnaires, 
should be employed to gather data on other lobbying methods. 
 
In the context of South Africa, the use of a survey-based research design was also 
deemed more appropriate for this study because of the limited availability of 
observable evidence (such as comment letters) of lobbying during the accounting 
standard-setting process (Gloeck, 2003:73). Hardly any empirical studies on the 
lobbying by South African companies of the accounting standard-setter have been 
conducted in this country. Consequently, archival research was not deemed an 
appropriate research design for this study.  
 
In light of the above, evidence of the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of 
lobbying by South African companies during the accounting standard-setting process 
could best be obtained directly from a sample of South African companies through 
the use of a questionnaire instrument. 
 
Georgiou’s (2004) study examined the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness 
of lobbying of the accounting standard-setter by UK companies. Georgiou (2004) 
used a questionnaire instrument to collect data from respondents. Georgiou’s (2004) 
survey delivered useful information regarding when UK companies lobby, how they 
lobby and how effective they perceive their lobbying to be. Based on these results, 
Georgiou (2004:223) found strong support for Sutton’s (1984) predictions drawn from 
rational choice theory in the UK context.  
 
Since Georgiou’s questionnaire addressed similar hypotheses to those in this study, 
and his questionnaire provided useful and reliable results, it was considered a 
suitable survey instrument for this study. Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire is included 
in appendix C of this dissertation. 
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3.2.2 Questionnaire instrument 
As discussed above, a questionnaire instrument was deemed an appropriate survey 
instrument for this study. A self-administered questionnaire has many advantages. 
Vogt et al (2012) and Lee Abott and McKinney (2013) highlight various advantages of 
questionnaires. Three of the advantages mentioned by them warrant attention. One 
significant advantage of using questionnaires as a survey instrument is that the 
researcher can be certain that all respondents are asked the same questions in the 
same manner (Vogt et al, 2012:21). This is not the case with face-to-face interviews 
where the tone, appearance or sex of the researcher may influence the respondent’s 
answers to questions (Vogt et al, 2012:21). Another advantage of questionnaires is 
that they can elicit more sensitive information from respondents  
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:210). In interviews, respondents tend to be biased 
towards answers that are socially acceptable (Schonlau, Fricker & Elliot, 2002:10). In 
this regard, it has been found that questionnaires provide better quality answers, 
especially from sensitive questions (Schonlau et al, 2002:10). 
 
In this study, the researcher required information on lobbying from the respondents, 
which included unobservable (or disguised) lobbying of the accounting standard-
setter. Respondents might have been reluctant to disclose that they were trying to 
influence the accounting standard-setter outside of the formal due process, as this 
could be deemed to be professionally and socially unacceptable. A questionnaire 
could have potentially elicited this information more easily than with an interview. 
Another advantage of questionnaires is that they are less costly than interviews  
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:210).  
 
Two disadvantages of questionnaires merit discussion. Firstly, respondents tend to 
lose interest in a questionnaire if the questions are long, complex or dependent on 
many contingency options (Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:210). Secondly, the 
evidence suggests that questionnaires have a lower response rate than interviews 
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:210). Proper survey design techniques, preparation 
and follow-up procedures can enable the researcher to overcome these 
disadvantages and mitigate the associated risks. More details on the research 
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method followed to overcome the above challenges are discussed in section 3.4 
below. 
3.2.3 A standard theory-testing model 
Vogt et al (2012:10) describe research where the researcher reflects on the theory, 
formulates hypotheses on the basis of that theory and then tests the hypotheses, as 
a standard theory-testing model. According to Vogt et al (2012:10), this “kind of 
research is very important and, according to many, the only way science 
progresses”. The standard theory-testing model approach was followed in this 
research.  
 
Chapter 2 reflected on Sutton’s (1984) predictions drawn from the rational choice 
model that served as a central theme in this study. The rational choice theory posits 
that a rational individual only lobbies an accounting standard-setter when the 
potential benefits of doing so exceed the costs of lobbying. In light of this, Sutton’s 
(1984) theoretical model predicts at which point in the accounting standard-setting 
process a company embarks on lobbying the accounting standard-setter and which 
lobbying methods it is likely to use based on cost/benefit considerations. The rational 
choice theory is therefore an ordered set of propositions about how something works 
(Vogt et al, 2012:11). Sutton’s (1984) predictions that are drawn from the rational 
choice theory can therefore be tested. Hence this study formulated testable 
hypotheses from Sutton’s predictions, as shown in section 3.3 below. The results of 
the survey-based research and testing of the hypotheses are discussed in chapter 4. 
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3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
A research hypothesis is a prediction that the researcher aims to prove as true 
(Kothari, 2004:186). It is a testable predictive statement relating to at least one 
dependent and one independent variable (Kothari, 2004:34). An independent 
variable is the “cause” variable since it is a variable that influences another variable 
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:34). The dependent variable in a hypothesis is the 
“effect” variable since it is a variable that is influenced by an independent variable 
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:34). The research hypotheses for this study were set 
out in section 1.3 of chapter 1. 
In hypotheses testing, the null basis of the hypotheses is used for statistical analysis 
(Kothari, 2004:186). The null hypothesis is based on the premise that there is no 
difference between the mean of the study sample and the mean of the population, 
and the prediction stated thus posits no difference (Lee Abott and McKinney, 
2013:340). The hypotheses in this study were formulated in their null form and were 
indicated in section 3.3 of chapter 3 for the purposes of statistical analysis, as 
discussed in chapter 4. 
The null hypotheses used in this study were based on the null hypotheses formulated 
by Georgiou (2004:222) in his research on the timing, methods and perceived 
effectiveness of lobbying in the UK context. The reason for using the hypotheses as 
formulated by Georgiou (2004) was that his research problem, research objectives 
and research methods were similar to those employed in this study. However, 
Georgiou’s (2004) study was conducted in the UK and investigated lobbying of the 
ASB’s due process, whilst this study was conducted in South Africa and investigated 
lobbying of the IASB’s due process. The due process of the ASB is similar to that of 
other accounting standard-setters, including the IASB’s due process. 
  
Support for the hypotheses used in this research is provided below.  
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3.3.1 The timing of lobbying 
The various stages of the accounting standard-setting process of the IASB were 
discussed in detail in section 1.1.2 of chapter 1. The seven stages of the due process 
provide lobbyists with a number of opportunities to participate in lobbying of the 
IASB.  
 
As discussed earlier in section 2.4.1, the literature on the timing of lobbying suggests 
that lobbying during the earlier stages is effective because it is less costly and the 
probability of influencing the accounting standard-setter is high (Sutton, 1984:88). 
Lobbying during this period is effective since the accounting standard-setter is still 
undecided about the accounting issue and is therefore susceptible to influence from 
affected parties (Sutton, 1984:88). Gullberg (2008:172) agrees that “early lobbying 
might influence the political debate by defining the political problem from the 
beginning, before decision-makers have decided on a position”. Hence lobbying is 
likely to be successful if it “takes place before a civil servant sets pencil to paper for 
the first time to write a proposal” (Van Lent, 1997:22). In light of the above, most 
lobbying activity is expected during the earlier stages since it is the most effective 
time in the process to influence the accounting standard-setter.  
 
It is also less costly for the lobbyist to participate during the earlier stages than the 
later stages. The accounting standard-setter progresses towards a more definite view 
on the accounting issue at hand as the standard-setting process progresses towards 
the exposure draft stage (Sutton, 1984:88). More resources are therefore required 
from the lobbyist to sway the accounting standard-setter’s settled position during the 
later stages of the process than to sway the undecided position of the accounting 
standard-setter during the earlier stages of the process. In formal terms, more 
companies lobby during the earlier stages because 𝑃(𝑈𝑎 −  𝑈𝑏) > 𝐶. 
 
As demonstrated above, there is a link between the perceived effectiveness of 
lobbying during a specific stage and the use of that stage by the lobbyist. Two 
hypotheses were therefore formulated in order to test Sutton’s predictions. The 
hypotheses were stated in their null form: 
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H01: There is no significant difference between the use of the earlier stages and the 
later stages of the accounting standard-setting process to lobby the IASB. 
 
H02: Companies perceive lobbying during all the stages of the accounting standard-
setting process as equally effective. 
3.3.2 The methods of lobbying and their perceived effectiveness 
Sutton (1984:89) predicts that a lobbyist uses a lobbying method if it “offers him the 
most influence (increase in P) per unit of lobbying expenditure”. Therefore when 
choosing a mix of lobbying methods, the lobbyist seeks benefits that exceed the total 
costs of the lobbying methods (Georgiou, 2004).  
Consistent with Sutton’s prediction that lobbying is not restricted to comment letter 
submissions, Georgiou found (2004:230) that companies make use of a variety of 
lobbying methods of which comment letter submissions are not the most popular. 
Sutton (1984) also suggests that other lobbying methods, such as seeking a private 
audience with the accounting standard-setter or using a third party to lobby on behalf 
of the lobbyists, are more popular than comment letter submissions. Based on the 
conclusions of Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2004), one would therefore expect South 
African companies to prefer using lobbying methods other than comment letter 
submissions. Gloeck (2003:73) also alluded to this assumption:  
“… the SAICA pre-standards documents (exposure drafts) elicit very little 
comment and therefore give rise to speculation that role players have found 
alternative ways of influencing the standard setting process”. 
Nonetheless, as indicated earlier in section 1.2, evidence of lobbying methods, other 
than the use of comment letters, is difficult to obtain and there is a paucity of 
academic literature available on the use of other lobbying methods. In this regard, 
Hodges and Mellet (2002) and Georgiou (2004) point researchers in a direction when 
attempting to investigate other lobbying methods. Georgiou (2004:230) found that 
overall comment letters submission are an effective indicator of the use of other 
lobbying methods by lobbyists. Georgiou’s findings are consistent with the findings of 
an investigation by Hodges and Mellet (2002:144) that show that companies make 
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reference in their comment letters of earlier lobbying attempts to influence the 
outcome of a proposed accounting standard.  
It is therefore hypothesised that there is significant association between the use of 
comment letter submissions and other lobbying methods. The hypothesis was stated 
in its null form: 
 
H03: The use of comment letters submissions is not significantly associated with the 
use of other lobbying methods. 
 
Sutton (1984:90) submits that it is difficult for the researcher to judge the relative 
efficacy of all the lobbying methods. Sutton (1984:90) suggests that indirect lobbying 
methods, though extremely costly (𝐶 ), are perceived to be more effective (𝑃) in 
influencing the accounting standard-setter than direct methods. Regarding direct 
methods, Sutton (1984:90) suggests that private meetings with the accounting 
standard-setter are the most effective. Sutton predicts (1984:90) that “the 
effectiveness of lobbying (its effect on P) is likely to vary inversely with its visibility”. 
Hence one would not expect an observable form such as comment letter 
submissions to be rated as a very effective lobbying method.  
To date, there is limited evidence available on how effective the lobbyists perceive 
lobbying to be. Georgiou’s (2004) survey results do provide some insight into the 
perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods. He found that lobbyists do not perceive 
the various lobbying methods to be equally effective, and they perceive lobbying 
methods other than comment letters to be more effective than comment letter 
submissions. 
In light of the above, the research hypothesis was that companies perceive lobbying 
methods other than comment letters to be significantly more effective than comment 
letter submissions. The hypothesis was stated in its null form: 
H04: Companies perceive all lobbying methods to be equally effective. 
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3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Schonlau et al (2002:6) suggest that proper construction of the entire survey process 
is essential to research success. The survey-process framework suggested by 
Schonlau et al (2002:6-7) is illustrated as follows: 
 
FIGURE 3.1 – Survey process framework 
 
Source: Own observation from Schonlau et al (2002) 
 
The research methodology followed by the researcher in this study is discussed in 
terms of Schonlau et al’s (2002) survey process framework. 
  
Defining the survey objectives 
This includes 
- Specifying the population; 
- Delineating the data; and 
- Determining the precision results. 
Determining the sample 
This includes 
- Selecting the sample; and 
- Specifying the sample selection method. 
Creating and testing the survey instrument 
This includes 
• Choosing the response mode; 
• Drafting the questions; and 
• Pre-testing and revising the survey instrument. 
Contacting respondents  
This is done through: 
• Pre-notifications; 
• Post-delivery reminders; and 
• Non-response follow-up 
Data collection, data reduction and analysis 
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3.4.1 Determining the survey objectives 
The objective of the survey was to collect empirical evidence of the timing, methods 
and perceived effectiveness of lobbying of the accounting standard-setter by South 
African companies.  The population, therefore, included South African companies. 
3.4.1.1 Population 
According to Lee Abbott and McKinney (2013:102), a researcher determines the 
population for his or her study on the basis of his or her research problem and 
design. Since the research problem of this study was the uncertainty of the timing, 
methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies of the 
accounting standard-setter, the researcher decided to select South African 
companies listed on the JSE as the population. 
A list of JSE-listed companies was obtained from the Share Data website on 
25 November 2015. From this list of companies, a sample for the survey based-
research was selected. 
3.4.2 Sample 
The procedure for selecting the sample is described below. 
 
The sample for this survey-based research was selected from a list of JSE-listed 
companies. Only those companies with a primary listing on the JSE were eligible for 
selection. The reason for excluding companies with a secondary listing on the JSE, is 
that it is likely that such companies lobby from the foreign country where they are 
primarily listed because this is where their administrative and accounting functions 
are probably situated. For example, British American Tobacco PLC was excluded 
from the list because it has a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange and a 
secondary listing on the JSE. This study aimed to examine companies’ lobbying 
behaviour in the South African context and it was therefore deemed prudent to 
exclude from the sample those “foreign” companies with a secondary listing on the 
JSE. 
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Also, in determining the top 100 primary JSE-listed companies, those listed 
companies belonging to the same group were treated as one company. The rationale 
for treating companies in the same group of companies as one, was that it is unlikely 
that companies in the same group would lobby separately. In line with Olson’s (2002) 
theory of collective action, companies with similar interests and cost sharing rules 
choose to lobby collectively rather than separately. 
 
The remaining companies on the list were ranked in descending order according to 
the market capitalisation of each company. The sample selected for this study 
comprised the top 100 listed companies based on their market capitalisation. The 
rationale for selecting the top 100 companies was based on the academic literature 
referred to in section 2.6.1, which indicated that larger companies are more likely to 
lobby than smaller companies. Georgiou (2004:224) also submitted that smaller 
companies are less likely to respond to a questionnaire on lobbying. The researcher 
therefore deliberately selected the 100 largest companies on the list, based on the 
suppositions from the academic literature.  
 
The above method for selecting a sample for this survey-based research was 
consistent with the approach followed by Samkin (1996:201) in his survey-based 
study. Khotari (2004:67) submitted that deliberate sampling is acceptable where the 
population is small and characteristics specific to that population are to be studied. In 
such cases the results are “tolerably reliable” (2004:59). Hence, even though the 
sample was not selected by a random sampling method, the results from this 
empirical study were still usable to make inferences about the timing, methods and 
perceived effectiveness of lobby by South African companies of the IASB. 
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3.4.3 Creating and testing the questionnaire instrument 
The researcher accepted Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire as a survey instrument in 
this research for the following reasons: 
 Georgiou’s (2004) research objective was the same as the research objectives for 
this study, the only difference being that this empirical study was conducted 
among South African participants; 
 Georgiou’s (2004) hypotheses were developed and formulated from Sutton’s 
predictions drawn from the rational choice theory, which was also the underlying 
theoretical framework of this research; and 
 Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire delivered reliable and usable responses.  
 
Based on the above, the researcher concluded that Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
was a suitable survey instrument to address the research objectives of this study.  
 
The main difference between this empirical study and Georgiou’s empirical study was 
the accounting institutional setting and the country where Georgiou’s (2004) research 
was conducted. Georgiou’s (2004) research was undertaken in the UK and was 
specifically aimed at the timing, method and perceived effectiveness of lobbying on 
the UK accounting standard-setter at the time, the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB). The accounting standard-setting process of the ASB is similar to that of other 
accounting standard-setting bodies (Georgiou, 2004:221). 
 
This survey-based research was performed in South Africa and aimed to determine 
the timing, method and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African 
companies of the IASB’s standard-setting process. The researcher elected to use 
Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire for this empirical study by adapting it to the South 
African context. The details of the questionnaire instrument of Georgiou (2004) are 
discussed in section 3.4.3.1 below. The adaption of Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
for this empirical study is discussed in section 3.4.3.2 below.  
  
86 
 
3.4.3.1 Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
Question format 
Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire consisted of three questions. The first two questions 
were close-ended questions, often referred to as “forced choice” questions (Vogt et 
al, 2012:25). The third question invited companies to provide additional comments if 
considered necessary. The questionnaire was therefore mainly a structured one. One 
of the main advantages of a structured survey such as this questionnaire is that it 
delivers higher response rates (Dilmann, 1999) cited in Lee Abott and McKinney, 
2013). 
 
Structure of the questionnaire 
Question 1 related to the stages at which companies participated in the standard-
setting process. The stages specified on the questionnaire referred to the accounting 
standard-setting stages of the ASB. The respondents had to choose between a “Yes” 
and “No” option to indicate involvement of the company at certain stages in the 
ASB’s process of developing an accounting standard. Regardless of a “Yes” or “No” 
answer, the respondents also had to indicate next to their responses, by using the 
following five-point Likert scale, the perceived effectiveness of participation at certain 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process. The Likert scale used by the 
respondents was as follows: 
 
1 Very effective 
2 Effective  
3 Neither effective nor ineffective 
4 Ineffective 
5 Very ineffective 
DK Don’t know 
 
A Likert-scale gives respondents the option to express their level of agreement or 
disagreement with a statement by using a value from one to five (Schonlau et al, 
2002:58). Georgiou added the “don’t know” option to the scaling system to avoid “… 
forcing an answer which might not have been well-informed” (2004:223). Likert 
scales are efficient in examining the degree of support for “… a belief, policy, or 
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practice” (Vogt et al, 2012:27) and were therefore deemed appropriate in this study to 
assess the perceived effectiveness of lobbying. 
 
Question 2 related to the methods used by a company to participate in the process 
of accounting standard-setting. Georgiou (2004:222) included in the questionnaire 
direct lobbying methods, where the respondents lobbied the ASB directly, and 
indirect lobbying methods, where the lobbyist lobbied the ASB via a third party. Again 
respondents had a “Yes” or “No” to indicate the type of methods employed by the 
company. Irrespective of their use of a method or not, they had to indicate the 
perceived effectiveness of the methods by using the Likert scale above. An “other” 
option was provided at the end of question 2, in order to allow respondents to 
indicate if a lobbying method, other than those mentioned in the questionnaire, was 
used.  
 
Question 3 invited companies to make additional comments if considered necessary. 
This question was therefore a general open-ended question and not designed to 
address a specific hypothesis, but information supplied here may provide the 
researcher with additional insights (Vogt et al, 2012:37). 
3.4.3.2 Adaptation of Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire focused on the accounting standard-setting process 
of the ASB, a private accounting standard-setter in the UK at the time. The focus of 
the study was the lobbying of the IASB by South African companies. The researcher 
therefore had to ensure that the accounting standard-setting stages (question 1) and 
the lobbying methods (question 2) were relevant and complete in the context of this 
empirical investigation.  
 
Amendments to question 1 
The accounting standard-setting stages of the ASB are similar to the accounting 
standard-setting stages of the IASB (Georgiou, 2010:105). However, Georgiou’s 
(2004) questionnaire did not include the post-implementation review stage even 
though this was part of the ASB’s due process. The post-implementation review 
stage of the IASB mainly consists of public consultation to determine the impact of a 
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new accounting standard or amendment on the public (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:35). 
This is also the only stage in the due process where the IASB officially mentions that 
informal consultation with interested parties is allowed (IFRS Foundation, 2013a:36).  
 
It was important to include the post-implementation review stage in question 1 of this 
study for two reasons. Firstly, the accounting standard-setting stages referred to in 
question 1 would have been incomplete if the post-implementation review stage had 
been excluded, since this is a formal stage of the IABS’s due process (IFRS 
Foundation, 2013a:35) Secondly, the public consultation by the IASB during the post-
implementation review stage provides the ideal opportunity for lobbying with a view to 
affecting the next agenda formation stage (see section 2.4.5 in this regard). Based on 
the above, the researcher amended the Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire to include 
the post-implementation review stage in question 1 of this study’s questionnaire. 
  
Amendments to question 2 
Regarding the lobbying methods (question 2) mentioned by Georgiou (2004) in his 
questionnaire, the researcher had to ascertain if the lobbying methods mentioned in 
Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire were relevant and complete in the context of the 
accounting standard-setting process of the IASB. To ascertain this, the researcher 
agreed the formal lobbying methods used in Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire in the 
context of the ASB to the formal lobbying methods outlined in the Due Process 
Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013a). The researcher noted no exceptions in this 
regard and concluded that the formal lobbying methods in Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire were relevant and complete in the context of this study. Therefore no 
amendments were made to the formal lobbying methods mentioned in Georgiou’s 
(2004) questionnaire.  
 
Since informal lobbying methods are not publicly available or documented by any 
accounting standard-setter (Jorissen et al, 2010:3), it is impossible to determine if the 
informal methods mentioned in Georgiou (2004) are complete. Although the 
completeness of informal lobbying methods mentioned by Georgiou (2004) cannot be 
tested, the researcher resolved to compare other scholarly observations of informal 
lobbying methods with Georgiou’s (2004) informal lobbying methods. In this way, the 
researcher ensured that, at the least, the most evident informal methods were 
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included in the questionnaire. The comparison between informal lobbying methods 
mentioned by other scholarly works and Georgiou (2004) is illustrated below: 
 
TABLE 3.1 – Comparison of literature examining informal lobbying methods 
 Informal lobbying 
methods mentioned by 
Sutton (1984) 
Informal lobbying 
methods mentioned by 
Jorissen et al (2010) 
Informal lobbying 
methods in  
Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire 
1. Private meetings with 
the accounting standard 
setter 
Informal meetings with 
members or staff of the 
accounting standard-
setter  
Communicating the 
company’s views to ASB 
members in prearranged 
private meetings 
2. Appealing to 
SEC/Congress or UK 
accountancy bodies 
Influencing the opinion 
of the accounting 
professional bodies 
 
Appealing to FRC 
members for support of 
the company’s views 
3. Private appeals to board 
officials 
Intervening directly with 
the project staff 
Communicating to the 
ASB members through 
other means (e.g. 
telephone conversation, 
meeting at conferences) 
4. Securing representation 
on the board of the 
accounting standard-
setter or a task force 
Becoming a 
member of the working 
group when it is formed 
Having members of 
one’s company 
appointed as 
consultants to the ASB 
on particular projects 
5. Using the company’s 
accounting firm as an 
information channel for 
the views of the 
company 
- Appealing to the 
company’s external 
auditors for support on 
the company’s views 
6. - Communicating with a 
preparer’s organisation 
in order to influence its 
comment letter sent to 
the IASB 
Appealing to the 
company’s trade 
organisation(s) for 
support of its views 
7. - - Commenting in the 
media 
 
In light of the above comparison it is clear that all of the lobbying methods mentioned 
by Jorissen et al (2010) and Sutton (1984) were included in Georgiou’s (2004) 
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questionnaire. Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire included one additional informal 
lobbying method not mentioned by Jorissen et al (2010) and Sutton (1984), that is, 
commenting in the media. There was also support from other studies (Hodges and 
Mellet, 2002:129) to justify inclusion of this informal method in Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire. In this regard, the researcher was satisfied that Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire included the most evident informal lobbying methods. The researcher 
also accepted the relevance of the informal lobbying methods in the IASB context  
because the ASB and IASB standard-setting processes are similar and it is therefore 
likely that similar informal lobbying methods are employed in the IASB’s standard-
setting process. In conclusion, the researcher was satisfied with the completeness 
and relevance of the lobbying methods mentioned by Georgiou (2004), and no 
amendments were made in this regard. 
  
The researcher amended question 2 of Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire by replacing 
all references to the ASB with the IASB in order to reflect the accounting standard-
setter in the case of this study. The reference in Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire to 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was also replaced with the Financial 
Reporting Standards Council. The aim of the FRC in the UK is to “implement and 
monitor standards for corporate reporting …” (Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
2016). The Financial Reporting Standards Council (FRSC) in South Africa was 
established in 2011 in terms of the Companies Act 2008 (Financial Reporting 
Standards Council (FRSC), 2016:2). The FRSCs objective is to review “… any newly 
issued International Financial Reporting Standards and Interpretations and assesses 
the impact thereof in a South African context with a view to determining whether local 
interpretations in the form of FRPs are required” (FRSC, 2016). The FRSC in South 
Africa therefore has a similar objective to that of the FRS in the UK, and the 
researcher consequently resolved to replace the reference to FRS to FRSC in the 
questionnaire for this study. 
 
Question 2 was also amended by including the lobbying methods used to lobby the 
IASB through SAICA. This amendment was made in order for the questionnaire 
instrument to include indirect lobbying that refers to using SAICA as a lobbying body 
on behalf of South African companies. “Indirect methods” are defined as those 
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lobbying methods where the lobbyist uses a third party to communicate its views to 
the accounting standard-setter (Georgiou, 2004:222).  
 
Inclusion of lobbying methods aimed at SAICA was deemed necessary for the 
following reasons: Samkin (1996:146) suggests that it is likely that SAICA will be 
used in a lobbying role once IFRS is adopted in South Africa. Also, SAICA is 
responsible for the products of the accounting standard-setting process in South 
Africa  
(Gloeck, 2003:221) and consequently a target for lobbyists.  
 
In light of the above, the researcher included in the questionnaire the indirect 
lobbying methods used to influence SAICA. These indirect methods are mirrored on 
the direct lobbying methods mentioned in Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire in the 
context of the ASB.  
 
In order to conclude on the above discussion, the amendments to Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire can be summarised as follows: 
 the inclusion of the post-implementation review stage in question 1; 
 amending UK institutional references to South African institutions in question 2; 
and 
 the inclusion of a question relevant to the lobbying methods to influence SAICA. 
3.4.4 Pre-testing the questionnaire 
This study’s questionnaire was primarily based on the questionnaire used by 
Georgiou (2004) and therefore consisted largely of standard items as opposed to 
new or original items. Lee Abbott and McKinney (2013:212) describe standard items 
as “… survey items that have been used before in previous surveys and have been 
found to be reliable and valid”. Pre-testing of a survey by using a small sample of the 
target population is only necessary if the survey items are new and original 
(2013:212). Although a few amendments were made to Georgiou’s (2004) questions, 
as discussed in section 3.3.3.2, these amendments did not result in a new or 
completely original questionnaire.  
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Although there were no major amendments to Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire and it 
was consequently not necessary to pre-test the questionnaire, the researcher 
decided that a pre-test of the questionnaire was necessary to ensure that in the 
context of South Africa, the questionnaire was reliable and valid. Reliability is the 
extent to which the questionnaire produces the same result  
(Lee Abbott and McKinney, 2013:45). Validity refers to the accuracy of the 
questionnaire, that is, whether it examines what it purports to  
examine (Lee Abbott and McKinney, 2013:45).  
 
The researcher selected two academic colleagues in the Department of Financial 
Accounting at the University of South Africa and two external parties involved in 
financial reporting at their companies, to pre-test this questionnaire. All four 
individuals are Chartered Accountants (SA). The motivation for selecting these 
individuals to pre-test the questionnaire was that they have the necessary academic 
qualifications, financial reporting experience, as well as a sound understanding of the 
accounting standard-setting process. After completing the questionnaire, the 
respondents were required to provide feedback on the clarity, understandability, 
length of the questionnaire and the time it took them to complete it. They were also 
requested to indicate if the instructions to the questionnaire were clear and 
understandable. 
 
The results from the pre-test indicated to the researcher that the questionnaire was 
reliable and valid. The questionnaire was therefore not amended in any way after the 
pre-test. 
 
3.4.5 Response mode 
The questionnaire in this study was an internet-based survey. Respondents replied to 
this survey by following the hyperlink contained in the communication email sent to 
them. The hyperlink contained a token that could only be used once to submit the 
survey online. In this way, the researcher could prevent a company from submitting 
more than one survey. The participant was able to save the questionnaire and return 
to it later in order to complete the questionnaire. In this way, the researcher was able 
to monitor on LimeSurvey any incomplete responses. 
93 
 
 
For an internet-based survey to be successful, the questionnaire design should have 
a simple presentation and all user-inputs should be understandable. In this regard, 
the researcher selected LimeSurvey as the survey tool since its presentation and 
functionality are simple and understandable to users. The researcher administered 
the internet-based survey on LimeSurvey.  
The researcher pre-tested the online functionality of the questionnaire.  
Schonlau et al (2002:51) suggest that pre-testing of internet-based surveys is 
important to ensure that different computing platforms, browsers and connection 
speeds can accommodate the survey. The researcher selected two individuals 
employed at different companies to complete the internet-based survey in order to 
test the online functionality of the questionnaire from various locations and computer 
platforms. The researcher was satisfied with results from the pre-test of the online 
functionality of the questionnaire.  
 
3.4.6 Contact, response and follow-up 
The researcher obtained the contact information of the head offices of the selected 
top 100 JSE primary listed companies from the Share Data website and also from the 
relevant companies’ websites. The researcher contacted the respective head offices 
telephonically to determine who the appropriate individuals at the companies were for 
participating in the survey. The researcher made contact with these individuals to 
determine their willingness to participate in the survey. Those individuals that 
indicated that they were willing to participate in the survey provided the researcher 
with their email addresses and contact details. These individuals received an email 
from the researcher containing the hyperlink to the survey.  
 
The email body contained the cover letter to the questionnaire that stated the 
following: 
 the purpose of the questionnaire; 
 the general target group of the questionnaire; 
 the estimated time to complete the questionnaire; 
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 assurance (to respondents) that the results of the survey would be reported in 
aggregate and treated as confidential;  
 the fact that the information provided by respondents would be treated as 
confidential; and 
 the researcher’s name and contact details. 
 
The results of the questionnaire were collected through LimeSurvey. Five follow-up 
reminders were emailed to those individuals that failed to respond but had indicated 
that they were willing to participate in the survey. 
3.4.7 Data collection, data reduction and analysis 
The statistical analysis of the empirical results was similar to that applied in 
Georgiou’s (2004) empirical study. The data collection, results and analysis are 
discussed in chapter 4. 
3.5 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
The top 100 primary JSE listed companies were selected by means of non-random 
sampling. For this reason, the results of this survey based-research cannot be 
generalised to the whole population. However, the largest companies on the JSE 
listed companies are more likely to lobby than the smaller companies on the JSE 
since the larger companies are able to afford the costs associated with lobbying and 
also obtain great benefits from lobbying (Sutton, 1984). The researcher thus felt that 
a study of the largest companies listed on the JSE would assist her to make 
inferences about the corporate lobbying of the accounting standard-setter by South 
African companies.  
 
Another limitation of this study might have been the companies’ willingness to 
disclose their participation in lobbying of the accounting standard-setter for fear of 
being perceived as illegitimately influencing a regulatory process. The potential 
negative publicity a constituent might be subjected to if they are associated with 
lobbying, and especially disguised lobbying, might have influenced the constituents’ 
responses in the questionnaire. 
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The research methodology of this study contained a delimitation. The listed 
companies that responded to the questionnaire were requested to indicate their 
lobbing during a specific period; from 1 January 2005 to December 2015. The reason 
for a time period delimitation was that listed companies were required to report in 
terms of IFRS from 1 January 2005. 
3.6 ETHICAL PROCEDURES 
The main ethical concern of the research methodology arises from the use of the 
questionnaire instrument to procure information from individuals. The protection of 
the individual’s personal details and the information of the companies they present is 
an important aspect of any survey-based research. The researcher employed the 
following procedures to counter the above ethical concern: 
 the details of the participants were kept confidential when reporting the findings 
and results of the questionnaire in chapter 4; 
 the details of the individuals, as well as their responses, were kept secure on a 
password-protected database. Only the researcher had access to the database; 
 the participants were informed that participation in the survey was voluntarily and 
they could withdraw at any time without any obligation to explain; 
 the identities of the researcher and the organisation she represents were 
presented in her email to the participants; and 
 the purpose of the questionnaire and the reason for collecting the information 
from the individuals were clearly described in the covering letter of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Although the nature of survey-based research has the potential of harm, the 
researcher made every effort  to counteract it. Approval for this research was 
obtained from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the College of Accounting 
Sciences at Unisa. The ethics clearance certificate is included in appendix D. 
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3.7 SUMMARY 
Chapter 3 first addressed the research design relevant to this study. The chosen 
empirical research design consisted of the distribution of a questionnaire instrument 
to a sample of South African companies in order to collect data on the timing, 
methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying the IASB. 
 
The next section proceeded with the formulation of the four hypotheses. The 
hypotheses were based on Sutton’s (1984) theoretical model and the hypotheses 
used in Georgiou’s (2004) study. The questionnaire instrument used in this study was 
based on the four hypotheses formulated in section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 explained the research method employed by the researcher. This 
included a discussion on the selection of the top 100 listed South African companies. 
This was followed by a discussion of the questionnaire instrument distributed to the 
sample companies. The questionnaire instrument mirrored Georgiou’s (2004) 
questionnaire instrument used in his UK study on lobbying of the ASB. Importantly, 
the relevance and completeness of Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire were considered 
and some minor changes were made to Georgiou’s original questionnaire. 
This chapter further dealt with the testing the questionnaire, the chosen response 
mode, contacting respondents and follow-up procedures. 
In the next section, the limitations and the delimitations of the empirical study were 
considered. An important limitation of the study arose from the non-random sampling 
method applied to selecting the top 100 listed companies. The results from the 
questionnaire instrument can therefore not be generalised to all South African 
companies. 
Lastly, the ethical procedures followed in terms of the prescriptions of the ethical 
approval obtained from the Research Review Committee of the College of 
Accounting Sciences at Unisa were discussed. 
The next chapter presents the research findings from the questionnaire instrument. 
Chapter 4 specifically deals with the response rate, profile of the respondents and 
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preparation of the raw data. Chapter 4 further reports on the testing of the four 
hypotheses and the statistical analysis of the results. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the findings of the empirical study of the corporate lobbying 
of the accounting standard-setter by South African companies. The chapter 
commences with a discussion of the number of responses received from the 
questionnaire, followed by an analysis of the respondents’ profiles. Thereafter the 
preparation of the data collected from the questionnaire is described. The various 
appropriate statistical tests for analysing the data are outlined in the section to follow. 
Finally, the four hypotheses are tested and the statistics for the data are interpreted 
and discussed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings of this study. 
4.2 RESPONSES 
The researcher contacted the sample of the top 100 primary JSE-listed companies. 
Of these, 84 companies indicated that they were willing to participate in the survey. 
The questionnaire was distributed to the 84 companies willing to participate. The 
survey achieved 41 responses. Five companies submitted responses that were 
incomplete to the extent that they were not usable for analysis and were 
consequently excluded from the data. A 36% usable response rate was therefore 
obtained for the questionnaire.  
The low response rate of this survey is similar to the response rate of other survey-
based research conducted among listed companies. For example, Georgiou’s 
(2004:224) questionnaire aimed at listed companies in the UK, delivered a response 
rate of 30,4 percent (2004:224). Another example, Venter and Stiglingh (2006:89) 
sent their questionnaire to the top 200 JSE-listed companies in South Africa and 
obtained a 40% response rate.  
 
Owing to the low response rate of the questionnaire, the extent of the non-response 
bias was investigated by comparing the market capitalisation of the 36 respondents 
and the 64 non-respondents. A Wilcoxon rank sum test was employed to determine if 
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there was a statistically significant difference between the market capitalisation of the 
companies that submitted the questionnaire and the companies that did not.  
 
The results revealed that the mean market capitalisation of the respondent 
companies was 53.417 and the mean market capitalisation of the non-respondent 
companies was 48.860. There was statistically no significant difference between the 
market capitalisation of the respondent companies and the non-respondent 
companies (Z = 0.750, p = 0.453). The results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test 
indicated that there was probably no bias in opinion that could be caused by 
differences in company size of the respondents and non-respondents.  
4.3 RESPONDENTS’ PROFILES 
The questionnaire distributed to the sample companies included questions pertaining 
to the profile of the individuals answering the questionnaire. The data of the 
respondents’ profile were gathered from questions 1 to 4 of the questionnaire. The 
profile questions required information from the respondents regarding their gender, 
position in the company, number of years of accounting-related work experience and 
if they are qualified Chartered Accountants (SA). The results from the profile 
questions are reported below in figures 4.1 to 4.4.  
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Figure 4.1 illustrates that almost 70% of the respondents to the survey were male. 
FIGURE 4.1 – Gender of respondents 
 
 
Nearly 90% of the respondents hold the professional designation of a Chartered 
Accountant (SA), as illustrated in figure 4.2. Owing to the high number of 
respondents being Chartered Accountants, the researcher was satisfied that the 
respondents had sufficient knowledge of the IASB’s accounting standard-setting 
process to understand and answer the questions in the survey.  
FIGURE 4.2 – Respondents holding the Chartered Accountant (SA) designation 
 
 
31% 
69% 
Female Male
89% 
11% 
Qualified CA (SA) Not a qualitied CA (SA)
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According to figure 4.3, approximately 60% of the respondents had more than 11 
years of accounting-related work experience.  
 
FIGURE 4.3 – Years of accounting-related work experience 
 
 
The questionnaire was mostly answered by individuals employed as senior 
managers (38.89%) and managers (30.56%). 
 
FIGURE 4.4 – Positions of respondents in their company 
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102 
 
4.4 DATA PREPARATION 
Data preparation includes editing of raw data, and coding, classification and 
tabulation of data (Kothari, 2004:122). The details of the preparation of primary data 
collected through the questionnaire used in this study are discussed below.  
 
4.4.1 Editing of raw data 
Editing of data entails examining the raw data for errors or omissions to ensure that it   
is accurate and complete (Kothari, 2004:122). In order to edit the data in this manner, 
the results from the questionnaire instrument were exported from LimeSurvey into an 
Excel worksheet. All the responses were scrutinised for completeness. Five of the 
responses were incomplete to the extent that they were not usable for data analysis 
purposes. No further editing of the raw data was required since the remaining data in 
Excel was of good quality and was well arranged for coding. 
 
4.4.2 Coding of data 
Coding is assigning numerals to answers so that responses can be grouped in 
categories to ensure efficient statistical analysis (Kothari, 2004:123). The survey data 
was imported into SAS JMP version 12, a statistical programme used to analyse 
data. Coding of the data was performed in SAS JMP version 12.  
 
4.4.3 Classification of data 
Classification of data entails arranging it into classes on the basis of common 
characteristics (Kothari, 2004:123). Classification of data was not performed in this 
study. Instead, the data from the questionnaire instrument was grouped for the 
purposes of testing the four hypotheses and for further analysis. For instance, in 
order to test hypothesis 1 in section 4.6.1.1, the various stages of the accounting 
standard-setting process were grouped into two categories, namely the earlier and 
later stages. The grouping of the data was necessary in order to test hypothesis 1 by 
means of a statistical test such as the paired t-test.  
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4.4.4 Tabulation of data 
Tabulation of data is the orderly arrangement of data in table format  
(Kothari, 2004:127). Tabulation of data was done throughout the analysis of the 
statistics relating to the four hypotheses. The tabulation of data was necessary in 
order to present the various data and statistical tests in a summarised and concise 
format.  This chapter contains eight tables explaining the results and findings of the 
survey-based research. 
4.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The following statistical procedures were employed to analyse the data from the 
questionnaire to determine the corporate lobbying of accounting standard-setting by 
South African companies. 
 Paired t-test: This test is used to test if a significant difference exists between the 
means of two related (paired) samples. The test statistic is expressed as t and is 
compared to the p-value based on t-distributions at a specified level of 
significance to determine if the null hypothesis can be rejected or accepted 
(Kothari, 2004:196); 
 Chi-square test of independence: This test determines if categorical data shows 
significant dependency (Kothari, 2004:233) or if it is significantly associated  
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:94). This test determines how well the sample 
proportions fit the proportions specified in the null hypothesis  
(Corder and Foreman, 2009:168). The test of independence uses the contingency 
table format. Cramer’s V is used to measure the association between the 
variables; 
 Fisher’s exact test: This test is used instead of a chi-square test when the data 
obtained is from small independent samples. Fisher’s exact test follows the same 
method as the chi-square test, and analyses the scores of two independent 
samples (Corder and Foreman, 2009:168); 
 Analysis of variance (ANOVA): This is a parametric test to test if significant 
differences exist between the means of various groups  
(Lee Abott and McKinney, 2013:397); 
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 Friedman test: This is a nonparametric test to determine if more than two samples 
are related. The ANOVA is the parametric equivalent of the Friedman test  
(Corder and Foreman, 2009:79); 
 Wilcoxon signed rank test: This is a non-parametric test that determines the 
differences between the values of two related (paired) samples and assigns a 
rank to absolute values of the differences, from the smallest differences to the 
largest differences (Kothari, 2004:291). Differences of zero are discarded and tied 
differences are assigned an average ranking. Thereafter the ranks are awarded 
the sign of the original difference of the data. The test of significance under the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test determines if the computed sum of signed ranks is 
significantly different from zero (Williams, Sweeney & Anderson, 2009); and 
 Wilcoxon rank sum test: The rank sum test differs from the signed rank test in that 
it is not based on matched samples but on two independent samples. The 
Wilcoxon rank sum test determines if two populations are equal. This test ranks 
the combined data from the two samples from low to high. The ranks of each 
sample are then added separately and the test of significant differences is 
performed (Williams et al, 2009:765). 
 
The researcher employed the services of an independent statistician to minimise the 
risk of bias during the statistical analysis of the data. 
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4.6 TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
The null hypotheses are tested to determine if the null hypotheses can be accepted 
or rejected. If a null hypothesis is rejected, then the set of alternatives to the null 
hypothesis is considered. The set of alternatives is referred to as the alternative 
hypothesis or the research hypothesis (Kothari, 2004:186). 
 
The procedure for testing hypotheses includes 
 determining a level of significance;  
 calculating the appropriate sampling distribution; 
 calculating the probability that the sample diverges from expectations if the null 
hypothesis is true; and 
 comparing the above probability with the level of significance (Kothari, 2004:191). 
 
The probability value (p-value) for hypothesis testing in this study was calculated as 
0.05, indicating a statistical significance at a 95% level of confidence. Therefore, a 
null hypothesis was rejected when the sampling result had a less than 0.05 
probability of occurring if the null hypothesis was true. 
 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests were employed to test the four 
hypotheses. In instances where data was not normally distributed, a parametric test 
was not performed. In such instances, only a non-parametric test was performed. 
 
Where respondents selected the “do not know” option when rating the effectiveness 
of the various stages and lobbying methods, the “do not know” responses were 
excluded from the sample when conducting statistical analysis. This was necessary 
since a score cannot be allocated to the “do not know” option and including it in the 
statistical analysis would result in errors. 
 
In the next section, each of the four hypotheses is discussed using the following 
structure: 
 results of the testing of the hypothesis; and 
 interpretation of the results. 
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4.6.1 Timing of lobbying 
4.6.1.1 Testing of hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 dealt with the lobbying by companies during the various stages of the 
accounting standard-setting process of the IASB. The data used to test the 
hypothesis was gathered from question 5 of the questionnaire where respondents 
were required to answer “yes” or “no” to the actual use of each stage of the 
accounting standard-setting process to lobby the IASB. 
 
H01: There is no significant difference between the use of the earlier stages and 
the later stages of the accounting standard-setting process to lobby the IASB. 
 
The data gathered from question 5 regarding the use of the various stages indicated 
that any stage of the accounting standard-setting process was used by no more than 
approximately 30% of the respondents.   
 
In order to test hypothesis 1, firstly, the stages of the accounting standard-setting 
process were classified into two groups, namely the earlier stages and the later 
stages. Sutton (1984) refers to the earlier stages as all the stages preceding the 
exposure draft stage. Therefore, for the purposes of grouping the stages into earlier 
and later stages, the agenda formation stage, drafting stage of the discussion paper 
and exposure period of the discussion paper were classified as earlier stages. The 
drafting stage of the exposure draft, its exposure period, the drafting of the final IFRS 
and the post-implementation review stage were classified as the later stages.  
 
Secondly, the appropriate statistical tests were considered. In order to examine the 
difference between the means of the two related samples, that is, the earlier stages 
and the later stages, a paired t-test was deemed an appropriate test to test 
hypothesis 1. Since the data was not normally distributed, a Wilcoxon signed rank 
test was conducted to confirm if the null hypothesis could be rejected. 
 
To perform the above statistical tests, the use of the earlier stages was scored from 0 
to 3 and each of the later stages was scored from 0 to 4, in both cases for every 
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respondent. For example, a score of 2 was awarded to the earlier stages if a 
respondent used two stages of the earlier stages to lobby the IASB. The scores out 
of 3 and out of 4 were calculated as percentages so that they were comparable.  
 
The results of the paired t-test indicate a significant mean difference of 8.80% 
between the mean scores of the earlier stages (mean use = 12.03%) and later stages 
(mean use = 20.83). The paired t-tests revealed that the null hypothesis of no 
significant difference between the use of the earlier or later stages to lobby the 
accounting standard-setter could be rejected (t (35) = 3.214, p = 0.003). 
 
The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test showed a p-value less than 0.05 (S = 
157.500, p = 0.001), with the scores for the later stages and earlier stages differing 
significantly at a 95% level of confidence. Therefore, the results of the test confirmed 
that the null hypothesis of no significant difference between the use of the earlier or 
later stages to lobby the accounting standard-setter, could be rejected.  
The above results from the paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test confirming 
that the later stages were used more for lobbying than the earlier stages, 
contradicted the research hypothesis, based on Sutton’s (1984) prediction, that the 
earlier stages are used more for lobbying than the later stages of the accounting 
standard-setting process.  
 
A detailed examination of the descriptive statistics in table 4.1 also demonstrates that 
the later stages of the accounting standard-setting process were the most used by 
companies. The most used stage was the exposure period of the exposure draft 
(30.56% users), followed by the post-implementation review (25% users). Both of 
these stages are later stages in the accounting standard-setting process.  
 
In contrast, the two stages used least by companies were in the earliest stages, 
these being the agenda formation stage (8.33% users) and the drafting stage of the 
discussion paper (8.33% users).  
 
Georgiou (2004) had similar findings, showing that UK respondents mostly used the 
exposure period of the exposure draft. The least used stage by UK companies was 
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the agenda formation stage to lobby the ASB. Importantly, Georgiou’s (2004) results 
also rejected Sutton’s (1984) prediction that stakeholders lobby more during the 
earlier stages of the accounting standard-setting process than later in the process. 
 
 
A statistical test, such as the McNemar test, to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the two most used stages and the use of any other stage was not 
performed because of the small sample size of this study. This could be considered a 
limitation of the study. 
  
TABLE 4.1 – Lobbying at different stages of the due process 
     
Stage of the process Number 
of 
users 
 
Number 
of 
non-users 
% 
of 
respon- 
dents 
using this 
method 
Earlier stages    
1 Agenda formation stage 3 33 8.33 
2 Drafting stage of the discussion paper 3 33 8.33 
3 Exposure period of the discussion paper 7 29 19.44 
Later stages    
4 Drafting stage of the exposure draft 5 31 13.89 
5 Exposure period of the exposure draft 11 25 30.56 
6 Drafting stage of the final IFRS 5 31 13.89 
7 
Post-implementation review of the final 
IFRS 
9 27 25.00 
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4.6.1.2 Interpretation of the results regarding the use of the various stages  
The inferential and descriptive statistics above show that the later stages were used 
more by respondents to lobby the IASB than the earlier stages. This finding should, 
however, be understood in the context of the IASB’s process of accounting standard-
setting. The earlier stages of the standard-setting process, as mentioned previously, 
consist of the agenda formation stage, the drafting stage and exposure period of the 
discussion paper. The two stages relating to the discussion paper are not mandatory 
steps of the due process. In other words, for every accounting standard proposed by 
the IASB, there is not necessarily a discussion paper issued for the standard. In fact, 
the number of discussion papers issued is small compared to the number of 
exposure drafts issued, which is a mandatory step in the due process. For instance, 
in Georgiou’s (2010) study conducted between 2001 and 2006, he found that 28 
exposure drafts were issued by the IASB compared to only four discussion papers 
issued.  
 
In light of the nature of the due process, the low number of users of the earlier stages 
could be simply explained by the fact that there were fewer opportunities for 
participation during the earlier stages since there were fewer documents (discussion 
papers) issued by the IASB during the earlier stages compared to the number of 
compulsory documents (exposure drafts) issued by it during the later stages.  
 
Surprisingly, the two stages of the discussion paper were perceived by respondents 
to be the two most effective stages for lobbying the IASB, based on the mean 
effectiveness ratings awarded by respondents to the various stages. The results of 
the effectiveness ratings of the various stages are reported in table 4.2. Therefore, 
based on the perceived effectiveness ratings awarded to the two stages of the 
discussion paper, greater use of the earlier stages would be expected. The 
researcher concluded that the results showing a low usage of the two stages of the 
discussion paper to lobby the IASB could not be attributed to ineffectiveness 
perceptions of these stages. Instead, the researcher suggested that the low use of 
the two discussion paper stages could be attributed to the low number of discussion 
papers issued by the IASB.  
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4.6.1.3 Testing of hypothesis 2 
The prediction that the earlier stages are used more for lobbying than the later stages 
of the accounting standard-setting process is based on the effectiveness of lobbying 
during the earlier stages compared to the later stages (Sutton, 1984). Hypothesis 2 
deals with the perceived effectiveness of lobbying during the various stages of the 
accounting standard-setting process. The data used to test the hypothesis was 
gathered from question 5 of the questionnaire where respondents were required to 
indicate on a Likert scale how effective they perceived lobbying to be during each 
stage of the accounting standard-setting process. Table 4.2 analyses the perceived 
effectiveness of each stage. The table excludes responses that selected the “do not 
know” option of the Likert scale. 
 
H02: Companies perceive lobbying during all the stages of the accounting 
standard-setting process as equally effective. 
 
In order to test hypothesis 2, the assumption of repeated measures of ANOVA that 
the distributions of variables are normal, was tested. Since the assumption was not 
satisfied, a nonparametric test involving the Friedman test was employed to test 
hypothesis 2.  
 
The results from the Friedman test (χ2(6) = 6.626, p-value = 0.357) indicated that 
there was no significant difference between the effectiveness ratings of the seven 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process. Based on results from the 
Friedman test, the hypothesis that lobbying during all the stages of the accounting 
standard-setting process are perceived as equally effective was not rejected. 
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¹ The mean of the Likert scores was used only for interpretation and discussion purposes and not for statistical analysis. 
²  Standard deviation 
 
TABLE 4.2 – Perceived effectiveness of the stages of the due process 
         
Stage of the process Very 
ineffective 
 
%  
of total 
Ineffective 
 
 
%  
of total 
Neither 
 
 
% 
of total 
Effective 
 
 
%  
of total 
Very 
effective 
 
%  
of total 
Mean of 
the Likert 
score¹ 
SD² 
1 Agenda formation stage 5.88% 11.76% 52.94% 23.53% 5.88% 3.12 0.93 
2 Drafting stage of the discussion paper 0.00% 10.00% 50.00% 30.00% 10.00% 3.40 0.82 
3 Exposure period of the discussion paper 4.76% 0.00% 38.10% 42.86% 14.29% 3.62 0.92 
4 Drafting stage of the exposure draft 0.00% 14.29% 52.38% 28.57% 4.76% 3.24 0.77 
5 Exposure period of the exposure draft 4.17% 8.33% 37.50% 45.83% 4.17% 3.38 0.88 
6 Drafting stage of the final IFRS 4.55% 18.18% 50.00% 22.73% 4.55% 3.05 0.93 
7 
Post-implementation review of the final 
IFRS 
0.00% 13.64% 63.64% 18.18% 4.55% 3.12 0.82 
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Although the respondents did not generally perceive the effectiveness of the various 
stages to be significantly different, the descriptive statistics reported in table 4.2 show 
that respondents did consider some stages to be more effective than others. The 
results in table 4.2 prove that, in line with Sutton’s (1984) predictions, companies rate 
the various stages of the accounting standard-setting process differently in terms of 
effectiveness. 
 
An analysis of the descriptive statistics in table 4.2 shows that the two stages that 
were perceived to be the most effective were the exposure period of the discussion 
paper (mean effectiveness = 3.62) and the drafting stage of the discussion paper 
(mean effectiveness = 3.40). Therefore, respondents perceived two of the three 
earlier stages to be the most effective time for lobbying the IASB. However, as 
discussed earlier in section 4.6.1.2, the high effectiveness of the two stages of the 
discussion paper did not correspond with the low use of the two stages of the 
discussion paper. It was explained in section 4.6.1.2 that low use of the two 
discussion paper stages may be explained by the low number of discussion papers 
issued by the IASB compared to the higher number of exposure drafts issued. 
The respondents considered the least effective stages as the drafting stage of the 
final IFRS (mean = 3.05), the agenda formation stage (mean = 3.12) and the post-
implementation review stage (mean = 3.12). Georgiou’s (2004) findings indicate that, 
based on the effectiveness mean of the stages, the most effective stage for lobbying 
the ASB is the exposure period of the exposure draft, and the least effective stage 
the agenda formation stage. 
The respondents in this survey gave the highest score of effectiveness, based on the 
sum of the “very effective” and “effective” ratings of each stage, to the exposure 
period of the discussion paper (sum of 57.15% effectiveness) and the exposure 
period of the exposure draft (sum of 50% effectiveness). Georgiou’s (2004) findings 
similarly demonstrated that UK companies awarded the highest score of 
effectiveness, based on the sum of the “very effective” and “effective” ratings of each 
stage, to the exposure draft period of the exposure draft and the exposure period of 
the discussion paper. 
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Approximately 40% of the respondents in this study selected the “do not know” option 
when rating the perceived effectiveness of the various stages. Since these “do not 
know responses” had to be excluded from the sample, it reduced the sample size 
significantly. For this reason, it was not considered practical to mirror Georgiou’s 
(2004) tests of running multiple paired t-tests to determine if the two most effective 
stages were considered significantly different than any other stage in terms of 
perceived effectiveness. 
 
The perceived effectiveness results from table 4.2 were divided between users and 
non-users in order to determine if the mean effectiveness of the stages between 
users and non-users were significantly different. Independent t-tests were performed 
to determine how the actual use of the various stages influenced the respondents’ 
perceived effectiveness of the various stages. However, since the distribution of the 
differences between the users and non-users was not normally distributed, Wilcoxon 
rank sum tests were employed to confirm the results. The results from the Wilcoxon 
rank sum tests and independent t-tests are reported in table 4.3.  
 
The independent t-tests showed that users perceived lobbying during the exposure 
period of the discussion paper (t(19) = -2.687, p = 0.015) and the drafting stage of 
the exposure draft (t(19) = -3.008, p = 0.007) to be significantly more effective than 
non-users, at a 95% level of confidence.  
 
The results from the Wilcoxon rank sum tests supported the above findings: the 
results of the agenda formation stage (Z = 2.200, p = 0.028), the drafting stage of the 
exposure draft (Z = 2.445, p = 0.015) and the exposure period of the discussion 
paper (Z = 2.607, p = 0.009) were considered to be significantly more effective by 
users than by non-users. 
 
In general, the results reported in table 4.3 show that the mean effectiveness of all 
the stages was higher for users than for non-users, suggesting that lobbying 
experience increased the perception of the effectiveness of lobbying. 
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TABLE 4.3 – Comparison of the perceived effectiveness of users and non-users of the stages
Stage Users 
 
Non-users Independent t-
tests 
Wilcoxon sum 
rank tests 
n 
Mean 
effectiveness 
SD n 
Mean 
effectiveness 
SD t p Z p 
Agenda formation stage 3 4.000 0.493 14 2.929 0.228 -1.973 0.067 2.200 0.028 
Drafting stage of the 
discussion paper 
3 3.667 0.482 17 3.353 0.203 0.600 0.556 0.747 0.455 
Exposure period of the 
discussion paper 
7 4.286 0.304 14 3.286 0.215 -2.687 0.015 2.607 0.009 
Drafting stage of the 
exposure draft 
5 4.000 0.290 16 0.162 2.661 -3.008 0.007 2.445 0.015 
Exposure period of the 
exposure draft 
11 3.455 0.269 13 3.308 0.247 -0.402 0.692 0.314 0.754 
Drafting stage of the 
final IFRS 
5 3.400 0.402 17 2.941 0.218 -1.004 0.327 0.719 0.472 
Post-implementation 
review of the final IFRS 
8 3.250 0.255 14 3.071 0.193 -0.558 0.583 0.279 0.781 
   n = number of users or non-users         
SD = standard deviation         
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4.6.1.4 Interpretation of results regarding the perceived effectiveness of 
lobbying during the various stages 
The prediction that most lobbying occurs early in the standard-setting process, is 
based on Sutton’s assumption that there is a higher probability of influencing the 
accounting standard-setter early in the process compared to later in the process. The 
findings from testing hypothesis 2 show that, regarding the effectiveness of the 
stages, respondents perceived the effectiveness of each stage not to be significantly 
different. However, the findings did support Sutton’s prediction that companies rate 
the different stages of the accounting standard-setting process differently in terms of 
effectiveness. 
 
Based on the ratings awarded to effectiveness of each stage, ranging from effective 
to very effective, the respondents rated the agenda formation stage as the least 
effective stage. As is to be expected, the results in table 4.1 showed that the agenda 
formation stage was also one of the least used stages.  
 
Analysis of the three respondents that used the agenda formation stage to lobby the 
IASB was revealing. Of the three respondents that used the agenda formation stage, 
two of them currently serve or previously served as members of the APC in South 
Africa, SAICA’s reporting technical committee. All three of the respondents that used 
the agenda formation stage rated lobbying during the agenda formation stage as very 
effective. Results from a Wilcoxon sum rank test reported in table 4.3 confirm there 
was a significant difference at a 95% level of confidence between the perceived 
effectiveness of the three users of the agenda formation stage and non-users of the 
agenda formation stage (Z = 2.200, p = 0.028). Although this result was based on 
limited data, it was apparent that these three users of the agenda formation stage 
shared Sutton’s view of the efficacy of lobbying during the agenda formation stage. 
 
Regarding the most effective stages of the accounting standard-setting process, 
respondents perceived the other two remaining stages of the earlier stages as the 
two most effective stages to lobby (based on the mean effectiveness of each stage) – 
in other words, the drafting period of the discussion paper and the exposure period of 
the discussion paper. As discussed in sections 4.6.1.2 and 4.6.1.3, the low use of the 
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two discussion periods to lobby surprisingly did not correlate with the high 
effectiveness ratings awarded to these two stages. It was explained that the low 
number of discussion papers issued by the IASB results in fewer opportunities to 
participate, and the lobbying activity during the two stages of discussion papers tends 
to be low.  
 
The results from this study’s questionnaire should make a contribution to the 
literature on lobbying during the post-enactment period of a final IFRS. The 
questionnaire instrument used in this survey-based research included the post-
implementation review stage in question, while neither Georgiou (2004, 2010) nor 
Sutton (1984) addressed the post-implementation review stage of the accounting 
standard-setter in their studies. 
 
The results indicate that after the use of the exposure draft period, the respondents 
favoured the use of the post-implementation review period for lobbying. This finding 
was unexpected given the fact that respondents did not perceive the post-
implementation review as an effective stage for lobbying, as can be seen from the 
mean effectiveness of the post-implementation review stage in table 4.2.  
 
The IASB had completed two major post-implementation reviews in the last few 
years, namely the post-implementation review for IFRS 3 Business Combinations 
and IFRS 8 Operating Segments. Investigation of the comment letters received by 
the IASB during both the above post-implementation reviews showed that the  
CFO Forum of South Africa responded to both the IFRS 3 post-implementation 
review and the IFRS 8 post-implementation review. The CFO Forum members 
consolidated their views in one comment letter to the IASB during the post-
implementation review. The CFO Forum members consist of the CFOs of the JSE 
top 40 listed companies. Since the JSE top 40 listed companies were also included in 
the top 100 JSE listed companies that served as a sample of this study, this explains 
the results of the survey regarding the much used post-implementation review stage 
for lobbying the IASB.  
 
As discussed earlier in section 2.4.5, the post-implementation review is not an 
effective time to lobby, but it may afford the lobbyist an opportunity to influence the 
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items included in the next agenda formation. Hence, it is suggested that respondents 
to this survey would only have perceived lobbying during the post-implementation 
review of IFRS 3 and IFRS 8 as effective, if their lobbying had had the potential of 
affecting the next agenda formation. 
 
4.6.2 Methods of lobbying 
4.6.2.1 Testing of hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 dealt with the methods of lobbying employed by companies during the 
accounting process of the IASB. The data used to test the hypothesis was gathered 
from question 6 of the questionnaire where respondents were required to answer 
“yes” or “no” to the actual use of a method to lobby the IASB. 
 
H03: The use of comment letter submissions is not significantly associated 
with the use of other lobbying methods. 
 
The data gathered from question 6 regarding the use of the various lobbying 
methods are presented in table 4.6. The appropriate statistical tests were considered 
to determine if there is a significant association between the use of comment letter 
submissions and other lobbying methods. The Pearson chi-square test is an 
appropriate test to determine the association between the use of comment letters 
and other lobbying methods. However, owing to the small sample size of the study, 
Fisher’s exact test is preferred when the p-value of the Pearson chi-square tests are 
inconclusive in rejecting the hypothesis. Hence the two-tailed results of Fisher’s exact 
tests are reported in conjunction with the Pearson chi-square tests results in tables 
4.4 and 4.5. 
 
The questionnaire of this study had two lobbying methods relating to the use of 
comment letters, namely submitting a comment letter to the IASB and submitting a 
comment letter to SAICA. The Pearson chi-square tests and Fisher’s exact tests 
were therefore firstly performed by using the submission of comment letters to the 
IASB as a variable to determine if there is a significant association with the use of 
other lobbying methods (excluding comment letter submissions to SAICA). The 
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results of the first analysis are reported in table 4.4. Secondly, the submission of 
comment letters to SAICA was used as a variable in the Pearson chi-square and 
Fisher’s exact tests to determine its significant association with other lobbying 
methods (excluding comment letter submissions to the IASB). The results of the 
second analysis are reported in table 4.5. 
 
The Pearson chi-square test results in table 4.4 demonstrated that there was a 
significant association at a 95% level of confidence between the use of comment 
letter submissions to the IASB and at least seven other lobbying methods. The two-
tailed results of Fisher’s exact test confirm that a significant association existed 
between the use of comment letter submissions and five of the seven other lobbying 
methods reported above for the Pearson chi-square results, at a 95% level of 
confidence.  
 
Further analysis to determine how many of the eight users of comment letters to the 
IASB also used at least one other lobbying method (other than comment letters to 
SAICA) revealed that six out of the eight (75.00%) users of comment letters to the 
IASB, also used at least one other lobbying method (p = 0.114, Fisher’s exact test). 
In contrast, 11 of the 28 respondents (39.93%) who indicated that they did not submit 
a comment letter to the IASB, used at least one other lobbying method.  
 
The above findings suggest that the submission of comment letters to the IASB by a 
lobbyist is a strong indicator that he or she also used other lobbying methods.  
 
The results of the statistical tests to determine the association between the comment 
letter submissions to SAICA and other lobbying methods are reported in table 4.5. 
The Pearson chi-square test results in table 4.5 show that there was a significant 
association at a 95% level of confidence between the use of comment letter 
submissions to SAICA and at least nine other lobbying methods. The two-tailed 
results of Fisher’s exact tests confirm that there was significant association at a 95% 
level of confidence between the use of comment letter submissions to SAICA and 
seven of the nine other lobbying methods reported above for the chi-square tests.  
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Further analysis to determine how many of the six users of comment letter 
submissions to SAICA also used at least one other lobbying method (other than 
comment letters to SAICA) revealed that five out of the six (83.33%) users of 
comment letters to SAICA, also used at least one other lobbying method (p = 0.081, 
Fisher’s exact test). In contrast, 12 of the 30 respondents (40%) who indicated that 
they did not submit a comment letter to SAICA, used at least one other lobbying 
method. The above results indicate that the submission of comment letters to SAICA 
by a lobbyist is a good proxy for the use of other lobbying methods. 
 
In light of the above findings, hypothesis 3, which stated that the use of comment 
letter submissions is not significantly associated with the use of other lobbying 
methods, was rejected. 
 
The results of the hypothesis testing provided evidence, similar to the evidence of 
Hodges and Mellet (2002) and Georgiou (2004), that the use of comment letter 
submissions by a lobbyist is associated with the use of other lobbying methods.  
In addition, the results also indicated that an informal lobbying method was the most 
used method. The respondents mostly used appeals to their auditors for support of 
their views (36.11% of the respondents) as a lobbying method. The above finding 
indicates that a less observable lobbying method was preferred by respondents 
above comment letter submissions.  
 
The results in table 4.6 also supported Gloeck’s (2003:73) suggestions that comment 
letter submissions to SAICA are not the most attractive form of lobbying. In fact, the 
most used lobbying methods by respondents, such as appealing to auditors and 
communicating with SAICA’s members or staff through other means are 
unobservable lobbying methods that fall outside of the scope of the due process.  
 
One respondent noted the following in the additional comments of the questionnaire, 
illustrating how the use of lobbying methods other than comment letters takes 
precedence over the use of comment letter submissions: 
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“Due to our committee representation and high attendance rate at SAICA 
committee comment letter writing meetings, our views tend to be well echoed in 
the APC’s comment letter to the IASB, hence we don’t need to prepare 
separate comment letters.” 
Gaining representation on the technical committees of an accounting standard-setter 
enables the lobbyist to be “close to the seat of power” (Sutton, 1984:85). This 
lobbying method enables the lobbyist to influence the accounting standard-setter 
over a period of time and is therefore considered a long-term lobbying strategy 
(Sutton, 1984:89). 
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TABLE 4.4 – Cross-tabulations and statistical tests: comment letter 
submissions to the IASB and other lobbying methods  
       
Lobbying methods 
(other than comment letters) 
Comment 
letters 
IASB 
Pearson 
chi-square 
Prob>chi-
square 
Fisher’s 
exact 
test 
p 
User Non-
user 
Speaking at the IASB’s public 
meetings 
User 
 
Non- 
user 
4 
 
4 
0 
 
28 
 
15.750 
 
<.0001 
 
0.001 
Speaking at SAICA’s public 
meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
3 
 
5 
2 
 
26 
 
4.794 
 
0.029 
 
0.061 
Communicating your 
company’s views to the IASB’s 
member or staff at pre-
arranged private meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
5 
 
3 
1 
 
27 
 
15.557 
 
<.0001 
 
 
<.0001 
Communicating your 
company’s views to SAICA’s 
member or staff at pre-
arranged private meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
4 
2 
 
26 
 
8.229 
 
0.004 
 
 
0.014 
Communicating your 
company’s views to the IASB’s 
members or staff through 
other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at 
conferences) 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
4 
1 
 
27 
 
11.215 
 
0.001 
 
<.0001 
Communicating your 
company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff through 
other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at 
conferences) 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
4 
4 
 
24 
 
4.592 
 
0.032 
 
 
 
 
 
0.054 
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TABLE 4.4 – Cross-tabulations and statistical tests: comment letter 
submissions to the IASB and other lobbying methods (continued) 
       
Lobbying methods 
(other than comment letters) 
Comment 
letters 
IASB 
Pearson 
chi-square 
Prob>chi-
square 
Fisher’s 
exact 
test 
p 
User Non-
user 
Commenting in the media on a 
proposed accounting standard 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
7 
0 
 
28 
 
3.6 
 
0.058 
 
 
0.222 
Appealing to the Financial 
Reporting Standards Council 
(FRSC) in South Africa for 
support of your company’s 
views 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
7 
0 
 
28 
 
3.600 
 
0.058 
 
 
 
 
0.222 
Appealing to your company’s 
external auditors for support of 
your company’s views 
User 
 
Non-
user 
5 
 
3 
8 
 
20 
 
3.105 
 
0.078 
 
0.107 
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to 
the IASB on particular projects 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
7 
1 
 
27 
 
0.945 
 
0.331 
 
0.400 
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to 
SAICA on particular projects 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
4 
2 
 
26 
 
8.229 
 
0.004 
 
0.014 
Sponsoring research studies 
on financial accounting and 
reporting issues 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
7 
1 
 
27 
 
0.945 
 
0.331 
 
0.400 
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TABLE 4.5 – Cross-tabulations and statistical tests: comment letter 
submissions to SAICA and other lobbying methods 
       
Lobbying methods 
(other than comment letters) 
Comment 
letters 
SAICA 
Pearson 
chi-square 
Prob>chi-
square 
Fisher’s 
exact 
test 
p 
User Non-
user 
Speaking at the IASB’s 
public meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
0 
 
30 
 
22.500 
 
 
<.0001 
 
0.000 
Speaking at SAICA’s public 
meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
3 
 
3 
2 
 
28 
 
7.850 
 
0.005 
 
0.024 
Communicating your 
company’s views to the 
IASB’s member or staff at 
pre-arranged private 
meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
5 
 
1 
1 
 
29 
 
23.040 
 
<.0001 
 
<0.0001 
Communicating your 
company’s views to SAICA’s 
member or staff at pre-
arranged private meetings 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
2 
 
28 
 
12.960 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
Communicating your 
company’s views to the 
IASB’s members or staff 
through other means (e.g. 
telephone conversations, 
meeting at conferences) 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
1 
 
29 
 
16.769 
 
<0.0001 
 
0.001 
Communicating your 
company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff through 
other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at 
conferences) 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
4 
 
26 
 
8.229 
 
0.004 
 
 
0.014 
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TABLE 4.5 – Cross-tabulations and statistical tests: comment letter 
submissions to SAICA and other lobbying methods (continued) 
       
Lobbying methods 
(other than comment letters) 
Comment 
letters 
SAICA 
Pearson 
chi-square 
Prob>chi-
square 
Fisher’s 
exact 
test 
p 
User Non-
user 
Commenting in the media on 
a proposed accounting 
standard 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
5 
0 
 
30 
 
5.143 
 
0.023 
 
 
0.167 
Appealing to Financial 
Reporting Standards Council 
(FRSC) in South Africa for 
support of your company’s 
views 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
5 
0 
 
30 
 
5.143 
 
0.023 
 
0.167 
Appealing to your company’s 
external auditors for support 
of your company’s views 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
9 
 
31 
 
2.914 
 
0.088 
 
0.161 
Having staff of your 
company appointed as 
consultants to the IASB on 
particular projects 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
5 
1 
 
29 
 
1.694 
 
0.193 
 
0.310 
Having staff of your 
company appointed as 
consultants to SAICA on 
particular projects 
User 
 
Non-
user 
4 
 
2 
2 
 
28 
 
12.960 
 
0.000 
 
0.003 
Sponsoring research studies 
on financial accounting and 
reporting issues 
User 
 
Non-
user 
1 
 
5 
1 
 
29 
 
1.694 
 
0.193 
 
0.310 
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TABLE 4.6 – The use of lobbying methods during the due process 
    
Lobbying methods Number 
of 
users 
Number  
of 
non-users 
% of 
respondents 
using this 
method 
Submitting a comment letter to the IASB during 
the comment period 
8 28 22.22 
Submitting a comment letter to SAICA during the 
comment period 
6 30 16.67 
Speaking at the IASB’s public meetings 4 32 11.11 
Speaking at SAICA’s public meetings 5 31 13.89 
Communicating your company’s views to the 
IASB’s members or staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings 
6 30 16.67 
Communicating your company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings 
6 30 16.67 
Communicating your company’s views to the 
IASB’s members or staff through other means 
(e.g. telephone conversations, meeting at 
conferences) 
5 31 13.89 
Communicating your company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff through other means (e.g. 
telephone conversations, meeting at conferences) 
8 28 22.22 
Commenting in the media on a proposed 
accounting standard 
1 35 2.78 
Appealing to Financial Reporting Standards 
Council (FRSC) in South Africa for support of 
your company’s views. 
1 35 2.78 
Appealing to your company’s external auditors for 
support of your company’s views 
13 23 36.11 
Having staff of your company appointed as 
consultants to the IASB on particular projects 
2 34 5.56 
Having staff of your company appointed as 
consultants to SAICA on particular projects 
6 30 16.67 
Sponsoring research studies on financial 
accounting and reporting issues 
2 34 5.56 
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4.6.2.2 Interpretation of statistics regarding the use of the various lobbying 
methods 
The most used lobbying methods by respondents, similar to those in  
Georgiou’s (2004) study, were the use of appeals to the company’s auditors for 
support of their views (36.11% users). Interestingly, almost half of the respondents 
rated the use of auditors to present their views to the accounting standard-setter as 
an effective lobbying method, as illustrated in table 4.7. The use of auditors to 
present the views of their clients to the IASB as an attractive and effective lobbying 
method is best illustrated by a comment received from one of the respondents in the 
survey: 
 
“The accounting team indicated that their feedback to the IASB is all routed 
through Deloitte, as they are probably better positioned to collate feedback on 
behalf of their clients.” 
 
The literature, as discussed in section 2.6.3, suggests that auditors are willing to 
present the views of clients to the accounting standard-setter because of the 
significant financial interest they hold in their clients’ welfare. Not only are auditors 
willing to lobby on behalf of their clients, but they also have more access to the 
accounting standard-setter than most preparers of financial statements. Evidence of 
their access to the accounting standard-setter is illustrated in their representation on 
the committees of the accounting standard-setters. For instance, four major audit 
firms serve as members of the APC, SAICA’s technical financial reporting committee 
(SAICA, 2016) and four major audit firms also serve as members of the  
FRSC (The Department of Trade and Industry, 2016).  
 
The results presented in table 4.6 indicated that other popular lobbying methods 
were communicating with SAICA through other means, such as through telephone 
conversations (22.2% users), communicating with the IASB and SAICA staff in 
private meetings (both showed 16.67% users) and having staff appointed on SAICA 
projects (16.67% users). This illustrates that lobbyists seek “a private audience with 
the rule making body”, as suggested by Sutton (1984:90).  
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Table 4.6 demonstrates that the least used lobbying methods by respondents were 
appealing to the FRSC for support (one user) and commenting in the media (one 
user). The lobbying methods of appealing to the national accounting standard-setter, 
the FRSC, lagged far behind the use of lobbying methods employed to influence 
SAICA. For instance, communicating the company’s views to SAICA’s members or 
staff through other means was used by eight respondents, as indicated in table 4.6. 
As discussed previously in section 2.7.1, the FRSC was established in 2011 as the 
national accounting regulator in terms of the Companies Act, thereby replacing the 
private accounting regulator, the APB of SAICA. SAICA, however, continues to issue 
exposure drafts, discussion papers and requests for information on behalf of the 
IASB in South Africa.  
 
The low number of respondents lobbying the FRSC could suggest that companies 
were unsure about the influence and/or role of the FRSC in the accounting standard-
setting process of the IASB. The above assumption was supported by the low 
effectiveness rating awarded by respondents to the lobbying method of appealing to 
the FRSC for support. As indicated in table 4.7 shows, respondents considered 
appealing to the FRSC as one of the most ineffective lobbying methods (mean 
effectiveness = 2.95).  
 
Also, the lobbying of a regulated accounting standard-setter such as the FRSC might 
be different to the lobbying of a private accounting standard-setter, in terms of the 
type of lobbying methods employed and their perceived effectiveness of influencing 
the regulator. This study, like those of Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2004), were 
conducted in the context of a private accounting standard-setting body. Hence the 
lobbying methods employed to lobby a regulatory body such as the FRSC might be 
different to the lobbying methods employed to lobby a private accounting standard-
setter. An interesting topic for future research would be lobbying of the FRSC since 
lobbying of a national regulatory body such as the FRSC may be unlike lobbying a 
private body such as SAICA and the IASB. 
 
The use of sponsored research to influence the IASB was also one of the least used 
lobbying methods by respondents (5.56% users). The reasons for this could be 
twofold. Firstly, sponsored research is a lobbying method mostly employed during the 
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agenda formation stage, but as indicated in table 4.1, the majority of respondents did 
not lobby during agenda formation. Therefore, owing to the lack of lobbying activity 
during the agenda formation stage,  a low number of respondents used methods 
associated with the agenda formation stage, such as sponsoring research. Secondly, 
the transfer of sponsored research to the IASB is a costly exercise because of the 
high cost of collecting expert information (Downs, 1957:148). As indicated in table 
4.7, respondents perceived the lobbying method of sponsoring research to be rather 
ineffective (mean effectiveness = 3.06). Thus the low number of respondents using 
sponsored research as a lobbying method could be explained by the fact that the 
high cost of using research as a lobbying method exceeds the perceived 
effectiveness of this method to influence the IASB. In conclusion, even though the 
literature shows that research contributes to the standard-setting process, especially 
during the early stages of this process (Fülbier et al, 2009:479), it is not a popular 
lobby method employed by South African companies. 
 
The researcher further analysed the data from the question on the use of the various 
lobbying methods to determine if South African companies’ use of lobbying methods 
directed at SAICA was significantly different to the use of lobbying methods directed 
at the IASB. The Wilcoxon signed rank test indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the use of lobbying methods directed at SAICA and the use of 
lobbying methods directed at the IASB (S = -75.500; p = 0.1452).  
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4.6.2.3 Testing of hypothesis 4  
Hypothesis 4 dealt with the perceived effectiveness of the lobbying methods 
employed during the accounting standard-setting process. The data used to test the 
hypothesis was gathered from question 6 of the questionnaire where respondents 
were required to indicate on a Likert scale how effective they perceived the various 
lobbying methods to be. Table 4.7 analyses the perceived effectiveness of each 
lobbying method by excluding the “do not know” option of the Likert scale. 
 
H04: Companies perceive all lobbying methods to be equally effective. 
 
Table 4.7 reports the effectiveness ratings awarded by the respondents for each of 
the lobbying methods.  
 
In order to test hypothesis 4, the assumption of ANOVA that the distributions of 
variables are normal, was tested. Owing to the fact that the assumption was not 
satisfied, a non-parametric test involving the Friedman test was employed to test 
hypothesis 4.  
 
The results from the Friedman test (Friedman chi-squared value = 13.8626, df = 13, 
p-value = 0.3836) indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
effectiveness ratings of the various lobbying methods. Based on these findings, the 
hypothesis that the perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods is equally effective 
was not rejected. 
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TABLE 4.7 – The perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods 
Lobbying methods Very 
ineffective 
% 
of total 
Ineffective 
 
% 
of total 
Neither 
 
% 
of total 
Effective 
 
% 
of total 
Very 
effective 
% 
of total 
Mean  
of the  
Likert score 
SD  
of  
Likert score 
Submitting a comment letter to the IASB during the 
comment period 
0.00% 9.09% 54.55% 22.73% 1.64% 3.41 0.85 
Submitting a comment letter to SAICA during the 
comment period 
0.00% 9.09% 40.91% 45.45% 4.55% 3.45 0.74 
Speaking at the IASB’s public meetings 0.00% 14.29% 42.86% 38.10% 4.76% 3.33 0.80 
Speaking at SAICA’s public meetings 0.00% 9.52% 52.38% 28.57% 9.52% 3.38 0.80 
Communicating your company’s views to the IASB’s 
members or staff at pre-arranged private meetings 
0.00% 9.09% 36.36% 45.45% 9.09% 3.55 0.80 
Communicating your company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff at pre-arranged private meetings 
0.00% 9.52% 38.10% 47.62% 4.76% 3.48 0.75 
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TABLE 4.7 – The perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods (continued) 
Lobbying methods Very 
ineffective 
% 
of total 
Ineffective 
 
% 
of total 
Neither 
 
% 
of total 
Effective 
 
% 
of total 
Very 
effective 
% 
of total 
Mean  
of the  
Likert score 
SD  
of  
Likert score 
Communicating your company’s views to the IASB’s 
members or staff through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at conferences) 
0.00% 14.29% 52.38% 28.57% 4.76% 3.24 0.77 
Communicating your company’s views to SAICA’s 
members or staff through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at conferences). 
0.00% 9.09% 40.91% 50.00% 0.00% 3.41 0.67 
Commenting in the media on a proposed accounting 
standard 
10.53% 15.79% 52.63% 21.05% 0.00% 2.84 0.90 
Appealing to Financial Reporting Standards Council 
(FRSC) in South Africa for support of your company’s 
views 
10.53% 10.53% 52.63% 26.32% 0.00% 2.95 0.91 
Appealing to your company’s external auditors for support 
of your company’s views 
4.00% 12.00% 36.00% 48.00% 0.00% 3.28 0.84 
Having staff of your company appointed as consultants to 
the IASB on particular projects 
5.26% 10.53% 47.37% 26.32% 10.53% 3.26 0.99 
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TABLE 4.7 – The perceived effectiveness of lobbying methods (continued) 
Lobbying methods Very 
ineffective 
% 
of total 
Ineffective 
 
% 
of total 
Neither 
 
% 
of total 
Effective 
 
% 
of total 
Very 
effective 
% 
of total 
Mean  
of the  
Likert score 
SD  
of  
Likert score 
Having staff of your company appointed as consultants to 
SAICA on particular projects 
0.00% 5.00% 50.00% 30.00% 15.00% 3.55 0.83 
Sponsoring research studies on financial accounting and 
reporting issues 
5.56% 16.67% 50.00% 22.22% 5.56% 3.06 0.94 
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Although the respondents did not generally perceive the effectiveness of the various 
lobbying methods to be significantly different, the descriptive statistics reported in 
table 4.7 indicate that respondents did consider certain lobbying methods to be more 
effective than others.  
 
Importantly, the descriptive statistics in table 4.7 indicate that the research 
hypothesis that respondents perceive lobbying methods other than comment letter 
submissions to be more effective than comment letter submissions was true. 
Respondents perceived communicating with the IASB’s members or staff at pre-
arranged private meetings (mean effectiveness = 3.55) and having staff of the 
company appointed as consultants to SAICA projects (mean effectiveness of 3.55) 
as the most effective lobbying methods. The mean effectiveness of the use of 
comment letters submitted to the IASB and SAICA was 3.41 and 3.45, respectively. 
Similarly, in Georgiou’s (2004) study, the most effective lobbying methods, based on 
the mean effectiveness, were having members appointed as consultants on ASB 
projects and communicating with the ASB’s members or staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings. 
The least effective methods were perceived by respondents to be the lobbying 
methods of commenting in the media (mean effectiveness = 2.84) and appealing to 
the FRSC for support (mean effectiveness = 2.95). The perceived ineffectiveness of 
the two methods above corresponds with their low use by respondents for lobbying, 
as illustrated in table 4.6. Georgiou (2004) found that the two least effective lobbying 
methods, based on the mean effectiveness methods, were sponsoring research 
studies and appealing to FRC members for support of the companies’ views. 
 
Approximately 40% of the respondents in this study selected the “do not know” option 
when rating the perceived effectiveness of the various lobbying methods. Excluding 
the “do not know responses” from the sample, reduced the sample size significantly. 
Consequently, multiple paired t-tests to determine if the two most effective lobbying 
methods were considered significantly different than any other stage in terms of 
perceived effectiveness, as performed in Georgiou’s (2004) study, were not 
considered feasible for this study. 
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Statistical tests were performed to determine how the actual use of the lobbying 
methods influenced the respondents’ perceived effectiveness of the various lobbying 
methods. The perceived effectiveness results from table 4.7 were divided between 
users and non-users of the various lobbying methods. The appropriate statistical test 
to determine how the actual use of lobbying methods affected perceived 
effectiveness was an independent t-test. However, since the differences between the 
users and non-users were not normally distributed, non-parametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum tests were employed to confirm the results of the independent t-tests.  
The results from the Wilcoxon rank sum tests and independent t-tests are reported in 
table 4.8. The independent t-tests in table 4.8 report that six of the lobbying methods 
were considered significantly more effective by users than non-users at a 95% level 
of confidence. The p-value of the various lobbying methods calculated by the 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests confirmed the results of the independent t-test, 
demonstrating that in the case of six lobbying methods, users perceived the use of 
the lobbying methods to be significantly more effective than non-users did, at a 95% 
level of confidence.  
Also, the results reported in table 4.8 indicate that the mean effectiveness of all the 
stages was higher for users than for non-users, suggesting that lobbying experience 
increased the perception of the effectiveness of lobbying. The only exception was in 
the case of the lobbying method of having staff appointed as consultants to the IASB 
on particular projects; the mean effectiveness by non-users (mean effectiveness = 
3.294) was somewhat higher than the mean effectiveness by users (mean 
effectiveness = 3.000). 
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TABLE 4.8 – Comparison of the perceived effectiveness of users and non-users of lobbying methods 
 
 Lobbying method Users 
 
Non-users Independent t-test Wilcoxon rank 
sum test 
n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD t p Z p 
Submitting a comment letter to 
the IASB during the comment 
period 
8 3.750 0.294 14 3.214 0.223 -1.452 0.162 1.428 0.153 
Submitting a comment letter to 
SAICA during the comment 
period 
6 4.167 0.246 16 3.188 0.151 -3.392 0.003 2.818 0.005 
Speaking at the IASB’s public 
meetings 
4 4.000 0.371 17 3.177 0.180 -1.996 0.060 1.685 0.092 
Speaking at SAICA’s public 
meetings 
5 3.800 0.0352 16 3.250 0.197 -1.362 0.189 1.267 0.205 
Communicating your company’s 
views to the IASB’s members of 
staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings 
6 4.167 0.293 16 3.313 0.179 -2.490 0.022 2.348 0.019 
Communicating your company’s 
views to SAICA’s members of 
staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings 
6 4.167 0.252 15 3.200 0.159 -3.243 0.004 2.722 0.007 
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TABLE 4.8 – Comparison of the perceived effectiveness of users and non-users of lobbying methods (continued) 
 
 Lobbying method Users 
 
Non-users Independent t-test Wilcoxon rank 
sum test 
n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD t p Z p 
Communicating your company’s 
views to the IASB’s members of 
staff through other means (e.g. 
telephone conversations, meeting 
at conferences) 
5 4.000 0.290 16 3.000 0.162 -3008 0.007 2.445 0.015 
Communicating your company’s 
views to SAICA’s members of 
staff through other means (e.g. 
telephone conversations, meeting 
at conferences) 
8 3.875 0.203 14 3.143 0.153 -2.878 0.009 2.545 0.011 
Commenting in the media on a 
proposed accounting standard. 
1 3.000 0.924 18 2.833 0.218 0.176 0.863 
0.000 
 
1.000 
Appealing to the Financial 
Reporting Standards Council 
(FRSC) in South Africa for 
support of your company’s views 
1 4.000 0.0900 18 2.889 0.212 -1.201 0.246 1.298 0.194 
Appealing to your company’s 
external auditors for support of 
your company’s views. 
12 3.583 0.233 13 3.000 0.223 -1.809 0.084 2.252 0.024 
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to the 
IASB on particular projects. 
2 3.000 0.718 17 3.294 0.246 0.387 0.703 -0.284 0.776 
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to 
SAICA on particular projects. 
6 4.000 0.322 14 3.357 0.211 -1.669 0.112 1.479 0.139 
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   n = number of users or non-users 
SD = standard deviation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.8 – Comparison of the perceived effectiveness of users and non-users of lobbying methods (continued) 
 
 Lobbying method Users 
 
Non-users Independent t-test Wilcoxon rank 
sum test 
n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD n Mean  
effectiveness 
SD t p Z p 
Sponsoring research studies on 
financial accounting and reporting 
issues 
2 4.000 0.636 16 2.938 0.225 -1.575 0.135 1.135 0.256 
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4.6.2.4 Interpretation of statistics regarding the perceived effectiveness of the 
various lobbying methods 
Respondents indicated that the equally most effective lobbying methods were having 
staff appointed as consultants to SAICA on particular projects (mean effectiveness = 
3.55) and communicating with the IASB’s members of staff at pre-arranged private 
meetings (mean effectiveness = 3.55). The third most effective method was 
communicating with SAICA’s members of staff at pre-arranged private meetings. 
Thus, respondents rated informal lobbying methods, those methods that are 
employed outside of the due process, as the most effective form of lobbying. Also the 
fact that respondents considered meetings with the IASB and SAICA as some of the 
most effective lobbying methods revealed that the respondents shared Sutton’s 
(1984:90) view that of all the direct methods, a private meeting with the accounting 
standard-setter is the most effective lobbying method.  
Sutton (1984:66) predicted that comment letter submissions are not the most 
effective lobbying method and respondents supported this notion, as is indicated in 
the discussion above. One respondent advanced the following reason for rating the 
comment letter submission as an ineffective lobbying method: 
 
“It is often difficult to understand how the comments are taken into account and 
how some are ignored while others are accepted. Two recent examples – 
leases and the amendment to bearer plants in agriculture.” 
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4.7 SUMMARY  
This chapter described the findings and results of the testing of the four hypotheses. 
Statistical tests were employed to analyse the 36 usable responses to the 
questionnaire that was distributed to the JSE top 100 primary listed companies.  
Firstly, the type of statistical tests employed in this study was described. Following 
this discussion, the testing of the four hypotheses in conjunction with analysis of the 
findings and interpretation of the results, was performed. The statistical results from 
the hypothesis testing revealed the following about the sample South African 
companies in this study: 
 South African companies used the later stages of the accounting standard-setting 
process more for lobbying the IASB than the earlier stages; 
 South African companies did not generally perceive the effectiveness of the 
various stages to be significantly different; 
 the use of comment letter submissions by South African companies was 
significantly associated with the use of other lobbying methods;and 
 in general, South African companies did not perceive the effectiveness of the 
various lobbying methods to be significantly different, but they did consider some 
lobbying methods to be more effective than others. 
Contrary to the research hypothesis regarding the timing of lobbying, the later stages 
were more used by South African companies to lobby the IASB than the earlier 
stages. The low number of users of the earlier stages could be explained by the 
fewer documents (discussion papers) issued by the IASB during the earlier stages 
compared to the later stages. As a consequence, there were fewer opportunities for 
formal lobbying during the earlier stages compared to the later stages. In conclusion, 
even though South African companies perceived the two discussion paper stages as 
effective stages for lobbying, there was a limited number of discussion papers issued 
in which they could participate.  
Regarding the effectiveness of the various stages, the results showed that South 
African companies generally perceived the effectiveness of the various stages not to 
be significantly different. Still, the companies did rate the various stages differently in 
terms of effectiveness: Two of the three earlier stages were rated by respondents as 
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the most effective time for lobbying. Based on the mean effectiveness of the various 
stages, users considered all the stages of the accounting standard-setting process to 
be more effective than non-users of the stages did. 
South African companies used a variety of lobbying methods, which they rated 
differently in terms of perceived effectiveness. The findings from the use of lobbying 
methods supported the research hypothesis that the use of comment letter 
submissions is strongly associated with the use of other lobbying methods. In 
addition, the descriptive statistics showed that comment letter submissions were not 
the most popular lobbying methods employed by South African companies. 
In terms of the perceived effectiveness of the various lobbying methods, the findings 
supported the research hypothesis that lobbying methods other than comment letters 
are considered to be more effective than comment letter submissions. Notably, the 
results demonstrated that respondents perceived a private audience with the 
accounting standard-setter to be an effective lobbying method. 
Notably, the findings from the descriptive and inferential statistics in this chapter also 
supported many of the findings and conclusions of Georgiou’s (2004) survey-based 
research in the UK. The similarities between lobbying by South African companies 
examined in this study and the UK companies examined in Georgiou’s (2004) study 
are summarised below: 
 there is greater use by companies of the later stages of the accounting standard-
setting process compared to the earlier stages of the accounting standard-setting 
process; 
 the most used stage for lobbying is the exposure period of the exposure draft; 
 the least used stage for lobbying is the agenda formation stage;  
 a strong association exists between the use of comment letter submissions and 
other lobbying methods; 
 the most used lobbying method is appealing to the company’s auditors for support 
of its views; 
 the two most effective lobbying methods are communicating with the accounting 
standard-setter at pre-arranged private meetings and having staff of the company 
appointed as consultants to projects of the accounting standard-setter; 
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 users of the stages of the accounting standard-setter for lobbying perceived 
lobbying during the stages to be more effective than non-users did; and 
 users of the various lobbying methods perceived the various lobbying methods to 
be more effective than non-users did. 
The difference between this study’s findings and those of Georgiou (2004) resulted 
from the perceived effectiveness ratings awarded to the various stages. 
The findings from this study and those of Georgiou (2004) lend strong support for 
Sutton’s (1984) predictions regarding lobbying that are based on the rational choice 
theory. In the next chapter, the findings of this study supporting Sutton’s predictions 
are summarised.  
In conclusion, it is evident that South African companies lobby the IASB during 
various stages of the accounting standard-setting process, and these companies 
employ different lobbying methods.  Yet not all respondents to the questionnaire 
participated in lobbying of the IASB. Wingard et al (2016:143) provide the following 
reason for the low participation in lobbying of the IASB: 
“The actions of the IASB of kowtowing to powerful interests can cause other 
affected parties to stay away from standard-setting activities if they believe that 
they have no real prospect of influencing the content of standards.” 
 
The next chapter also presents a summary of the results of the testing of the 
hypotheses, draws conclusions on the outcome of the study, highlights the 
contributions of the work and makes suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter summarises the findings of the empirical investigation and draws 
conclusions on the corporate lobbying of the accounting standard-setter by South 
African companies. It specifically presents the findings that supported the predictions 
made by Sutton (1984) regarding lobbying of the accounting standard-setter. 
Before proceeding with the summary of the findings and the discussion of the 
applicability of Sutton’s predictions to the South African context, the chapter 
commences with a summary of the research study. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The lobbying attempts by South African companies during the accounting standard-
setting process are uncertain because of the paucity of empirical research available 
in this regard. The reason this study was conducted was to empirically investigate the 
timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying the IASB by South African 
companies. The research objectives were stated in chapter 1 (refer to 1.4) as: 
 to critically analyse the extant literature on accounting lobbying behaviour from 
which hypotheses are formulated; 
 to empirically test the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying of 
the accounting standard-setting process through a questionnaire instrument 
distributed to a sample of South African listed companies; and 
 based on the findings of the empirical investigation, to determine the applicability 
of Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory in the South African 
context. 
 
The critical analysis of the extant literature demonstrated that the theoretical model of 
Sutton (1984) on lobbying of the accounting standard-setter, which is based on the 
rational choice theory, is central to this study. Sutton (1984) used this theory to 
explain when and how companies lobby the accounting standard-setter. 
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From the literature review it was also determined that Georgiou’s (2004) research in 
the UK, strongly supports Sutton’s (1984) prediction that companies employ various 
lobbying methods ranging from formal methods allowed by the due process and 
informal lobbying methods that are more disguised in nature. According to Sutton 
(1984), lobbyists tend to select those lobbying methods that are the most effective 
(P) per unit of cost (C) in influencing the accounting standard-setter. The above 
assumption is based on the rational choice theory. From this perspective, Sutton 
(1984) predicts that the most used lobbying methods include indirect lobbying 
methods, such as using a third party to present the lobbyist’s views. Regarding the 
timing of lobbying, Sutton (1984) predicts that lobbying during the earlier stages is 
more effective and less costly than lobbying at later stages in the accounting 
standard-setting process. 
 
Both the seminal work of Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2004) served as a platform on 
which the hypotheses and questionnaire instrument for this study were developed. 
The study included the following four null hypotheses based on the predictions of 
Sutton (1984) and the empirical research of Georgiou (2004): 
 
H01: There is no significant difference between the use of the earlier stages and the 
later stages of the accounting standard-setting process to lobby the IASB. 
 
H02: Companies perceive lobbying during all the stages of the accounting standard-
setting process as equally effective. 
 
H03: The use of comment letter submissions is not significantly associated with the 
use of other lobbying methods. 
 
H04: Companies perceive all lobbying methods to be equally effective. 
 
In order to test the four hypotheses above, data was obtained from South African 
companies through a questionnaire instrument. The questionnaire was based on the 
questionnaire used by Georgiou (2004) in his UK study on corporate lobbying of the 
ASB. The questionnaire in this study was distributed to the top 100 JSE primary 
144 
 
listed companies in order to collect primary data on the timing, methods and 
perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies during the IASB’s 
accounting standard-setting process. The online questionnaire was administered by 
the researcher using LimeSurvey software.  
 
The data collected from the questionnaire instrument was reported in chapter 4. The 
data in chapter 4 was statistically analysed, the hypotheses were tested and the 
findings were discussed. It is clear from the findings that South African companies 
use various lobbying methods and lobby during different stages of the accounting 
standard-setting process. 
 
The next section provides a summary of the findings and concludes on the 
applicability of Sutton’s predictions to lobbying in the South African context. 
5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The second objective of the research was to empirically test the timing, methods and 
perceived effectiveness of lobbying of the accounting standard-setting process 
through a questionnaire instrument distributed to a sample of South African listed 
companies.  The empirical investigation established the following factors regarding 
the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying of the accounting 
standard-setter by South African companies: 
5.3.1 Timing of lobbying 
It was observed from the data collected from the question regarding the use of the 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process to lobby, that the later stages were 
used more for lobbying than the earlier stages of the due process of the IASB. The 
South African companies mostly used the exposure period of the exposure draft to 
lobby the IASB. 
 
Regarding the perceived effectiveness of lobbying during the various stages of the 
accounting standard-setting process, the findings indicated that South African 
companies generally did not perceive the effectiveness of the various stages to be 
significantly different. However, the descriptive statistics of the data obtained from the 
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question regarding the perceived effectiveness of the various stages, indicated that 
South African companies did consider certain stages to be more effective than others 
to influence a proposed accounting standard. South African companies perceived 
two of the earlier stages as the most effective stages for lobbying the IASB, namely 
the exposure period and drafting period of the discussion paper.  
 
Further analysis and comparisons of the results of the questions related to the use of 
the various stages and the perceived effectiveness of the stages, revealed that users 
perceived lobbying during the various stages of the accounting standard-setting 
process to be more effective than non-users did. This finding suggests that lobbying 
experience increases the perception of the effectiveness of lobbying. 
5.3.2 Methods of lobbying 
The data collected from the question regarding the use of lobbying methods 
illustrated that South African companies use a variety of lobbying methods to 
influence the outcome of the IASB’s accounting standard-setting process.  
 
The results from the question regarding the use of lobbying methods, revealed the 
following: 
 comment letter submissions are not the most attractive form of lobbying;  
 the use of appeals to the company’s auditors for support of their views was the 
most used lobbying method; and 
 the use of comment letter submissions by a lobbyist is strongly associated with 
the use of other lobbying methods. Therefore, even though comment letter 
submissions are not the most popular lobbying method, they are still a good proxy 
for the use of other lobbying methods. In other words, comment letter 
submissions are rarely used on their own. Companies submitting a comment 
letter to the IASB and/or SAICA are likely to have employed other lobbying 
methods to influence the accounting standard-setting process. 
The empirical evidence also revealed that South African companies rate the various 
lobbying methods differently in terms of effectiveness. Of all the lobbying methods, 
respondents perceived those lobbying methods seeking a private audience with the 
accounting standard-setter as some of the most effective. Respondents also 
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perceived as effective a more long-term lobbying strategy, such as having staff of a 
company appointed as consultants to SAICA projects.  
 
The results from the effectiveness of lobbying methods suggested that users of 
lobbying methods perceived the various lobbying methods to be more effective than 
non-users did.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
According to Sutton (1984:93), a rational individual only lobbies an accounting 
standard-setter by considering the probability of affecting the outcome, the potential 
benefits of succeeding with its lobbying and the costs of his or her lobbying efforts. 
The above is established under the rational choice theory, and from this perspective, 
Sutton (1984) predicts the timing and methods of lobbying the accounting standard-
setter. 
The third objective of the research was to determine the applicability of Sutton’s 
predictions based on the rational choice theory in the South African context. 
 The findings from the hypotheses testing and the descriptive statistics of the 
empirical evidence from the questionnaire provided support for Sutton’s (1984) 
predictions (with an exception mentioned in section 5.4.1 below). The applicability of 
Sutton’s (1984) predictions in the South African context is discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 Timing of lobbying 
Sutton (1984) predicts that lobbying during the earlier stages, such as the agenda-
setting stage, is more effective and less costly than lobbying at a later stages of the 
accounting standard-setting process (Sutton, 1984:88). However, contrary to  
Sutton’s (1984) predictions, the results showed that South African companies use the 
later stages more than earlier stages of the accounting standard-setting process to 
lobby. This result contradicted the research hypothesis of this study, based on 
Sutton’s (1984) prediction, that the earlier stages are used more for lobbying than the 
later stages of the accounting standard-setting process. However, it is suggested by 
the researcher and Georgiou (2010) that this contradiction of Sutton’s (1984) 
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prediction regarding the timing of lobbying is likely a consequence of the fewer 
opportunities awarded for formal lobbying during earlier stages compared to the later 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process. The discussion paper stages are 
not compulsory stages of the due process, leaving only the agenda formation stage 
for lobbying during the earlier stages. In situations where accounting standard are 
proposed, where no discussion papers are issued, the use of the earlier stages for 
lobbying compared to the use of the later stages for lobbying is expected to be low.  
 
Regarding the effectiveness of the various stages for lobbying, South African 
companies view earlier lobbying as more effective than belated lobbying, thereby 
sharing Sutton’s (1984) view that the earlier stages are more effective for lobbying 
the accounting standard-setter than the later stages. Since the low use of the earlier 
stages for lobbying does not correspond with the high effectiveness ratings awarded 
to two of the earlier stages, it is suggested that the low use of the earlier stages for 
lobbying may be ascribed to the limited number of discussion papers available for 
participation. Hence rejecting Sutton’s (1984) hypothesis regarding the timing of 
lobbying would not be judicious. Instead, it is proposed that further research on the 
timing of lobbying be conducted to establish the use of the earlier stages compared 
to the later stages of the due process of the IASB.  
For the purposes of comparing lobbying during the earlier stages to the later stages, 
the researcher recommends conducting a study that would include the counting of 
comment letters submitted during the exposure period of discussion papers and the 
exposure period of the exposure drafts of multiple proposed accounting standards 
issued by the IASB. Through such an investigation one would be able to determine, 
at the minimum, if the formal participation during the earlier stages exceeds the 
formal participation during the later stages of the due process of the IASB.  
5.4.2 Methods of lobbying 
The results of the questionnaire regarding the use of the various lobbying methods 
supported Sutton’s (1984) view that lobbyists prefer indirect lobbying methods. The 
results of this study revealed that South African companies relied heavily on their 
auditors to support and defend their views on accounting issues with the IASB. This 
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lobbying method is an indirect lobbying attempt to influence the accounting standard-
setting process. As Sutton (1984) predicted, companies preferred indirect lobbying 
methods above direct lobbying methods.  
 
Sutton (1984) also predicted that if lobbyists employ direct lobbying methods, they 
prefer direct lobbying methods that include a private audience with the accounting 
standard-setter. South African companies did communicate their views directly to the 
IASB and SAICA through other means (e.g. telephone conversations) but did not use 
this lobbying method more than other direct lobbying methods. Yet, regarding the 
perceived effectiveness of seeking a private audience with the accounting standard-
setter, South African companies agreed with Sutton (1984) that a lobbying method 
that seeks a private audience with the accounting standard-setter is the most 
effective direct lobbying method.  
 
The above findings regarding the preferred lobbying methods employed by South 
African companies, illustrated that South African companies perceive lobbying 
methods, outside of the formal due process of the IASB, to be effective in influencing 
the outcome of proposed accounting standards. Lobbying methods outside of the 
formal due process of the IASB are generally unobservable to the public. However, 
this is exactly the reason why they are considered to be so effective in influencing the 
outcome of proposed accounting standards. In the words of Sutton (1984:86):  
 
“…the effectiveness of lobbying (its effect on P), is likely to vary inversely with 
its visibility”.  
 
In conclusion, empirical evidence of the study supported most of Sutton’s (1984) 
predictions, which are based on the rational choice theory. The aim of this study was 
not to prove the correctness of the rational choice theory, since this has already been 
established in other studies in the political, economic and social sciences (see 
section 2.2.2.3). The findings from this empirical investigation merely provided 
evidence in a South African context of the accuracy of Sutton’s predictions regarding 
the timing and methods of lobbying that are based on the rational choice theory.  
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The general applicability of the findings is subject to the following limitations of this 
study: 
 the sample of the empirical study was not randomly selected but deliberately 
chosen as the top 100 JSE primary listed companies. The results might not 
necessarily guarantee representativeness of all South African companies; and 
 the low response rate from the questionnaire instrument might affect the general 
applicability of the empirical findings.  
 
5.5 CONTRIBUTION 
Apart from the limitations mentioned above, this empirical study should make a 
significant contribution to the accounting literature in respect of an understanding of 
corporate lobbying attempts by South African companies during the accounting 
standard-setting process of the IASB. To date there is hardly any academic literature 
available on the participation of South African companies in the accounting standard-
setting process of the IASB. Gloeck (2003) previously attempted to investigate South 
Africa’s participation in the accounting standard-setting process of SAICA but was 
obstructed in his research by the limited public evidence available on South African 
companies’ participation in the process. This study overcame the challenge faced by 
Gloeck (2003) by using a questionnaire instrument to collect evidence of South 
African companies’ participation in lobbying the accounting standard-setter. In this 
manner it was possible to collect evidence of corporate lobbying of the IASB and 
SAICA by South African companies that is not available in the public domain. 
This empirical investigation also lent support to the findings and suggestions of 
Sutton (1984), Georgiou (2004) and Gloeck (2003) that a number of lobbyists prefer 
using lobbying methods for which there is inadequate public evidence. 
 
In addition, this study was also the first study to empirically investigate the 
applicability of Sutton’s predictions based on the rational choice theory in the South 
African context. 
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5.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Owing to limited academic literature available on the lobbying of the IASB by South 
African stakeholders, further research avenues in this regard are abundant. For 
instance, the researcher recommends replicating this study in respect of users of 
financial statements in South Africa. Such a study could also employ Sutton’s (1984) 
theoretical model to determine its applicability to users of financial statements in 
South Africa. A sample for such a study could be selected from the investment firms 
in South Africa. A similar study of user participation was conducted  
by Georgiou (2010) in the UK context, and could therefore serve as a reference and 
model for a similar study in South Africa.  
Another interesting topic for future research would be the exmination of the lobbying 
of the FRSC since lobbying of a national regulatory body such as the FRSC may be 
unlike lobbying of a private body such as SAICA and the IASB. 
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Appendix A – Questionnaire 
PARTICIPATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES IN THE ACCOUNTING 
STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS 
 
Good day sir/madam 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) accounting standard-setting 
process consists of a number of stages before a proposed accounting standard is 
issued as a final IFRS. Throughout this process, the IASB encourages companies to 
participate in its accounting standard-setting process. South African companies have 
the opportunity to raise their views on a proposed accounting standard or 
amendment directly with the IASB (e.g. by writing a comment letter to the IASB).  
 
In addition, South African companies can also indirectly participate in the IASB’s 
process through communicating their views on a proposed accounting standard to 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) (e.g. by writing a 
comment letter to SAICA or attending a SAICA meeting). In such cases, SAICA, in 
cooperation with the Accounting Practices Committee (APC), submits a comment 
letter to the IASB on behalf of South African companies, thereby presenting the most 
dominant concerns of South African companies on a proposed accounting standard 
or amendment. Some companies prefer to discuss their concerns on a proposed 
accounting standard with their auditors, who in turn communicate these concerns to 
SAICA or the IASB. 
 
This survey is about your company’s participation in the accounting standard-setting 
process of the IASB since 2005 to the current year. Please click on "Next" to proceed 
to the survey. 
 
There are eight questions in this survey. 
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section relates to background information. Although we are aware of the 
sensitivity of the questions in this section, the information will allow us to draw 
comparisons in the group of respondents. Once again we assure you that your 
response will remain confidential. 
 
1. Kindly indicate your gender: 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Female 
 Male 
 
2. Are you a Chartered Accountant (SA)? * 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
3. Please indicate your number of years of accounting related work experience. * 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 0-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-20 years 
 21-30 years 
 31 years and above 
 
4. Which one of the following most closely matches your job title? * 
 
Please choose only one of the following: 
 President or CEO 
 C level executive (for instance CFO) 
 Senior Vice President 
 Vice President 
 Director 
 Senior Manager 
 Manager 
 Supervisor 
 Associate 
 Intern 
 Entry Level 
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SECTION 2: PARTICIPATING DURING THE STAGES OF THE ACCOUNTING 
STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS 
 
This section relates to the stages at which your company participates in the IASB’s 
accounting standard-setting process. For each of the following stages of the IASB's 
process, please indicate:  
 Whether your company participated during the accounting standard-setting 
stages of the IASB by clicking Yes or No; and 
 Regardless of whether your company actually participated during these stages, 
how you rate participation at each stage in terms of effectiveness (i.e. having an 
effect on the final outcome of an accounting standard) 
 
5. Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
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Stages of the standard-setting 
process 
Actual use Effectiveness scale 
Yes No Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don’t 
know 
Agenda formation stage         
Drafting stage of discussion paper         
Exposure period of discussion 
paper 
        
Drafting stage of exposure draft         
Exposure period of exposure draft         
Drafting stage of the IFRS         
Post-implementation review of the 
final IFRS 
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SECTION 3: METHODS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ACCOUNTING STANDARD-
SETTING PROCESS 
 
This section relates to the methods used by your company to participate in the 
IASB’s process of accounting standard-setting. For each of the following methods of 
participating in the accounting standard-setting process of the IASB, please indicate 
the following: 
 Whether your company used these methods by clicking Yes or No; and 
 Regardless of whether your company actually used these methods, how you rate 
these methods in terms of effectiveness (i.e. having an effect on the final outcome 
of an accounting standard). 
 
6. Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
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Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale 
 Yes No Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don’t 
know 
Submitting a comment letter to the 
IASB during the comment period 
        
Submitting a comment letter to 
SAICA during the comment period 
        
Speaking at the IASB’s public 
meetings 
        
Speaking at SAICA’s public meetings 
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Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale 
 Yes No Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don’t 
know 
Communicating your company’s 
views to the IASB’s member of staff 
at pre-arranged private meetings. 
        
Communicating your company’s 
views to SAICA’s member of staff at 
prearranged private meetings. 
        
Communicating your company’s 
views to the IASB’s members of staff 
through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at 
conferences). 
        
Communicating your company’s 
views to SAICA’s members of staff 
through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversations, meeting at 
conferences). 
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Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale 
 Yes No Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don’t 
know 
Commenting in the media on a 
proposed accounting standard 
        
Appealing to Financial Reporting 
Standards Council (FRSC) in South 
Africa for support of your company’s 
views 
        
Appealing to your company’s 
external auditors for support of your 
company’s views 
        
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to the IASB 
on particular projects 
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Method of participation Actual use Effectiveness scale 
 Yes No Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don’t 
know 
Having staff of your company 
appointed as consultants to SAICA 
on particular projects 
        
Sponsoring research studies on 
financial accounting and reporting 
issues 
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7. Other participation methods not mentioned above (please specify) 
 
Please write your answer here: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION 4: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
8. If you have additional comments please make use of the space provided below. 
 
Please write your answer here: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B – Covering letter (email) 
Invitation to participate 
Dear sir/madam 
I am undertaking a research project to determine the participation of South 
African companies in the accounting standard-setting process of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is responsible for the 
development and issue of accounting standards.  
The outcome of this survey will be used in my dissertation for a Master's 
degree. Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your 
participation is entirely voluntarily. Information provided by you 
remains confidential and will be reported in summary format only. 
This survey consists out of four sections and should take no longer than six 
minutes of your time. Please click here to complete the 
survey: {SURVEYURL}. 
Should you have any queries or comments regarding this survey, you are 
welcome to contact me at 012 429 3560 or at gbooyf@unisa.ac.za. 
Thank you in advance for your valuable time and input. 
Regards 
Felicia Gaie-Booysen CA(SA) 
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Financial Governance 
College of Accounting Sciences 
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Appendix C – Georgiou’s (2004) questionnaire 
The ASB standard setting process includes a number of stages through which a 
proposal passes before it is adopted as a financial reporting standard (e.g. an issue 
has to be first admitted on the ASB’s agenda). A company may participate in the 
process in a variety of ways (e.g. directly by communicating its views to the ASB, or 
indirectly by communicating its views to other parties, such as its external auditors or 
the Financial Reporting Council [FRC]). 
 
Questions 1 and 2 relate to the stages at which, and the methods by which a 
company may participate in the ASB standard setting process. As appropriate, 
please tick Yes or No, and then tick the number on the effectiveness scale which 
best represents your opinion. Use the scale: 
1 = Very effective 2 = Effective 3 = Neither effective nor ineffective 4 = Ineffective 
5 = Very ineffective DK = Don’t know 
 
1. For each of the following stages of the ASB standard setting process, please 
indicate: 
(i) whether your company has participated at these stages over the period 1991 to 
1996 inclusive; and 
(ii) regardless of whether your company has actually participated at these stages, 
how you rate participation at each stage in terms of effectiveness (i.e., having an 
effect on the final outcome of the process). 
 
Stage of the standard-setting process Actual use 
Yes    No 
Effectiveness scale 
1      2       3       4      5   
 
DK 
Agenda formation stage 
Drafting stage of Discussion Paper 
Exposure period of Discussion Paper 
Drafting stage of Exposure Draft 
Exposure period of Exposure Draft 
Drafting stage of Financial Reporting Standard 
   
 
 
2. For each of the following methods of participating in the ASB standard setting 
process, please indicate:  
(i) whether your company has used these methods over the period 1991 to 1996 
inclusive; and 
(ii) regardless of whether your company has actually used these methods, how you 
rate each method in terms of effectiveness (i.e., having an effect on the final outcome 
of the process)? 
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Method of participation Actual use 
Yes     No 
Effectiveness scale 
1       2       3       4      5   
 
DK 
Submitting comment letters in response to ASB’s 
invitations to comment 
 
Speaking at ASB public hearings 
 
Communicating your company’s views to ASB 
members in prearranged private meetings 
 
Communicating your company’s views to ASB 
members through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversation, meeting at conferences) 
 
Communicating your company’s views to ASB 
staff in prearranged private meetings 
 
Communicating your company’s views to ASB 
staff through other means (e.g. telephone 
conversation, meeting at conferences) 
 
Commenting in the media 
 
Appealing to FRC members for support of your 
company’s views 
 
Appealing to your company’s external auditors for 
support of your company’s views 
 
Appealing to your company’s trade 
organization(s) for support of your company’s 
views 
 
Having members of your company appointed as 
consultants to the ASB on particular projects 
 
Sponsoring research studies on financial 
accounting and reporting issues 
 
Other (please specify) 
   
 
 
 
3. If you have any additional comments to make please use the space provided 
below. 
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Appendix D – Ethics clearance certificate 
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